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1

I'd like to refer your attention to Exhibit AF, please.

Q.

2

Is that your letter of January 3, 2007, to attorney

2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Patrick Moran, attorney for your brother Reed?

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15

A.

Yes, it is.
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit the exhibit,

Exhibit AF.
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.
THE COURT: Exhibit AF is admitted.
(Thereupon, Exhibit AF was admitted into

10
11

evidence.)
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
And in the letter you refer to negotiations with

Q.

Mr. Reed Taylor?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you indicate that --

16

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, the record -- the

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

17
18
19

letter speaks for itself, your Honor.

20

counsel, your Honor, what question I was going to ask because I

20

21

don't think the question is objectionable.

21

THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. CRESSMAN: Okay. Well, I'd like to ask

22
23
24

25

So it was you that -- it was Reed Taylor that wanted to

negotiate, not yourself?
A.

I think I have stated that frequently today, yes.

Q.

Okay. So it's your testimony that you were not a

moving party in terms of attempting to negotiate with your
brother?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, moving party is vague
and ambiguous.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. CRESSMAN: Is it -- I'll rephrase.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Is it your testimony, Mr. Taylor, that you were not the

instigating individual with regard to negotiations with your
brother over restructuring his indebtedness?
A.

From March of 2003, no, I was fine.

Q.

From March of 2003 -- I didn't hear you?

A.

I did not initiate any of the restructuring.

Q.

Okay. So if the documents state otherwise, they would

be in error?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, argumentative. Doesn't
identify the documents.

22

THE COURT: Go ahead with your question,

23

Mr. Cressman. Ask the question.

24

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
In your letter, Mr. Taylor, the last sentence states,

Q.

Q.

25

THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Now, I'd like to refer you to Exhibit AG, please, and I

will tell you that your brother did not keep a conformed copy

103

101

of this document, but it is the notice of special meeting of

Mr. Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate including

1
2

calling a special shareholder's meeting. And my question to

3

those pieces of correspondence. And my question to you is did

you is --

4
5

you receive a document that is identical to this but signed by

if the negotiations eventually fail, I fully recognize that

2
3
4
5

MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm going to object if counsel is

shareholders that your office responded to, and we will get to

your brother and dated?

6

making an argument in the middle of the examination, I would

6

A.

7
8
9

object to that.

7
8
9

Q.

Scheduling a shareholder's meeting for February 5?

A.

That's what it says.

10

THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead, Mr. Cressman.
MR. CRESSMAN: Let me start again because I think

10

this is a completely proper question.

I believe I did, yes.

MR. CRESSMAN: We'd move for the admission of
ExhibitAG.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

calling a special shareholder's meeting." And my question,

19
20

sir, is if you and Mr. Taylor had an arrangement such that his

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

note was not in default, why was it necessary to negotiate with

20

speaks for itself and I can read.

21

him or his counselor persons on his behalf in 2007 or 2006?
Well, I did so because of my long term personal

21
22

eVidence.)

relationship and respect for my brother. If he wants to

23

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

22
23

MR. MCNICHOLS: I think it's an improper question.
THE COURT: Stop it, stop it. Ask the question,
Mr. Cressman.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Mr. Taylor, the last sentence of your letter Exhibit AF

states, "If the negotiations eventually fail, I fully recognize
that Mr. Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate including

A.

24

negotiate the speeding up the payments of his note, of course

24

25

I'll talk to him about that.

25

MR. MCNICHOLS: I guess I'm a little concerned,
your Honor, that not scheduling, scheduling could be a word of
art. I would agree that it says "demanding."
MR. CRESSMAN: I'll accept -- Counsel can mOdify
my question so he can insert the word "demand."
MR. MCNICHOLS: I modified the question so that it
comports with the words of the exhibit to which I do not
object.
THE COURT: Exhibit AG is admitted. And it also

(Thereupon, Exhibit AG was admitted into

Q.

NOW, I'd like you to take a look at Exhibit H, please.
MR. MCNICHOLS: H or AH?
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1

2
3

1
2
3

MR. CRESSMAN: H.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:

4

Is that letter your company's response to the notice of

Q.

5

special shareholder's meeting received exhibit -- the previous

6

exhibit we discussed?

7

A.

Yes.

8
9

Q.

And did you approve this -- we'd move for the admission

of Exhibit H, your Honor.

10
11
12
13
14

5
6
7
8
9

Q.

And did Mr. Quarles prepare ExhibH: H, Mr. Taylor?

A.

I think I said I don't know.

Q.

And did I understand you correctly that you did not

review the letter before it went out?
A.

I don't think I did.

Q.

Did Miss Duclos operate on her own with regard to this

particular response?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance.

MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.

10

THE COURT: Exhibit H is admitted.

11

objection.

(Thereupon, Exhibit H was admitted into evidence.)

12

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

13
14

authorized this letter to go out?

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

15
16
17
18

4

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

Q.

Did you prepare this letter?

A.

I did not.

Q.

Did you review it before it went out?

A.

I don't think so.

Q.

Did a lawyer prepare it?

15
16
17
18

19

A.

I don't know.

19

20
21
22
23

Q.

Do you recognize the legend in the lower left-hand

A.

No.

Q.

Is there a James Gatziolis that's worked for you as a

20
21
22
23
25

corner?

24

lawyer?

25

A.

James Gatziolis is an attorney for Crop USA, yes.

Q.

And is his firm -- what is the name of his firm in

24

THE COURT: I'm going to sustain that relevance

Q.

Who was the -- who was the person in authority that

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, argumentative. Assumes
something other than Miss Duclos.
THE COURT: Overruled, Mr. Taylor, you can answer
that.
A.

What was the question?
MR. CRESSMAN: Could you read the question back

for the witness, please.
(Thereupon, the requested question was read back
by the court reporter.)
A.

JoLee Duclos.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

105

2

Chicago? Quarles and Brady?

3

A.

That's it.

4
5

Q.

LlP?

A.

Yes, Quarles and Brady.

6

Q. . And he works for Crop USA?

7

A.

Yes.

8
9

Q.

Has he been assisting you in responding to the

correspondence from your brother and your brother's attorney?

10
11

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance and about to
invade the attorney-client privilege.

12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23

. MR. CRESSMAN: I haven't.
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to let him answer that
question, and I'm going to overrule your objection for that

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10

MR. MCNICHOLS: Move to strike on the grounds that
the question asks for irrelevant information.
THE COURT: Overruled, I'm going to let that
answer stand.

I don't know.

You don't know whether you did or not?

A.

(Witness shakes head.)

Q.

Do you know that that section provides that holders of

MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm going to object on the grounds

is pretty clearly, I think, a question of law.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

THE COURT: Well, his knowledge isn't, overruled.
A.

What was the question? Excuse me.
MR. CRESSMAN: I'll restate the question.

20
21
22
23

meeting, signed, date and deliver the corporation one or more

24

demands for the meeting describing the purpose or purposes for

25

which it is to be held?

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND
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A.
Q.

that it asks the witness about his knowledge of a statute which

19
MR. CRESSMAN: The answer was yes for the record.

notice as provided in IC 30-1-02" referring to the notice
that's Exhibit G. Did you look at that statutory section, sir?

meeting?

Yes.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, irrelevant.

oh, about half way through it says, "Attached hereto is the

13
14

A.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

letter to you of December 12th, and look at the second page of
the letter. And in there in the paragraph that's numbered 2,

20 percent of the votes of the stock may call a special

Has he been paid by Crop USA to do so?

Yes, he has.

Let me ask you to go back to Exhibit F, Mr. Moran's

12

Q.

A.

Q.

11

15
16
17
18

question, Mr. McNichols. You can answer that, Mr. Taylor.

24

25

107

1
2

Page 104 to 107 of 211

Q.

Did you know, sir, that that statute authorized the

holders of at least 20 percent of all the votes entitled to be
cast on any issue proposed to be conSidered at the proposed

957

110

108

1

2

A.

No.

Q.

Had you known that, would that have made a difference

3

to you in terms of allowing your brother to call the special

4
5

shareholders meeting.

6

speculation.

7
8
9

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1
2
3
4
5

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance and

6

7
8

THE COURT: Sustained.

Insurance, Inc., correct?
A.

Uh-huh, yes.

Q.

And as a person in such authority, did you have

occasion to review Exhibit I?
A.

I have seen Exhibit I, yes.

Q.

And did you consider when you reviewed Exhibit I that

it was responsive to Miss Duclos' request in Exhibit H that
your brother provide evidence of his authority for his

9
10

propOSition?

your brother, Exhibit I, did you review -- excuse me, Exhibit
H, did you review a copy of it, Exhibit H?

11

witness' consideration of whether Exhibit I is responsive to

12

Exhibit H is irrelevant.

Q.

Shortly after Miss Duclos transmitted her letter to

A.

I can't say that I did.

Q.

Take a look at Exhibit

r. Is that a letter that your

company received dated February 1, 2007, from your brother?
A.

I think so.
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit Exhibit I.
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.
THE COURT: Exhibit I is admitted.
(Thereupon, Exhibit I is admitted into evidence.)

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

And, Mr. Taylor, did you -- in Miss Duclos' letter

Exhibit H, she asks your brother to provide evidence of his
authority for calling the meeting. Did you consider his letter
Exhibit I to be providing that evidence of authority?
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm going to object to the

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, the relevance of this

THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. CRESSMAN: You may answer.
A.

I really have no weight to this letter because this

just repeats all the other allegations that you are making and
he has no right to call a board meeting.
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to strike as nonresponsive.
THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Taylor, the question
was whether you considered it a response to Miss Duclos' letter

21

to set forth the basis for his claim.

22
23
24

meeting, the second -- last sentence of the -- second to the

MR. CRESSMAN: Authority to call the special

last paragraph.

25

THE COURT: Did you consider that letter

111

109

1

question, your Honor. I think it's quite ambiguous, it asks

2

whether he thought the letter was providing that authority, and

3

I guess it's -- first of all it's subjective, but it's

4
5

about, Mr. Reed Taylor's or his own.

impossible to tell whose subjective mind he's being asked

6

7
8
9
10

THE COURT: Yeah, could you -- I'm going to
sustain that objection, Mr. Cressman. If you want to go back
-- if you want to try to do that again, go ahead.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Insurance, correct, sir?

14
15

board members in your mind other than yourself?

16

mind" mean?

17
18
19
20

10

Alright. You are the President and CEO of AlA

11
12
13

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
11

responsive?
A.

No, I did not.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
In what way did you not consider your brother's letter

Q.

responsive?
A.

Because it's all based upon a default.

Q.

That's the only reason you found it was not responsive

that in your mind there was not a default.
A.

Yeah.

Q.

In other words, if there had been a default, your

brother would have had a right to call the special meeting?

A.

Uh-huh, yes.

12

A.

No, I don't think that's true.

Q.

You are also -- presently right now are there any other

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Q.

Why do you disagree with that statement by me?

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection. What does "in your

MR. CRESSMAN: Well, it's our position that the
only board member now is Mr. Reed Taylor. I assume that
Mr. John Taylor may have a different view. That's why I asked
the question that way trying to be completely accurate.

21

Let me go back. I'll start again.

THE COURT: I agree. I think we have crossed over
into that inclusive area, Mr. Cressman. I'm going to sustain
that objection.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:

That is your brother's letter of February 2, 2007, to the Board

Board received.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

24

me, the Chief Executive Officer and President of AlA Insurance

24

25

in February of 2007, you were also Chairman of the Board of AlA

25

In addition to being the sole shareholder -- or excuse

witness.

21
22
23

22
23

Q.

MR. MCNICHOLS: Your Honor, I'm going to object.
These are questions of law again, not questions of fact for the

Q.

Let me ask you to take a look at Exhibit J please.

of Directors of AlA Insurance, Inc. Is that a letter that the

A.

Yes.
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112

1

MR. CRESSMAN: Move for the admission of

2

2

Exhibit J.

3
4

THE COURT: Exhibit] is admitted.

5

(Thereupon, Exhibit J was admitted into evidence.)

6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20

MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Has an annual meeting of AlA Insurance been taken this

year?
A.

No.

Q.

And held?

A.

No.

Q.

When was the last annual meeting held for AlA

Insurance?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer that,
Mr. Taylor.
A.

I don't know that.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Was there a meeting held in 2006?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, asked and answered.

21

22
23
24
25

THE COURT: Overruled.
A.

Q.

Was a meeting held in 2005?
Don't know that.

Q.

Do you know why a meeting was not held in 2006.

18
19
20
21
22

I don't think so.

23
24
25

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

A.

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Q.

Let's keep going in order. Exhibit M, Mr. Taylor,

those are bylaws of -A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

AlA, the company now known as AlA Insurance, Inc?

A.

Yes.
MR. CRESSMAN: Move for the admission of

exhibits -- Exhibit M.
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: Exhibit M is admitted.
(Thereupon, Exhibit M was admitted into evidence.)
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Exhibit N, is that a letter dated February 25, 2007,

from your brother to your attorney which you also saw a copy on
February 25, 20077
A.

Yes.
MR. CRESSMAN: Move for the admission of

Exhibit N.
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.
THE COURT: Exhibit N's admitted.
(Thereupon, Exhibit N was admitted into evidence.)
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Exhibit P, is that the lease signed by you on behalf of

AlA Insurance dated December 3D, 1993, for the premises it
continues to occupy today?
A.

Yes.

113

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A.

No.

Q.

When is the annual meeting scheduled for 20077

A.

I don't know what date it is. May, I believe, usually

May.
Q.

Now, I'd like you to take a look at Exhibits K and L

being consents in lieu of special meeting of shareholders of
AlA Insurance signed by your brother February 22, and a consent
in lieu of meeting of the board of directors of AlA Insurance
signed the same date by your brother. And those have been
presented to you; correct?
A.

They have been.

Q.

Yes?

A.

Yes, they were presented to me.

Q.

And you saw them on February 25; correct?

A.

Is that Sunday?

Q.

Yes.

A.

That's when I would have seen them.
MR. CRESSMAN: Move for the admissions of Exhibits

K and L.

MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.
THE COURT: Exhibit K and L are admitted.
(Thereupon, Exhibit K & L were admitted into
evidence.)
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
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MR. CRESSMAN: Move for the admission of
Exhibit P.
MR. MCNICHOLS: I guess -- may I ask a qUestion in
aid of what I'm doing because I don't know, your Honor. And I
guess, Mr. Taylor, has this lease been modified in any way
since it was originally signed?
A.

I don't think it has. AlA is master lessee of the

whole building and we do subleases.
MR. CRESSMAN: There's an amendment attached, your
Honor, but I do object to Counsel. He will have his
opportunity to examine the witness. The witness answered the
question.
THE COURT: Well, I allowed Mr. McNichols to go
ahead and ask his question.
Any objection to Exhibit P, Mr. McNichols?
MR. MCNICHOLS: I guess does Exhibit P include the
amendments? That's why I'm in doubt. There is a IS-page lease
it looks like, 16, and then there are these amendments. Are
they all part of Exhibit P.
MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, they are.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Okay. I have no objection.
THE COURT: Exhibit P is admitted.
(Thereupon, Exhibit P was admitted into evidence.)
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I'm confused whether I
moved to admit Exhibit T. If I haven't, I would do so. It's

5ef1

118

116

1

the partial tax return. I thought I had but maybe I didn't.

1

Q.

2

THE COURT: No, you had not.

2

A.

No.

3

MR. CRESSMAN: So moved.

3

Q.

Why does AlA Services have an assignment of it?

4

MR. MCNICHOLS: I have no objection.

A.

AlA Services purchased the mortgage -- oh, I think the

5

THE COURT: Exhibit T is admitted.

4
5
6
7

6
7
8
9

10
11
12

(Thereupon, Exhibit T was admitted into evidence.)
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Let me refer to you to Exhibit W, Mr. Taylor. Are

those the consolidated financial statements for AlA Services
Corporation and subsidiaries for year-end -- for year-end
December 31, 2005?
A.

Yes.

13
14
15

16
17
18
19

20
21
22

MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: Exhibit W is admitted.
(Thereupon, Exhibit W was admitted into evidence.)
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Refer you to Exhibit X. Is Exhibit X the consolidated

financial statements unaudited for AlA Services Corporation and

part we are missing is that these mortgages were contributed to
Crop USA in 2004 and then purchased by the shareholders of AlA
and of -- of, excuse me, of Crop USA and including AlA Services

8

401(k).

9

Q.

The mortgages were purchased when, 2004?

10
11
12

A.

They were contributed to Crop USA in 2004.

Q.

By who?

A.

Adrian Johnson -- well, a partnership controlled by

13
14
15

MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit.

And who is it owned by, Crop USA?

16
17
18
19

Adrian Johnson.
Q.

What were the total amounts of those mortgages, a

million eighty-seven?
A.

Two million.

Q.

Okay. They were contributed to Crop USA. How were

they assigned to AlA?
A.

They weren't.

Q.

Can you explain to the Court why AlA Services 401(k)

20
21
22

plan is listed on Exhibit V?

MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit Exhibit X.

23

one-fourth interest in those mortgages for three hundred and

24

MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection, your Honor.

25

THE COURT: Exhibit X is admitted.

24
25

paid, they get the five hundred thousand.

subsidiaries for the years ending December 31, 2002, and
December 31, 2001?
A.

Yes.

23

A.

Yes, because AlA Services 401(k) plan purchased

seventy-five thousand dollars. And when those mortgages are

119
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1
2
3

4

(Thereupon, Exhibit X was admitted into eVidence.)
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Mr. Taylor, was five hundred thousand dollars borrowed

THE COURT: V as in Victor?
MR. CRESSMAN: Vas in Victor.

8

A.

No, sir.

6

Q.

Take a look at Exhibit V.

Q.

Have they been paid?

A.

One of them has been paid. The other one will be paid

this month or next month.
Q.

Exhibit Y please, could you look at that. Are those

copies of the articles of incorporation of the company now
known as AlA Insurance, Inc?
A.

Yes, I believe so.
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit Exhibit Y.

9

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

parties on the financial statements provided to Mr. Bond during

18

the negotiations, and what this -- on the books of Crop USA are

19
20
21
22

mortgages of Houston properties which were assigned to Crop

23
24
25

3

4
5
6
7

from AlA Services 401(k) plan and loaned to Crop USA?

5

7
8
9

1
2

MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.

Q.

Is Exhibit V a document which you provided to Mr. Bond?

10

A.

I believe so, yes.

11

Q.

Does that show that five hundred thousand dollars is

12

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

your brother Reed.

A.

No.

Q.

It does not. What does it show?

13
14
15

A.

On the books I think it refers to a duly related

16

owing to AlA Services 401(k) plan?

17
18
19

THE COURT: Exhibit Y is admitted.
(Thereupon, Exhibit Y was admitted into evidence.)

Q.

A.

Exhibit AH is a letter of February 6, 2007, to you from

Excuse me, which exhibit?

Q.

Exhibit AH.

A.

Okay. Yes.
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit Exhibit AH.
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection.

comes in, that goes -- gets passed into Crop USA because -- or

20
21
22

evidence.)

AlA because they have an assignment out of it.

23

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

USA. And that relates to the Houston and Minneapolis
properties that Crop services bought. And when that money

Q.

Who has an assignment out of it?

A.

AlA Services.

24
25

THE COURT: Exhibit AH is admitted.
(Thereupon, Exhibit AH was admitted into

Q.

Isn't it correct, Mr. Taylor, that you did not respond

to this letter?

5Lfl>
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1
2
3
4
5

122

6
7

THE COURT: AJ is admitted.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8

(Thereupon, Exhibit AJ was admitted into

8

9
10
11
12
13

A.

I doubt if I did.

Q.

Let me ask you to look at Exhibit AJ please. Are these

accountings for various year-ends for Reed Taylor's note?
A.

Yes, from the records of AlA Services.
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit Exhibit Al.
MR. MCNICHOLS: I have no objection.

evidence.)
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Now, if J understood your testimony earlier, you

indicated that you agreed to pay in 2003 your brother fifteen
thousand dollars in interest a month; correct?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

And Exhibit AJ shows that that did not occur; correct?

16

MR. MCNICHOLS: First of all, AJ is how many

17
18

pages, Counsel?

19
20
21
22

can look at each one if you like.

MR. CRESSMAN: I'm looking at the first page. You

MR. MCNICHOLS: Well, if the Court please, I
object because the first page I don't think says anything about
2003.

23

MR. CRESSMAN: That was not the question.

24

THE COURT: Well, review the entire exhibit,

25

Mr. Taylor, and then ask your question again, Mr. Cressman.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A.

Not yet, no.

Q.

And take a look at the fourth page of the exhibit. You

didn't pay him fifteen thousand dollars a month in 2003, did
you?
A.

Well, no, because we didn't start the deal until after

the first of the year.
Q.

I thought you said the deal was made in March?

A.

It is. We began paying him fifteen thousand a month it

appears in right at the end of March, first of April. In fact,
it was the first of April.
Q.

Well, my account -- my numbers or math would indicate

forty-five thousand would have been due the end of June for
April, May and June?
A.

Except we paid in advance at the end of March of six

thousand of that forty-five. So it looks like six thousand got
caught in the end of March and the rest -- the balance was paid
the next three months as agreed.
Q.

I'd ask you to take a look at the second volume of the

exhibits, please.
Maybe I can short cut this which I'd love to do,
Exhibits AL through AV are financial statements for various
years for AlA Services Corporation subsidiaries. We would move
that they all be admitted.
MR. MCNICHOLS: If the Court please, I'm totally
unfamiliar with them. If counsel will represent that they are

121

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Q.

2

My question is, am I correct, Mr. Taylor, that AlA

Services did not pay Mr. Reed Taylor fifteen thousand each
month on his promissory note in 2006?
A.

The records show we paid him $274,729 last year.

Q.

Well, let me go back and make sure I understand your

agreement. I thought you Indicated that your two -- your March
2003 agreement with Mr. Reed Taylor was that he would receive
fifteen thousand dollars cash each month plus payment of his
employees; correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Was that what you testified to?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And is It correct that you did not pay in 2006 the

fifteen thousand dollars cash per month?
A.

You know the records indicate that we paid fifteen

17

thousand dollars in cash payments to Reed each month plus these

18
19
20
21

other benefits, and I think there was one month where we didn't
pay -- I didn't pay.
Q.

There was one month that you didn't pay the fifteen

thousand?

22
23

was in March -- around March of last year, and I told Reed I'd

24

catch up with him this year.

25

A.

Q.

123

1

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

I think so and I -- well, yeah, in fact I remember it

And you haven't caught it up, have you?

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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15
16
17
18
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20
21
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23
24
25
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accurate copies of the records, I will stipulate they may be
admitted so long as I can have some reasonable period of time
to review them and double check. Is that fair enough?
MR. CRESSMAN: These are accurate copies of what
was provided to Mr. Bond by Mr. Taylor we will so represent.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Okay. So I will not object
subject to a rlght within a reasonable time to review them for
error. Thank you.
THE COURT: I'll grant that. Thank you,
Mr. McNichols. Exhibit AL through AV, as in Victor,
Mr. Cressman?
MR. CRESSMAN: Yes.
THE COURT: Exhibit AL, AM, AN, AO, AP, AQ, AR,
AS, AT, AU, and AV are admitted.
(Thereupon, Exhibits AL through AV were admitted
Into evidence.)
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Now, Mr. Taylor, is AlA Services insolvent?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Object to the form of the question

-- object to the question on the grounds that It calls for a
legal and an accounting conclusion.
THE COURT: Well, I think Mr. Taylor's probably
qualified to give an opinion in both of those things.
Overruled.
A.

The question was?

5111

124

1
2
3
4
5

126

No.

1
2

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

3

MR. CRESSMAN: Is AlA Services insolvent?

A.

Is AlA -- are the assets of AlA Services less than its

Q.

relationship, the stockholder deficit would be a positive or
the stockholder equity would be a positive two million plus.
Q.

Okay. Now you say GAAP, and that harkens me back to

4

the years when I was an accounting student in college and

5

actually got a degree in accounting, and would you tell the

liabilities?

6

A.

No.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Q.

Okay. Is AlA Services able to pay its bills on time?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Assuming that the obligation owing to Reed Taylor is

the mandatory accounting transactions that were required at the

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

A.

Yes, I need to turn that page, but yes.

time of purchase of Reed's stock. Had AlA -- had Reed and I

22

Q.

Okay. And even if we deducted the obligation to your

23

not been related, AlA Services Corp would have on its books the

23

brother --

24
25

value of the purchase of Reed's interest, ten point some

24
25

obligation. At the initial onset we had to charge about ten

due and owing, is AlA Services able to pay that obligation?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, calls for speculation.
THE COURT: Overruled.

A.

AlA does not have the cash to pay to Reed Taylor at

this point in time, no.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

And it also doesn't have assets to pay that; correct?

A.

No -- excuse me, my answer to that question should have

been no, you are wrong. The value of AlA, Inc., far exceeds
its book value as far as accounting statements are concerned.
AlA Services Corporation has a negative net worth only because

million dollars of asset. However, since we were related by

Court what GAAP, stands for?
THE COURT: The court knows what GAAP stands for.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Generally Accepted Accounting PrinCiples, correct, sir?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And what your testimony is is that these statements,

Exhibit AT are prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles; correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And the obligation owing to your brother by AlA

Services, Inc., is shown as a liability listed on these
statements as obligation of former stockholder.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And then when that obligation is taken into account,

the stockholder deficit is $8,724,855; correct?

A.

No, you are confused. It's not a deduction of

125

1

blood, IRS rules and all this new accounting rules, which are

2

now called Sarbanes and Oxley, etc., required that be there be

3
4
5

a direct charge to retained earnings. Had it not -- had we not

6

not fully reflect the value of the subsidiary AlA, Inc.

7
8
9
10
11
12

13

been blood brothers, the assets would exceed the liabilities
and, No.2, the assets and the liabilities of the company do

Q.

Let me ask you to take a look at Exhibit AT, and that's

the last most recent set of financial statements that were
provided for the period ending September 30, 2006?
A.

Yes.

Q.

These were prepared by an accounting firm; correct?

A.

These are internally generated documents.

Q.

Now, when I look at that document on the second page on

14

the balance sheet, the consolidated balance sheet, I see totals

15
16
17
18

of stockholders deficit which would be assets minus liabilities

19
20

that the assets of AlA Services are less than their

21

of a negative $8,724,855; is that correct?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

So these financial statements prepared in-house reflect

liabilities?
A.

These assets -- these statements are prepared according

127

1
2
3
4
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6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

point some million dollars directly to retained earnings. So
if you add the ten million dollars back, it's a positive one
and a half to two million.
Q.

Well, if I add up the assets and the liabilities which

include your brother's obligation on September's statement
listed as seven point eight million and take the assets and
subtract the liabilities, and I remove your brother's
obligation of seven point eight million, I still end up with a
negative number. Is my math wrong?

A.

It is. Perhaps the easiest way for you to look at that

would be to take a net asset of one point three million, add
ten million dollars to that number, and then deduct from that
stockholder deficit of -- or total obligations of, what, eight
million, eight and a half, and then your net would be about a
million.
Q.

Well, I disagree with you. I don't know, let me ask it

this way. The assets are shown and the liabilities are shown
including the obligation of the company to your brother, and
when that math is done, it results in a negative eight million
seven hundred twenty-four thousand stockhOlder deficit. And if
I remove the obligation of your brother identified above as

22

to GAAP Financial Accounting Standards which require us to take

22

obligation of former stockholder, it would only reduce that

23

the amount paid or payable to Reed Taylor as a direct charge to

23

obligation down to about nine hundred thousand negative?

24

stockholders equity. If they were prepared according to the --

25

what I \'IIould call normal business, but for our personal

24
25
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130

1

that's in evidence which speaks for itself, and has been asked

2
3
4
5

2

and answered.
THE COURT: Well, sustained. I can do that math
too, Mr. Cressman, so -BY MR. CRESSMAN:

6

Q.

I think the document does speak for itself, there is an

7

issue of accounting here which I think I understand, but in any

8

event, I do think the Court can do the math.

3
4
5
6
7
8

Have Miss Duclos and Mr. Freeman resigned from the

Q.

board of PJA Insurance?
A.

They have tendered their resignation. I have not

accepted them yet.
Q.

Have they resigned from the board of AlA Services?

A.

They have tendered their resignation, but I have not

accepted them yet.
Q.

Have they resigned from the board of Crop USA?

A.

Bryan Freeman's not a member of the board of Crop USA;

9

And am I correct, sir, that if I went back the last

9

10
11
12
13

three years or so, we would show at each of the financial

10
11
12
13

JoLee is, and, no, she has not tendered a resignation.

resigned as board members.

and I believe I referred to this letter earlier and it was

14
15
16

admitted, and since you received this letter on February 25,

17

tendered their resignations, but he had not accepted them.

and I'll let you get it there in front of you, have you refused

18
19
20

the first part -- I wanted to make sure I got the first part of

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22

statements for PJA Services, the consolidated financial
statements would show a negative stockholders deficit or a
stockholders deficit?
A.

Based on GAAP accounting rules, yes.

Q.

Now, Mr. Taylor, let me refer you to Exhibit N again,

to comply with the directions from your brother?
A.

Certainly, that's the basis of the lawsuit.

Q.

And you are continuing to transact business on behalf

23

MR. MCNICHOLS: Counsel, this is N?

21
22
23

24

MR. CRESSMAN: N.

24

25

MR. MCNICHOLS: Which is a letter to me.

25

of PJA Insurance?

THE COURT: I'm sorry, did you ask what that was
tendered, their resignations as board members?
MR. CRESSMAN: I asked had those individuals

THE COURT: Alright. Thank you.
MR. CRESSMAN: And his answer was they had

THE COURT: I understand that. I just didn't get

your question, Mr. Cressman. Thank you.
MR. CRESSMAN: We have nothing further of this
witness, your Honor.

Mr. Taylor?

THE COURT: Mr. McNichols, any questions for

MR. MCNICHOLS: Yes, your Honor.

129

1

2

MR. CRESSMAN: Well, he testified earlier that he
received it.

3
4
5

wanted to make sure we were talking about the same letter.

6

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22

MR. MCNICHOLS: Okay. No more, your Honor, I just

THE COURT: Alright. Go ahead, Mr. Cressman.

Q.

You continue to transact business personally on behalf

of AlA Insurance?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, I don't understand what

10

"personally on behalf of AlA Insurance" means.

negative net worth, is that the proper term?
A.

Negative, yes.

Q.

When did that first exist?

A.

Consistent with the transaction when we purchased

Reed's -- when AlA Services Corporation purchased Reed's stock
in 1995.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

14
15
16

came in at that time they were -- I think it was BOO Seidman,

Isn't it true, Mr. Taylor, that you continue to act on

I continue to act as CEO and Chief Executive Officer

and President of the companies, yes.
And despite the fact that your brother's letter

indicated you were terminated along with the corresponding

Well, it was found by the auditors -- when the auditors

which was a national, we found that after we had completed the
transaction that there is a rule that required because the
relationship between I and Reed was on some code section,
basically we were brothers, therefore we could not book the

24

THE COURT: Sustained.

24

25

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

A.

And can you tell us why that purchase of the stock

17

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, asked and answered.

employee?

Q.

18
19
20

23

consents, you continued to act on behalf of PJA Insurance as an
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Mr. Taylor, this -- these balance sheets that

created this negative net worth?

21
22
23

25

Q.

Mr. Cressman was just asking you about in a negative -- is it a

11

behalf of PJA Insurance since receipt of this letter?

Q.

BY MR. MCNICHOLS:

12
13

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

A.

CROSS-EXAMINA11 ON

MR. CRESSMAN: Let me rephrase the question, your
Honor.

Q.

131
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value of the assets in excess -- the value that we purchased
the assets for in excess of the hard money value. So we had to
take a charge to retained earnings in 1995 of about ten million
dollars. And had we not done that, then it would be positive.

GAAP rules are like that.

And, of course, that's not inconsistent with GAAP -- sometimes

For example, everybody just heard about the sale of My

543

134

132

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13

MR. MCNICHOLS: Yes, I think it was December of

Space to Fox or three billion dollars, and I think it has a

2

negative net worth too. So negative net worth for GAAP
purposes is not necessarily the same thing as negative net
worth for valuation or insolvency purposes.
Q.

How long has Mr. Reed Taylor known about this

situation?

A.

He's been delivered financial statements every year

since 1995.
Q.

So he knew at least as early as 1996?

A.

Oh, yeah.

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

2006. It's a $307,721 number.
A.

Yeah. And that's come up and that's what I said, in

2000 -- either 2001 or mid 2002 we -- Reed and I had -- excuse
me, Mr. Reed Taylor and I had entered into negotiations because
for a couple reasons. One is we were no longer able to sell
any insurance for Trustmark because the new rules, small group
reform laws, and so we went through -- and some other reasons.
We went very through a very long and complicated process to
restructure the company so that he and I would be equal

0.

Has he ever complained to you about it?

11

partners. He would own half of Crop USA, I would own half of

A.

No.

12

the note, the six million dollar note, and there was a bunch of

0.

Now if you could look at Exhibits 5 and T for me,

13

other things that were involved in that including I would write

14

please. Exhibit S is the October 1st letter from

14

off -- I would give to Reed from the company three hundred and

15
16
17

Mrs. Donna Taylor to you -- excuse me, from you to

15
16

seven thousand dollar note that lowed the company, and then we

Mrs. Donna Taylor in which you said that you were not taking a
salary, and Exhibit T is the tax return which seems to say that

17

Reed owed the company.

18

you did draw a salary. And Mr. Cressman for some reason didn't

19

ask you to explain that, so now I ask you to explain it.

18
19

it down to Hawley Troxell in Boise, a law firm down there, to

20
21
22

most of 2001 I did not draw a salary. Normally I take ten

23
24
25

would write off a hundred and thirty or forty thousand that

And I thought that transaction was done. We had sent

during that period I waived my salary to conserve cash for the

20
21
22
23

don't recall. And we couldn't ever get Reed to sign the

corporation. However, I did have other transactions during the

24

papers. And so in March of 2003, he decided that, I just want

year that are considered compensation. For example, if -- use

25

to keep my note, you guys figure out how to pay me, and that's

A.

In 2001 and most of -- I think it was all of 2002 and

thousand dollars a month salary from AlA as a salary. But

do all the documents. And that was done during the -- I
believe the end of 2002 -- sometime in 2002. And it was -there was about ten or twelve other points involved that I

133

1

of my car or other items like that, and I have to take that in

2

compensation regardless. And even though it wasn't salary,

3

it's still considered for the tax return.

4
5

three hundred seven thousand dollars, do you remember that?

6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19

20
21

22
23

24
25

Q.

Now, Mr. Cressman asked you about this adjustment of

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that -- can you explain that to the court, what

happened and why it occurred?
A.

I can and I'm embarrassed because of it. What exhibit

- if I could show you on that exhibit.

0.

I'm not sure which exhibit -- well T is the tax return.

I'm not sure where the three hundred seven thousand dollars is.
A.

Well, there's a schedule of four pages of payments.

0.

Maybe you can look, there's an index In the front,

135

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

when we did the other program.
I had reversed most of those transactions but I failed
to reverse the long term note transaction. But under the books
and records as you see here, we still credited him interest
each and every month based upon the six million total, not the
six million minus the 307. And I'm embarrassed about it
because when I -- when Pat Moran pointed this out that the
interest was on six million but the number wasn't, I had Aimee
correct it as a year-end adjusting entry for 2007 -- 2006.
BY MR. MCNICHOLS:
Q.

To the benefit of Mr. Reed Taylor?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Thank you. Now, Mr. Cressman asked you about whether

14

you provided monthly statements of commissions to

MR. CRESSMAN: Let me see if--

15
16

monthly statements of commissions?

MR. MCNICHOLS: Maybe you could help us, Counsel,

17

Mr. Taylor, and maybe that would help you find it.

18
19

that would be appreCiated.
MR. CRESSMAN: How about AJ.
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm not sure that that has the
three hundred seven thousand. That's the -MR. CRESSMAN: The deduction's made there because

THE COURT: Are you speaking of the adjustment in

Not in the same way we did back in the mid '90s.

Everything is electronic now and you have to look it up on the
-- actually monthly statements of new sales I think is what he
was asking about, and that's all automated now through an

22

the system daily if you want.

24

25

December of 2006, Mr. McNichols?

A.

20
21
23

it doesn't equal six thousand.

Mr. Reed Taylor. Does AlA Services Corporation generate

internet based reporting system that you can look that up on

Q.

How long has it been since you generated these

documents?
A.

Probably five years, four or five years.

5Lfl-f
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1

2
3
4
5

Q.

Has Mr. Reed Taylor ever complained about not receiving

those monthly statement of sales before?
A.

Oh, he comes to my office all the time and asks what

were the sales this week, what was last month, what was last
week, and I look them up for him.

6

Q.

7
8

A.

Oh, yeah.

Q.

Does he ever get documents, print-offs or that kind of

9

thing?

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

A.

And tell him what the sales were?

Sometimes I print them off for him. It's kind of like

an e-mail system, just print the document if you want it.
Q.

And he also asked you about monthly financial

statements of PJA Services. Does AlA Services generate monthly
financial statements?
A.

No, it doesn't. It's generally quarterly financial

statements for Services and has been forever.
Q.

And do you provide Mr. Reed Taylor with copies of the

18
19
20

quarterly financial statements?

21

monthly statements?

A.

I believe we do.

Q.

How long has it been since you had -- did you ever have

22

A.

For Services, I don't think we ever have had.

23

Q.

Generally has Mr. Reed Taylor been provided with the

24

financial statements of both PJA Services Corporation and PJA

25

Insurance, Inc., within a reasonable time from the time they

138

1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Trustmark. And instead of having a lock box, they just said
you guys in lewiston collect all the money. So all the money
came here. So that -- so lock box is a very expensive
procedure, and it was -- it was irrelevant after that time.
And so we quit that in September or October of 1997, ten years
ago.
Q.

Did Mr. Reed Taylor participate in the decision to

terminate the lock box arrangement?
A.

He was involved with the Department of Insurance

discussion extensively.
Q.

Has he ever complained about that between 1997 and

December of 2006?
A.

No.

Q.

Did Mr. Taylor complain about the amounts of money you

were paying to him and the expenses you were paying for him
between March of 2007 and December of 2006?
A.

Occasionally he'd come in and ask me to make a special

payment, for example, to pay the insurance on his airplane or
something like that, and I -- sometimes I was able to
accommodate that request and sometimes I wasn't. But, no, he
-- I resisted all attempts for him to raise the fifteen
thousand a month.
Q.

And so except for his request, he has accepted the

amounts that you have paid him?
MR. CRESSMAN: Objection. I have allowed Counsel

137

1
2

139

~

Y~

1
2

Q.

For how long?

3

4

~

Since 1995.

5

Q.

Okay. You testified about the lock box. Can you tell

are prepared?

3

6

7
8
9

the Court why the lock box was originally established?
A.

In 1994 our friends at the Idaho Insurance Department

came in and told us we were getting too big and we needed to
get rid of our business. So we had to transfer large portion

10

of our health insurance business from lewiston to Kansas City

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

to a company called Centennial life Insurance Company. And at

18
19
20

that time point in time a large portion of all of our premiums
went through Kansas City, and so a lock box was set up in
Kansas City so that -- because Reed did not know who Centennial
was or why they were there or what was involved other than -didn't know those people personally, and so he requested and we
granted him a lock box procedure. So the premiums that we
collected from farmers would be deposited in Kansas City lock
box, and there was a period of time before the money actually
got transferred either to us or to Centennial.

21

22

In December of -- September of '97 we discontinued that
lock box procedure totally in conjunction with the Idaho

23

Department of Insurance, and we worked out a new deal to

24

transfer all the business including the Universe and Centennial

25

business to a new company, a third company in Chicago named

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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wide latitude to put words in this witness' mouth. He should

what happened or did not.

not use the words such as "accepted." He should testify as to

THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer that,
Mr. Taylor.
A.

Yes.
MR. MCNICHOLS: I have an exhibit and I'm not sure

what number to call it, your Honor. I had some exhibits
earlier, maybe you can mark it and then tell me what number you
have used.
THE COURT: How about one.
MR. MCNICHOLS: I think I already used one.
THE COURT: You used one.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Or maybe even two.
THE COURT: You just used letters on all yours,
didn't you, Mr. Cressman?
MR. CRESSMAN: I did.
MR. MCNICHOLS: I have a bench copy also.
THE COURT: Okay. I think we have marked it as
Exhibit 2 then.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Okay. Thank you. May the witness
be shown Exhibit 2.
THE COURT: As soon as we mark it.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you.
THE COURT: The witness has Exhibit 2,

5'15

142

140

1

Mr. McNichols.

2
3
4

Preferred Shareholder Agreement, are you familiar with that

5

document?

Mr. Taylor, Exhibit No.2 is entitled Series A

6

A.

I am.

7
8

Q.

And are you a party to that document?

A.

AlA Services is, yes; I am not.

9

Q.

And can you tell me how that document came to be

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

2

A.

Yes.

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Q.

Are they evidenced by written documents?

BY MR. MCNICHOLS:
Q.

executed?
A.

In 19 - mid 19805 we issued as part of a divorce

settlement to Mrs. Taylor a substantial amount of what we
referred to as Series A - what do they call it, Series A
Preferred Stock that had certain call and put features in it.
And when we did the reorganization in 199 - or one of the-changed the documents in 1996, we changed the terms of these
agreements, I think basically the interest rate for the
redemption of Mrs. Taylor's stock. And that's what this
agreement was, that 1996 restatement of what her rights were.
Q.

Does this agreement include any agreement concerning

payments of interest to Mr. Reed Taylor by AlA Services
Corporation? I direct your attention to paragraph 3 on page 4,
and I direct the Court's attention to paragraph 3 on page 4.
A.

Yes. Actually not interest payments but prinCiple

payments.

Are these transactions arms-length transactions?

Q.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

A.

Sometimes; sometimes just by memo, yes.

Q.

And who are these trusts, can you give us -- how many

of these trusts are there that you have had financial
transactions with?
A.

Oh, we have financial transactions with them almost

daily or weekly, sweeps back and forth. There are five trusts.
They are in the nature of - they are a business entity, not in
the nature of a trust like an insurance trust account that you
have in the agency level. But these trusts are controlled and
owned by various commodity associations and they have
independent board of directors on them.
Do they independently negotiate these agreements with

Q.

AlA Insurance?
A.

We meet with them -- used to be quarterly. Now we meet

-- in fact, I'm missing a meeting tomorrow in Tampa, Florida,
now because we meet periodically or with them. The trust have

20

-- the two major trusts, one of them has seven directors and

21
22
23
24
25

the other one has sixteen directors, and they represent farmers
from each state where we do business.
Are they totally independent from AlA Services

Q.

Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc?
A.

Yes.

143

141

1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10

Q.

I meant to say principle. If I said interest, I meant

to say prinCiple.
A.

We agreed at the time that no payments would be made on

the six million dollar note until all the Series A had been
redeemed by the company.
Q.

And the Series A redeemed is payable to

Mrs. Donna Taylor?
A.

~~

8

Q.

How much is still owed to Mrs. Donna Taylor?

9

A.

It's right at five hundred thousand plus or minus.

10

Q.

And are you making monthly payments to her?

A.

Yes, we have actually increased the monthly payments to

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

questions about borrowing from a trust account. Do you

20

remember that?

21
22

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

her in the last year to, I think, ten thousand a month, and
then we will increase those again this August.
Q.

Has Mr. Donna Taylor made any complaint or claim that

you are in default of the provisions of Exhibit 2?
A.

No, I'm not aware of any.

Q.

Now, Mr. Cressman started his questions of you with

A.

Yes.

Q.

Are you the trustee of any of these trusts? Are you a

23

trustee of any of these trusts that you have done business

24

with?

25

A.

20
21
22

23
24
25

No.
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MR. MCNICHOLS: I have no more questions, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Any questions in light of those,
Mr. Cressman?
MR. CRESSMAN: I do, your Honor.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
With regard to Exhibit 2, do you have that in front of

Q.

you, sir?

A.

Yes.

Q.

I call your attention to the second -- or excuse me,

third page of the exhibit. Am I correct by reading
Paragraph 1A that Mrs. Taylor was required to be paid off on
the -- as a Series A preferred Shareholder within ten years of
the date of the agreement which was July 1, 1996?
A.

Yes, that was what it originally called for.

Q.

And it has not been amended in writing, has it, sir?

A.

Yes, it has.

Q.

In what way has it been amended in writing, sir?

A.

There is an agreement between -- a four-party agreement

including myself that changes the terms of this.
Q.

How does it change the terms?

A.

Extends the pay-off time.

Q.

Until when?

A.

Until under the same terms and conditions -- generally

5'Lft.P
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1
2

the same terms and conditions that we had with Reed, and that

1

is as we become -- hit different goals, we will be able to pay

2

3

her off.

3

4
5

agreement, that was what your testimony was; correct?

6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Now, I understood you to say this was a written

Q.

No, you asked me if there were any written agreements

A.

amending this.

8
9

Yes, and you said there was?

Q.

A.

Yes, there is.

Q.

Do you have them with you?

A.

I filed it as part of my affidavit.

Q.

Okay. Other than what is attached to your affidavit,

10
11

I don't know that.
I beg your pardon?

A.

There may be, I don't know. I haven't --

17

Q.

You don't know of any; is that correct?

A.

Well, I'm trying to think. I would have to look in our

18
19
20

file to see if there is anything else.

21

MR. CRESSMAN: Counsel, do you have a copy of

22

that? I have got one here but I have written on it. Do you

23

have one, Rod, that I could pull out?

MR. CRESSMAN: It's a leading question, and it's
proper.
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer,
Mr. Taylor.
Had we reinstated the payments the same as what had

A.

been called for, yes, It would have been paid in 2005, but that
wasn't the case. We came back to her and I think we began
paying her four thousand a month and then she asked to raise
that and we raised. And that's been acceptable to her.

12

agreement Exhibit 2?
A.

Honor, rather than a question.

13
14
15
16

are there any written amendments to this subordination

Q.

4
5
6
7

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, it's an argument, your

21
22
23

24

MR. MCNICHOLS: A copy of what?

24

25

MR. CRESSMAN: The Exhibit 2, his dedaration.

25

145
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

10
11

asked and answered.

looking at the letter of February 27 --

12

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

12

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

You are referring to the February 27, 2001, letter, correct,
sir?

A.

Uh-huh.
MR. CRESSMAN: Exhibit A to one of your

declarations. Next would be AY.
I'm trying to find one that you and the witness, your

7

Honor, can both have a copy.
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'll show him a copy of mine if

THE COURT: Well, I have the affidavit so -- I'm

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Is that the agreement that you were -- Exhibit AY, is

that the written agreement that you referred to just a moment
ago?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that agreement was February 27, 2001?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

And It requested -- AlA requested that payments the

next five months be deferred; correct?

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
You have no further written amendment to the

Q.

arrangement with Mrs. Taylor other than Exhibit AY; correct?
I don't know that. I have said that before, I don't

A.

know that.
Q.

To the best of your knowledge I'm correct; is that not

true, sir?

8
9

you want.

Q.

1
2
3
4
5
6

MR. MCNICHOLS: No, that's a double question there
and It's also been asked and answered. Both of them have been

THE COURT: Sustained.

Q.

Now I want to make sure I understand at the end of 2002

papers were prepared by lawyers to amend Mr. Reed Taylor's
arrangement with the company; correct?
A.

No.

Q.

Alright. So you were negotiating with Reed but you

didn't consummate a deal; is that correct?
A.

We had -- I prepared -- Ernie Oantlni and I prepared

numerous memorandum, memorandum to the attorneys on what we

A.

Yes.

21

wanted them to prepare. We could never get Reed to actually

Q.

If the obligation -- if the payments were deferred for

22

sign an agreement, so we never did end up getting it done.

23

Q.

That was at the end of 2002?

July 1, 2005, the due date would be sometime at the very end of

24

A.

It was in 2002, I'm not sure about the end.

2005; correct?

25

Q.

Now Exhibit AJ, Counsel talked to you about, and I'm

five months and they were otherwise due to be fully paid by
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interested in the very first page which is the accounting as of

2

2
3
4

year-end 2006, 12-31-06. Do you have the exhibit there?

5

12-31-06 but the deduction or the adjustment for the $307,000

6
7
8
9

to bring the principal back up to six million has not been

A.

I do.
And I note that although this document is dated as of

Q.

made?

A.

Not at this time.

Q.

So that adjustment is made sometime --

10
11

THE COURT: You lost me, Mr. Cressman, which page
are you talking about?

12
13
14

MR. CRESSMAN: First page of AJ.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry, go ahead.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:

15
16

us. This Exhibit was prepared by AlA Services to show the

17

status of Mr. Reed Taylor's note as of the year-end 2006;

18
19
20
21
22

correct?

Let me back up for -- make sure the Court's following

Q.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And at this time it does not reflect the $307,000

deduction which you inappropriately took some years before,
correct, or it does reflect that?

23

24

MR. MCNICHOLS: Now there's an impossible set of
questions to answer. It either does or it doesn't.

25

1

MR. CRESSMAN: Let me rephrase.

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Q.

Is it your testimony that at this point the adjustment

has made been made sometime in 20077

A.

No, I just said it was going to be done as a year-end

adjusting entry and I have instructed her to do that.
Q.

In 2007 you have instructed her to do that?

A.

Yes, but it will be reflected on the year-end 2006

statements. So the next time we give you this, it will be
reflective of this. I also might want to point out that the
interest calculation here is based on the full six million on
the column 2.
Q.

Do you have a copy of Mrs. Miran's -- excuse me,

Mrs. Aimee Gordon's declaration, paragraph 5?

A.
Q.

I do not.
Let me -- I have got a copy here.
I'm referring to paragraph 5 of Miss Gordon's

declaration. And in there she states that you told her to make
the adjustment in 2006. She's in error then, is she not?

A.

Yeah, I'm sure that it was when Pat Moran was here the

first part of January.

20
21
22

Q.

Okay. Thank you.
MR. CRESSMAN: Nothing further, your Honor.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Your Honor, I have one thing that

23

I've simply overlooked to ask Mr. Taylor and it was about the

24

consent order that I tendered to the Court in very beginning.

25

May I ask him a question or two about that?

151

149

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22

1
2

THE COURT: Rephrase.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

It continues to show on this document as of year-end

2006 an improper $307,000 deduction from the principle amount
owing to Mr. Reed Taylor by AlA Services; does it not?
MR. MCNICHOLS: I object to the question because
first of all it asks for a positive answer and then followed by
a negative, and also it uses the word "improper."
THE COURT: Let's just rephrase it and ask him if
it evidences that deduction or not, Mr. Cressman.
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, let me ask a bunch of
questions.
THE COURT: Alright, go ahead.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

You determined in some time in 2007 that a $307,000

deduction from principle of Mr. Reed Taylor's note was
inappropriately taken earlier; correct?

A.

No. I discovered that these subsidiary ledgers did not

reflect the reversal of the 307,000. And I found that out

3

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
1B
19

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. McNichols.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. MCNICHOLS:
Q.

You have seen the consent order that I prepared

earlier, Mr. Taylor?

A.

Yes, I have.

Q.

If the judge enters the preliminary injunction, are you

willing that he enter this consent order?

A.

As well -MR. CRESSMAN: If, your Honor -- go ahead.

BY MR. MCNICHOLS:
Q.

And if he enters the consent order, will you abide by

A.

Yes.

it?

MR. CRESSMAN: Objection, your Honor.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you. That's all I have,
your Honor.
THE COURT: What's your objection, Mr. Cressman?
MR. CRESSMAN: I don't understand this consent

get this thing negotiated. And I noticed it wasn't done and so

20
21
22

what terms -- if the Court was giving a restraining order or a

23

when I got back to the office, I told Aimee to make sure that

23

preliminary injunction, what terms, that's a different story,

24

is done as a year-end adjusting entry, and it will be done when

24

but to tender a document that was handed to us in settlement I

25

the auditors do the year-end adjusting entries.

25

think is inappropriate.

because we gave these subsidiary ledgers to a guy named
Pat Moran during our negotiation periods when we were trying to

order that is some kind of proposed settlement position that's
being tendered to the Court. I mean if we are going to ask

54 g
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THE COURT: Well, I didn't necessarily take it as

2
3
4
5
6
7

a settlement, I took it as some additional order that
Mr. McNichols was requesting or consenting to be entered as
part of the request for the preliminary injunction, so I guess
I didn't take it as a settlement discussion.
Do you have any questions for Mr. Taylor on that,
Mr. Cressman? The fact that he's willing to abide by a consent

8

order doesn't mean a great deal to me. I would think he would

9

be willing to abide by any order.

10
11
12
13
14
15

MR. MCNICHOLS: He is, your Honor, I assure you of

ilial
MR. CRESSMAN: We have nothing further of this
witness. It is our understanding, however, that the affidavits
that were tendered by Mr. Reed Taylor will not be utilized in
these proceedings, John Taylor will not be utilized in these

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

session at 3:30. Thank you. We will be back in session in
about 20 minutes.
(Thereupon, a recess was taken from 3: 10 p.m. to
3:30 p.m.)
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, we would call
Mr. Reed Taylor, please.
THE COURT: Alright. Thank you. Mr. Taylor, if
you would come forward.
REED TAYLOR,

10
11
12
13
14
15

affidavits of Mr. John Taylor dated yesterday, we would make

Having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, relating to said cause,
testifies and says:
THE COURT: Have a seat, Mr. Taylor.
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, with regard to the two

16

proceedings. He is here, he's available to be examined by his

16

the same objection and leave it to his Honor to review those

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

counsel, and I think that's the proper way to proceed.

17

for lack of foundation, hearsay, conclusionary statements

18
19
20
21

without foundation, non evidentiary facts, not personal

MR. MCNICHOLS: If it's necessary to say I totally
disagree with counsel, then I say so for the record, but I have
no more questions for Mr. Taylor unless does your Honor have
questions for him?

knowledge, and the other objections we made to the earlier
declarations. I will examine Mr. Reed Taylor on several of the
statements that are in those declarations, but unless the Court

THE COURT: I do not.

22

would like me to, I won't go painstakingly through this

MR. CRESSMAN: Well, I had made a motion early

23
24
25

paragraph by paragraph.

this morning to strike the declaration or affidavits of
Mr. Taylor with the understanding -- that were delivered to us

THE COURT: No, I'd prefer not. And I have looked
through the affidavits and I also agree that I think they,

155
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1
2
3

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

on the grounds that the evidence would not be relevant to any

that I find them to be relevant and contain admissible

17

issue before your Honor.

evidence. I will be considering them along with the other

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

late yesterday with the understanding that the Court set a
hearing for live testimony and -- for testimony. And those
affidavits are fraught with inappropriate comments not quite to

4

the same extent as the other declarations, but rather than

5
6

having something as one-sided and we are not able to
cross-examine him, I believe it's appropriate for counsel to

7

inquire and present any material that he believes is relevant

8

and pertinent rather than presenting us with a one-sided

9

affidavit that I'm required to pick and choose from.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to conSider the
affidavits to the extent that I find them to be relevant and
admissible. Certainly I did provide this hearing for the
opportunity to present evidence. Mr. McNichols chose to submit
evidence by way of affidavits, so I'm not -- I cannot provide
you with any assurance, Mr. Cressman, I'm not gOing to consider
the affidavits of -- submitted by John Taylor to the extent

relevant and admissible information contained in the
affidavits.
MR. CRESSMAN: May I have a minute, your Honor, to
review those affidavits?
THE COURT: Well, we are going to go ahead and
take an afternoon recess right now anyway, so you can certainly
have that time, Mr. Cressman. Let's just plan on being back in
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along with some of the others we talked about previously, do
have some impermissible information contained in them, so I
appreCiate your relying on me to make those appropriate
decisions. Go ahead, Mr. Cressman.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Would you state your name and address for the record,

please.

A.

Reed l. Taylor, 7498 Lapwai Road, Lewiston, Idaho.

Q.

And are you the founder of what is now AlA Services and

AlA Insurance?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

And can you tell the Court how you came to found those

two companies?
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm going to object, your Honor,

THE COURT: Mr. Cressman.
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, this man was the reason why
these companies came to be, they have challenged his ability to
run these companies, it's our position that this man when he
ran those companies they ran well, they were profitable, and
they would remain profitable should they continue to be run by
him.
THE COURT: Well, I guess if you want to make a

SL/tt

158

156

1

few questions along this line, I'm going to let you do it. I'm

2

going to overrule your objection for now, Mr. McNichols.

3
4

MR. CRESSMAN: If the other Defendants want to
stipulate to that, then we will move on.

5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT: Well, just go ahead and I'm going to
let you pursue this line of questioning. Go ahead.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

How was it that you came to found these companies, sir?

A.

I went in the insurance business in 1966 with my uncle

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

sold 2S6 policies. And then we went to two more counties here

8

and duplicated it, went to Montana, and we just got kept

start my own agency. That I did in January of '69, basically
the same farmers, I went into direct competition through the
wheat grower associations.
Then I had an idea of collecting dues for them where it
helped them out and made the money along with the insurance
policy. In Latah County, two of us when we started, my agency

had licensed me. But I wasn't interested -- I was licensed as

9
10
11

a courtesy to - when I was 19, and I was actually going to

12

college and working full time. And I was selling encyclopedias

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

several states into one individual trust.

20
21

Administrators?

and he had been in the business life long and he at one time

and I really was making more money and I wasn't interested in
insurance and so I didn't.
Seven years later after I went to four years of
college, I did not graduate, but I was in the encyclopedia
business for four or five years here and back in the Midwest.
And I came back and my uncle approached me again and I went out
and he had a program that was set up to go through dairies, to
the dairyman's and selling them a group type program. He asked
me to go out with him and I did, and I could see where it had
tremendous possibilities with the training and what I had been
doing. Actually made it look really easy which it was, and so
I moved back from st. Louis and went to work for him.

22
23
24
25

growing because it was good for the associations and good for
us. And we were high producing, high producing volume agency.
Q.

At this time were you operating under AlA, Inc?

A.

Initially we called it -- I think the first month it

was Reed Taylor Insurance Agency and then we started collecting
dues so we called it Agricultural Insurance Trust. And we did
that for a few years, and then we found that was an illegal
name, had to be a bank to use that, bank or stock so we changed
to Agriculture Insurance Administrators. That was several
years later. That was after we had formed a trust and put

Q.

A.

And so AlA stands for Agricultural Insurance

Correct.

Q.

And you were the founding founder of that company?

A.

I was.

Q.

And you continued to operate that company up until

159
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

During that next year, 18 months, I put together 16

1

1995?

agency 23 out of the 24 awards for the monthly awards were won

2
3
4
5
6
7

by either myself or my brother. They had the biggest volume

8

Q.

Was it finanCially successful?

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

A.

Very financially successful.

salesmen for him for various dairies. One of them which was my
brother which was the second one which also had been in the
encyclopedia business.
Q.

This Is another brother besides John?

A.

Right, in Boise. And that year - that year that

they had ever had with that particular product.
My uncle eventually -- he actually made more money than
he had ever made before but he didn't keep ahead of us. And
the broker, the insurance broker in Boise had gone into
business, and he was in several states with the Cattlemen's
associations and on a bigger scale, and the Pacific Supply
Co-ops. So I transferred to him and within four months I was
made a manager and moved to Lewiston in the late '60s.

A.

Correct.

Q.

And what was the status of the company's business at

that time?
A.

I think at that time we had the most successful health

insurance agency in the United States. Nine full time and they
all sold one product.

Q.

How many employees did the company have?

A.

At that time we did claims, service -- which we

gradually had gotten into that to provide the service, so I
wasn't at home office much, but I think there was over 125,
150, maybe more.
Q.

Do you know how many employees AlA Insurance has now?

A.

Not for sure the way they are keeping records now.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

co-ops, so I'd end up doing that, took away from my other time.

24

A.

That is not correct.

25

We had SOme disagreements over it, so I reSigned and decided to

25

Q.

It is not correct. Did that meeting take place?

And I worked the Circle P stores that were at that time
the Lewiston Grain Growers from Grangeville to all across
Washington. At that time they had a company person that was

It's four or five, I think.

a.

NOw, your brother has testified that there were

modifications to your agreements to redeem your stock, and he's

doing the. work, and we were the biggest agency the company had.

20

testified as to events that you would not sign documents at the

That year we wrote more than all of the rest of his agents put

21

end of 2002 and that you and he together alone met in his

together, and yet we had a relatively small agency. And they

22

offices in March of 2003 and made a verbal agreement modifying

had a company representative that wouldn't take care of the

23

your agreement?
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162

160

1

A.

John tends to have a tendency if you have a meeting,

2

you write something up and say you got an agreement which he

3
4
5

did that recently in these negotiations we are just doing right
now in the last three weeks.
Q.

But did you ever sign any documents?

6

A.

I did not.

7
8
9

Q.

Did you ever agree to modify your original transaction?

A.

I did not.

Q.

Now you have in front of you -- your Honor, may I

10

approach the witness?

11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Cressman.
MR. CRESSMAN: Make sure he's got the right
exhibit because I don't -- I want to inquire about Exhibit AY
which is -- Exhibit AY is Exhibit A to one of the John Taylor
declarations which is the February 27, 2001, letter Signed by
John, Reed and Donna Taylor.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Mr. Taylor, did this letter modify your agreement in

any way?

20

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

was very excited about it, but this -- she would not do that
agreement because of her feelings about John unless he
personally signed it and I signed it too because it didn't
affect me because I'm still liable for the full amount in my
divorce decree but -BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Who drafted this document?

A.

Pardon?

Q.

Who drafted it?

A.

John.

Q.

What was your understanding as to the meaning of this

document and what it meant for your wife?
A.

She was going to delay her payments for a few months,

and I didn't know they had been delayed as long as they were,
and I thought they had been resumed.
Q.

Was that the full extent of your -MR. MCNICHOLS: We'd ask the answer be stricken,

your Honor, on the grounds it was not responsive to the
question.

20

MR. MCNICHOLS: Object to the form of the

21

question. The documents speaks for itself and is calling for a

22
23
24
25

legal conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I'm not quite sure
because it wasn't explained what the Defendants feel this

THE COURT: Overruled.

21
22

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

23
24
25

understanding of this document, the agreement?

Q.

A.

Was that your extent -- is that the extent of your

Exactly, that's all. It had nothing to do with my

agreement whatsoever.

163

161

1
2
3
4
5

agreement means, and I -- you know, if it was completely clear

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

I could understand the objection, but I can tell you that I
don't understand how this agreement amends Mr. Reed Taylor's
situation. It refers to the deferral of five payments of
Miss Donna Taylor for five months. But I understand the

6
7

objection and I understand the Court's ruling and I'll move on.
THE COURT: I don't have any problem with you

10

ag reeing to but --

9
10

11

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

11

12
13

to when you signed Exhibit AY?

14
15
16
17
18
19

entirely appropriate for you, I guess, to ask him what he was

recognize your Honor just said that he could do that, but I
object on the grounds that his understanding is not relevant.
THE COURT: Thank you. Overruled. Go ahead,
Mr. Taylor.

19

This was a time when I became involved back and they

20

were unable to pay me or short of money, and I become first

21

aware of this crop program they had been working on, and that

22
23
24
25

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Mr. Taylor, what did you understand you were agreeing

MR. MCNICHOLS: If the Court please, and I

A.

modifying or amending your agreement?
A.

Never.

Q.

Now, you should have in front of you, I believe it's

the other John Taylor affidavit, the last word on the first
page is "been," b-e-e-n.
MR. MCNICHOLS: That's the same one in mine.

looked like a real opportunity, and they needed the money. And

22

23
24
25

because this looked like the type of program that could
actually duplicate and put AlA back where it was before. And I

That's the same one.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Well, I had Exhibit AY attached to an affidavit of

R. John Taylor and the last word was "issues, government
issues" on page 1. Let me -- if I can approach the witness,
your Honor -A.

I got that one. I have that one also.

Q.

This is the one I want you to have in front of you

right now. Do you have that one?
MR. MCNICHOLS: They are both -- they are exhibits
to both affidavits.
THE COURT: Which-MR. CRESSMAN: It's the one where the last word on
the first page is "been," b-e-e-n.
THE COURT: Alright.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

On the bottom of page 2, your brother has made a

5S'
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A.

20
21

so I thought that Donna would also take less, my ex-wife,
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Did your brother ever tell you that this document was

8

asking him what his understanding of -- I mean I guess it's

Q.

Q.

to 163 of 211

166

164

1
2
3
4
5

indebted to the Plaintiff under the terms of written agreement
which has been amended and modified by written and oral
agreements." Do you agree with that?
No.

A.

6

MR. MCNICHOLS: Object -- object to the question

7
8
9
10
11

interest of moving this along. So I'm going to overrule the

12

objection. Mr. Taylor, you can answer that.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24

25

1

statement there, paragraph 9, "AlA Services corporation is

on the grounds it's repetitious, your Honor. It's asked and
answered.
THE COURT: Well, it was at least part asked and
answered, but I'm going to let Mr. Taylor go ahead just tn the

MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, he did answer it.
THE COURT: He did.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Mr. Taylor, take a look at paragraph 11 on page 3 of

Q.

the affidavit, and I'm referring you to -- are you there on
page 3?
A.

Got it.

Q.

Paragraph 11, the sentence that begins on the 5th line

referring to you, "f-je has had a standing offer to rejoin the
board as a member or observer which was reiterated late last
year." Do you agree with that?
A.

There was never a standing offer. In fact, my

accountant and I was discussing it before that we had meetings

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22

MR. MCNICHOLS: Object as leading.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A.

Question, okay, I got it, that's false. I mean I have

encouraged people to stay with AlA, and I don't know how I
could name one. I mean I made special arrangements for Some of
them to stay when I left so I don't have that reputation of
stealing agents.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

"He references forming a competing company." Do you

know what he was referring to?

A.

I don't know anything about competing. When I left and

I think we were doing some college advantage work which Ernie
my accountant, and I took that company, weren't doing business
yet if I recall or very little, and they didn't want it, I
think we actually paid money for it, but we had an office
downstairs which we paid rent to AlA and we developed that.
They started selling a similar product, the same ideas, same
general ideas with a broker that came in, and I understood they
sold about a hundred policies. But I didn't run across one of
their agents, I never talked to any of them because -Q.

But did you buy this business from AlA?

A.

I can't remember exactly, we either bought it or it was

23
24

recall it.

25

Q.

included in the package that we took, but it was -- that's as I

Did anyone complain to you about your actions?

167

165

1

and we were -- my wife and I were both supposed to be on the

2

board, and I assumed they just weren't having them for shortage
of money or whatever. By last year an offer, he could have

1
2
3

made it during sometime when we were negotiating with Ernie but

4

I don't recall it specifically, no.

deal, did your brother ever give you a standing offer to rejOin

5
6
7

the board?

8

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

times: apparently this is '95 through '97 as indicated in the

12

previous paragraph, "many of the agents and agencies that

13
14
15
16
17

traditionally represented AlA left the company. The Plaintiff

Q.

But other than negotiations over modifications of your

A.

Never came up period.

Q.

Paragraph 13, your brother states, "During these

exasperated the sales force decline by forming a competing
company which further caused the decimation of the company's
sales force and independent AGC system." Do you have a comment
on that, sir?

18

MR. MCNICHOLS: Object to the form of that

19

question. It's not a commenting contest here, he's supposed to

20
21
22
23

ask a question and then I can object to it.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

And they sold about a hundred and we sold 25 or 30 thousand.
Q.

On page 4 of your brother's declaration, paragraph 14,

he testifies in his affidavit that you agreed to accept partial
interest payments of fifteen thousand per month?
MR. MCNICHOLS: 15, Counsel.
THE COURT: I think you are at paragraph 15.
MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, 15.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CRESSMAN: Not only do I have trouble with
names, I have trouble with numbers.
A.

When I come back and I initiated going to Billings to

get the -- I was very excited about the co-op program, I put a
lot of time into it, and it wasn't so much the money, it was
the fact of putting AlA back on the map where it was because it
was going down close to zero which it is now virtually. And I
took different amounts of money but no specific figure was ever
set on -- I mean I took no money and paid my own expenses in
most cases.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:

payments to be made to you under your redemption agreement to

24

"Plaintiff actually induced AlA agents to leave the company and

25

work for Plaintiff." Is that statement true or false?

25

Let me continue and then I'll ask the question again.

No, we volunteered. And I took the one girl went with

21
22
23
24

Q.

A.

us also under the agreement that was working with the program.
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Q.

Did you ever agree with your brother to limit the

fifteen thousand dollars per month?
A.

No, I did not agree and even after they were at
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170

168

fifteen, they didn't even uphold those. I mean there was never

2
3

no set amount. Used to be zero, different amounts sometimes up
to twenty-five, and it was kind of what I needed but most of it

4
5

was used for expenses.

6

pOSing objections because the witness talks immediately after

1
2
3

THE COURT: Well, overruled.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10

MR. CRESSMAN: I won't ask it again if I have

11

MR. MCNICHOLS: Your Honor, I'm having difficulty

7
8
9
10
11

and answered, I believe, twice.

the question is open. Is there -- and my reason that I wanted
to object was on the grounds that the question had been asked

directors. I further isolated all sales managers from the
Plaintiffs demands, directives and sales tactics." Is that
true or false?

A.

Shortly before Christmas I contacted Minnesota Soy Bean

Association, Andy Anderson and myself, to look at this crop
program. Fortunately we had a very sophisticated association
manager and assistant and several workers or secretaries and et
cetera, saw the value of it, and they instigated it. In 90
days we put on over a million of premium.
And coming back we were set to go to Kansas, we had
already contacted every director twice to set the same program

12

asked it twice. I'm sorry.

12

up with what we had learned there to turn into a volume

13
14

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

situation. And when we got back they decided that they were --

15

you agreed to defer -- well, Counsel, if I ask about this

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23

Q.

Paragraph 16, your brother testifies that additionally

paragraph, I assume, your Honor, he will object, so I -- is
that -- can I ask you if he's gOing to object because I just as

wooTHE COURT: Just ask your question.

and interest on your note until the companies were financially

20
21
22
23

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Mr. Taylor, the paragraph 16 your brother testifies

that additionally you agreed to defer the receipt of principle

they had already had a changed program to go on salaried only,
and these five people, including myself, they would not let go
to Kansas.
So at that time we had been talking about who owned
what, and Crop USA as far as I was concerned was part of AlA,
that's why I was there, and I said to hell with it, and I had
witnessed that I told the agents they are going to do a bond
deal, John said you will be paid off in August, and I said all
right, I'll take my money and leave, forget about Crop. And I
did nothing that summer. That year they sold three or four

24

able to be restructured and redeem your note. "He was provided

24

25

written business plans and budgets outlining the plans and he

25

Q.

Did you ever get paid for your time?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

agreed to the objectives. When the plan achieved break-even

1
2
3
4

A.

No, or expense -- well, some expenses.

Q.

Let me ask you to refer to paragraph 21 on page 5.

policies. This year I think they sold one or two maybe.

171

169

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

status at about thirty-five million dollars in new business
placement, the companies could begin catching up on accrued
interest payments. When the companies aChieved 60 million in

"Plaintiff now alleges as an egregious event of default that
the company failed to provide a lock box that diminished his

AlA Services." Did you agree as your brother indicated in that

5
6
7

efforts and consent to assist in the transfer of the AlA

~~~

8

Insurance block of health insurance business in 1997 from

new business placements, the companies would then be able to
retire his note and redeem all outstanding preferred shares of

A.

No, and I don't think the amount of fifteen thousand or

twenty-five thousand a month or Donna's note ever come up in
the same subject -- same subject time.
Q.

Okay. Paragraph 17. "The companies had hoped to

achieve the goals by this time but Plaintiffs interference
with various agents and insurers delayed full implementation of
the agreed plan for at least three years." Did you ever
interfere with agents and insurers such as a plan was delayed?
A.

Well, I'd like them to introduce me to the agent

because I was the only one out there working. We worked
several different programs to find what would work and we were

9
10
11

Trustmark Insurance." Do you agree with that?

12

recollection of anything about a lock box. And, frankly, I

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

March of 2006, "I ordered the Plaintiff not to interfere with

20
21
22
23

or contact the agents, employees or sales managers of the

24

companies and not to contact any commodity association

25

working full time at not -- only business they got was directly
from me.
Q.

And the next paragraph your brother testifies that in

security. In fact, Plaintiff consented to and was intricately
involved in the termination of the lock box agreement by his
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Universal Life and Centennial Life insurance companies to

A.

No, other than when it was initially set up, I have no

don't" understand his previous discussion of why we didn't need
it with a different company because we always use the same
system. Frankly, I wasn't too concerned, we had so much money
coming in, mine was of small amount of the total.
Q.

Paragraph 24 on page 6, "After 2005, Plaintiff ran out

of money and demanded additional payments from the company
which I repeatedly resisted." Is that a true statement?
A.

No, in fact, I had a good year that day -- or that

year. My other brother and I, we bought a farm for five
hundred and we sold it for three million, so I didn't run out
of money that year.
Q.

Paragraph 25, "During 2006, the companies arranged a

line of credit from a lender for up to fifteen million dollars.

55'3
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172

1

The previous line of credit with Zions Bank was not adequate to

1

2

enable the company to grow as fast as outlined by the company

2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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business plan. The amount of the loan able to be drawn is
dependent on the commissions receivable by Crop USA and the
amount of certificates of deposits posted by shareholders.
Beginning this year, the borrowing capacity will enable AIA
Insurance to begin carrying its plans to reintroduce a new
medical product to association members. Plaintiff knew of the
terms of this agreement, received drafts of the agreement and
eagerly antiCipated the new line because it so increased his
prospects of being paid off." Is that true, sir?
A.

John was continually working on loans in which I did

not know where they were or who with. I occasionally heard
Zions Bank, I heard Minnesota, I knew nothing about what they
were doing. He was changing and he was always trying to get
money. And he was going to pay me off when he got it and it
just kept getting delayed and delayed and delayed. And I had
no idea who he was working with, I had no contact with him
period.
Q.

let me ask you to go to the next affidavit of your

brother. Do you have the other one up there, Mr. Taylor. let
me refer you to page -- or paragraph 9. This paragraph reads,
"The current management staff of AIA Insurance have a long and
personal relationship with the clients and insurers of the AlA
programs. The Plaintiff is unknown to the current insurance

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

had started the company, thought I was an employee. That was
when I was on the payroll. So what they know about me is what
John has told them, not what I have done.
Q.

let me ask you to take a look at paragraph 10. "The

Plaintiff is known to have a disrespectful notoriously impolite
and brutish attitude towards the employees of AlA Insurance,
and many of the current employees would not work for him. Some
employees actually fear him and our receptionist suffers
anxiety attacks when I leave town."
A.

Well, I can't imagine that. If they have a problem,

I'd be glad to talk to them or apologize if I have offended
them. I don't know if I have a problem like that but -Q.

And take a look at paragraph on the next page.

"Plaintiff lacks the management ability, temperament and skills
to rationally operate AlA Insurance in the best interest of all
of its stakeholders. He suffers from short term memory loss,
excessive uncontrollable anger, and an abusive and abrupt
personality." Is that true, sir?
A.

Sounds bad.

Q.

That's what your brother is saying a bout you.

A.

The only one I recognize is that my CPA when I was in

Bellevue two months ago or three, we're having dinner, just
before I left, and he says -MR. MCNICHOLS: This is going to be pretty rank
hearsay, your Honor.

175

173

1
2
3

carriers and Is disliked and disrespected by the company's
association clients." Is that true or not?
A.

let me read this. I have not dealt personally with the

4

current carrier and I didn't deal personally with all of them

5

we had before, but most of them I did have some dealings with.

6

But that's -- I mean that's not unusual, Some change every

7
8

several small companies and had to go to the big ones, so we

9

didn't have a company problem. So I don't know what management

10
11

year. I was always able enough to get business, so we outgrew

- my management got the business, I mean that was evident.
Q.

What about the sentence, "The Plaintiff is unknown and

12
13
14
15
16

association with them, I never lost an association. And I

17

spent summers fishing and fall hunting and on the ranches, and

18

I mean they were all my best friends. I had no problem with

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

any of them period, and that's how one way I developed them.

is disliked and disrespected by the company's association
dients," is that true?
A.

Some of them don't know me because I haven't been there

for ten years and they have changed. And as far as my

And so John has left me on the outside, I do know that,
because a couple of them didn't know who I was when I was in

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10

your short term memory is all right.
THE COURT: Hang on. Mr. Taylor, why don't you
just -MR. CRESSMAN: Without referring to Mr. Dantini's
comments -THE COURT: Don't refer to anything that anybody
else has said to you, Mr. Taylor, just respond -BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Can you give your own comment on whether that statement

is true or not in providing any commentary that you like as to

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

that answer?

22

help. And they didn't know who I was, not the last financial

23
24
25

advisor but someone told me that - or CFO, chief financial

I'll leave that word out, but he said that to tell John

11

the Crop program, the computer program which I designed with

officer, resigned and went to Moscow, didn't even know that I

A.
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MR. MCNICHOLS: Excuse me, your honor.
Instructing the witness to provide commentary is totally
improper. He can ask him a question to which he's entitled to

have an answer.
THE COURT: I agree.
A.

Well, I'm 70 so I'll take credit for a little. How's

that.
MR. CRESSMAN: Mr. Taylor, just wait until his
Honor rules.
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection to
that question. Mr. Taylor, again if you could just directly
respond to Mr. Cressman's question to the extent that's
necessary. I don't know that comment is appropriate, but if
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178

176
you can just respond directly to that question without

2

referring to anything that you may have been told by anyone

3
4

else, please.

5

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

A.

6

7
8
9
10
11

12
13

3

Your question then?

With regard to the testimony of your brother in

Q.

. paragraph 15, is any of that true?

A.

No.

Q.

Has anyone told you that you have an uncontrollable

anger?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained.

Q.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

14
15

1
2

14
15

We are through with that exhibit, Mr. Taylor.
Now, you are familiar with Mr. Patrick Moran's letter

of December 12th to your brother?

20
21
22
23

AIA Services paid you the accrued interest on the six million

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

If you care to take a look at it for reference, it's

18
19

Exhibit F. And my question is since that letter was sent, has

20
21

dollars principle amount?
A.

No.

22

Q.

Have they paid you any part of the six million dollar

23

24

principle?
A.

Not except what we have got through the attorney's

Q.

Now, you endeavored to set up two shareholders

meetings; correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And were you allowed to have those meetings?

A.

No, we were not•

Q.

And on -- let me ask you to take a look at Exhibits K

and L. Are these the consents you signed on February 22, 2007,
in lieu of a special meeting of shareholders of AlA Insurance
and in lieu of a meeting of the board of directors of AlA
Insurance?
A.

They are.

Q.

Can you tell the Court why you executed these

instruments?

16

16
17
18
19

25

A.
office.

I may have gotten some interest, all interest or part

MR. MCNICHOLS: Object, your Honor, on grounds of
motivation of the witness' state of mind is irrelevant.
THE COURT: Overruled. You may go ahead and
answer that, Mr. Taylor.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Why did you execute these consents, Mr. Taylor?

A.

Because we felt it was legally a way to have the board

meetings and we had - we had attempted to -- been turned down

24

twice to have them. And so we did it in this manner to replace

25

the directors and officers and put myself in as officers and

179

177

1
2
3
4

interest.
Q.

How much interest have you received since then,

apprOXimately?
A.

I know I got my last deposit of seventy-five hundred.

5

Q.

So you may have gotten seventy-five hundred dollars?

6
7
8
9
10
11

A.

A week or ten days ago. No principle.

Q.

Right. Since that letter was sent, to your knowledge

had AlA Services -- well, strike that. We have already had

Were you regularly provided with audited financial

14
15
16
17
18
19

No.

Q.

You did not receive annual statements from AlA

Not on a regular basis, no.

Q.

Did you receive month Iy income statements?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you receive weekly summaries --

A.

Never.

Q.

--

4
5
6
7
8

in accordance with Exhibit L; were you not?

16
17
18
19

20
21

A.

No.

22

Q.

Have you received any of those things since Mr. Moran

23

February 25, you were at the offices of AlA to change the locks

14
15

Services, finanCial statements?
A.

3

11
12
13

statements of AlA Services?
A.

directors.

9
10

testimony to that fact.

12
13

1
2

of the business?

sent the letter December 12th?

20
21
22
23

Q.

Now, in the morning, early morning of Sunday,

MR. MCNICHOLS: Object, leading, your Honor.
THE COURT: It is leading, Mr. Cressman.
Sustained.
MR. CRESSMAN: I beg your pardon.
THE COURT: It is leading, Mr. Cressman.
Sustained.
MR. CRESSMAN: I didn't think it was denied that
he was there that evening but -THE COURT: It isn·t.
MR. CRESSMAN: This is preliminary, your Honor, I
mean holy smokes. Alright, I'll rephrase.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Were you or were you not, Mr. Taylor, at the offices of

AlA Insurance In the early morning of Sunday, last Sunday?
A.

Yes, I was there accompanied by a locksmith and

security people.
Q.

And were you there in response to -- or pursuant to the

consent of the boand that you had signed earlier?
A.

That's right.

24

A.

Since when?

24

Q.

And why did you elect to proceed at that hour and time?

25

Q.

December 12th of '06.

25

A.

We thought that that would be the quietest, easiest way
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180

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11

to. do. it without a IDt of pUblicity and controversy.
Q.

Now, when the police arrived, did you put up any

disturbance?
A.

No, sir. They arrived with Brian -- or Shane, and

Shane evidently gave him my cell phone. We were upstairs
changing the locks so we came down, and they were outside. And
1 -- and Shane called me by name and asked me what we were

doing there and I told him. And they wanted to. come in so 1
let them in, and then they wanted to go upstairs, so. 1 took
them upstairs.
Q.

Were you asked to leave?

A.

No, they didn't know what to. do.. They said it was a

12
13

civil matter, and we said we were the owners, and they said

14

they were. And so we didn't want to. get arrested for so.mething

15
16

Dr Dther, but we decided that we wDuld leave if we could leave

17
18
19

that's what we did and we left.

20

a person there, and they could also leave someone there. So.

Q.

Was there any breach of the peace?

A.

No.

Q.

Was everything peacefully done?

1

or not you do have a secured interest in AlA Insurance's

2

commissions?

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, calls for a legal
conclusion, and his understanding is irrelevant.
THE COURT: I'm going to let Mr. Taylor answer
that. Overruled, you can answer that, Mr. Taylor.
A.

As far as I'm concerned, the only security I have is in

the commissions.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Okay. Now, Mr. Taylor in the event that you are not

Q.

allowed to proceed pursuant to the votes of the shareholders,
the sole share -- or the sole person entitled to vote the
shares yourself, and the meeting of the board of directors, in
other words, if you are not able to proceed in accordance with
the consents Exhibits K and L, are you concerned as to what
will happen to your securities, sir?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, his concern is
irrelevant and also calls for speculation.
THE COURT: Sustained.

21

A.

Yes.

20
21

22

Q.

You left voluntarily?

22

are determined to go forward with the consents that are

A.

That's correct. With the understanding that we CDuid

23

Exhibits K and L?

23

24

both have someone there. So. we took Dur regular people, sent

24

25

them back to Coeur d'Alene and called a IDcal Dne.

25

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Mr. Taylor, can you tell the Court why it is that you

Q.

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, your Honor. The same
objection where he's trying to get around it that his

181

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Q.

Local security people?

A.

Right, with -- they were supposed to. call the police if

someone would come and they didn't do. that so -Q.

Now, take a look at Exhibit N.
MR. MCNICHOLS: M or N?
MR. CRESSMAN: N, please.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

9

Q.

That's a letter that you Signed, Mr. Taylor; correct?

10

A.

CDrrect.

Q.

And in this letter did YDU advise Mr. McNichols that he

11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19

20
21

12

expend any funds of AlA Insurance for the representation of any

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

of the defendants?
A.

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, the document speaks for

THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Mr. Taylor, do you have a security interest pursuant to

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, legal conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, what I'm trying to get
out is not his state of mind, but what losses and damages and
potentially irreparable damages that cannot be recovered
monetarily in the event he's not allowed to proceed. That was
the intent of my question. I don't know how It's state of mind
after I had asked the question two or three times without
leading the witness. I can keep trying.

20

THE COURT: Well, no, I'm just going to move this
along. Overruled, you can answer that, Mr. Taylor.
MR. CRESSMAN: Go ahead, Mr. Taylor.
A.

Mr. Taylor, do you have an understanding as to whether

22
23
24
25
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I didn't hear the questiDn.

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Okay. In the event you cannot proceed pursuant to the

consents, do you have concerns as to what will happen to your
security?
MR. MCNICHOLS: That's not the question. That was
the question to which your Honor sustained my objection.
MR. CRESSMAN: Let me ask the court reporter to
read back the question before my last question.

21

the redemption agreement in AlA Insurance's commissions?

23
25

1 did.

itself.

a.

intentions, his state of mind is not relevant.

9

10
11

was not authorized to represent AlA Insurance in this case or

22

24

183

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

(Thereupon, the requested question was read back
by the cou rt reporter.)
THE COURT: Ask another question, Mr. Cressman.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Mr. Taylor, why is it that you felt necessary to

S~
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184

1

1
2

BY MR. MCNICHOLS:

know, the real records and what's happening. I worked the last

3

had some security people at the offices Sunday morning from

four years on a crop program with no income with the idea it

Coeur d'Alene; is that correct?

proceed in accordance with Exhibits K and L?

2

A.

I have repeatedly tried to get access to what -- you

Mr. Taylor, you have said -- I think you said that you

Q.

3
4
5

would make AIA a way to grow, get back where it was and have

4
5

6

th.e commissions that it did have. Now, as I understand it, I'm

6

Q.

How many security people came from Coeur d'Alene?

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

A.

Three.

Q.

Only three. Who else went there with you besides the

7
8
9
10
11

in the position that Crop's shown separately and I have nothing
left but what's in the -- possibly in AlA. That money's being
used and that money is going down continually every month, I
know that. That's my immediate source to correct my debt -- or
my debt over eight million.

12

Q.

In the event that you are not able to run AlA and your

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

enough left there to pay it now. So I am concerned, yes.

21

22

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

22
23

23
24
25

brother remains running it, do you have concerns over what will
happen to your ability to collect your debt?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, your Honor, it's
irrelevant and calls for the state of mind of the witness, his
concerns.
THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer that,
Mr. Taylor.
A.

Q.

The way it's been going downhill, I question if there's

And assuming you are going to be allowed to comply with

the terms of the consents, how do you intend to run the

24

~~~

~

Correct.

A.

security people then?

A third party observer, so we had a third party

A.

observer unbiased.
Q.

And the locksmith?

A.

Oh, and the locksmith, yeah.

Q.

So there were only six of you all together?

A.

Right.

Q.

And you had three security people because you thought

there would be no kind of a disturbance if you went in at 3: 00
o'clock in the morning, is that why you had three security
people from Coeur d'Alene come down?
No. They told us they only worked eight-hour shifts,

A.

so they were set to go twenty-four hours a day.
Q.

So they were not all three there at the same time?

A.

There was one inside and I don't know where the other

two were if they were outside or where they were.
Weren't there two inside and two out in the car and one

Q.

187

185

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, totally speculative,
your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Has your brother told you recently, your brother John,

that AlA is worth only approximately a million dollars today?
A.

Yes. I have seen other figures as low as six hundred

thousand that we have got from them.
Q.

And do you have an opinion as to where this company's

going?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, calls for speculation.

12

THE COURT: Sustained.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

have access.

22

Cross-examination, Mr. McNichols.

23
24
25

BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Mr. Taylor, is there enough collateral or assets in AlA

today to pay your debt?
A.

I serious doubt it, but I can't answer that until I

Q.

Access to what, sir?

A.

The books, books and the premium and the assets.
MR. CRESSMAN: That's all we have, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cressman.

MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you, your Honor. I have
just a few questions.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23

A.

No, there was one downstairs and there was nobody

upstairs with us.
Q.

Did you testify earlier that all of the interest you

have received since your lawyer'S letter of December 12th was
seventy-five hundred dollars, that's all you have received?

A.

I said I don't know how much I received, but I'd check

with my secretary. And my last deposit was seventy-five
hundred on the first -- or I mean on the 15th, so whenever it
goes in.
Q.

Your testimony is then you just don't remember if you

have received any other interest since the 12th of December
other than the seventy-five hundred?
A.

I assume the rest were in there or she would have told

me, but I know the last one was put in there because I asked
her.
Q.

Well, you either got the paid the interest fifteen

thousand dollars a month or you didn't or you don't know; which
is it?
A.

I don't know.

Q.

You don't remember how much interest you got in the

month of February, for example?
A.

No, I didn't check.

24

Q.

You don't know how much you got in January?

25

A.

I think I got fifteen in January.
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49 of 55 sheets

upstairs with you, five of them?

Page 184 to 187 of 211

5S7

190

18B

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Q.

four years, haven't you?
A.

20
21
22

23

I don't know how long it's been -- no, I don't think

it's been that -- I don't know,
Q.

You don't know. Alright. Now, do you remember the

lock box?
A.

What do you mean, do I remember it?

Q.

Do you remember the lock box program?

A.

Yes,

Q.

And when did the lock box program cease?

A.

I have no idea,

Q.

You have no idea?

A.

No.

Q.

Was it ten years ago?

15
16
17
18
19

Oh, okay. You've been getting fifteen for pretty much

A.

No, it was set up ten years ago.

Q.

But do you know between now and ten years, sometime in

the last ten years it was discontinued; is that correct?
A.

That's the way I understand it.

Q.

But you don't know whether it would be last month or

ten years ago?

A.

I have no idea.

Q.

No idea. Didn't you receive money from the bank when

the lock box program was active?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

that's the first time you ever claimed that your brother or AlA

22
23

that's the first written claim of default you ever made, isn't
it?

24

A.

Well, I got a check. I don't know where it came from.

24

25

Q.

You don't know where it came from. You just got a

25

Q.

So now you know that you have been getting the fifteen

thousand dollars a month, don't you?
A.

I know some months I have got fifteen thousand, and I

know some months I didn't.
Q.

Which months didn't you?

A.

I don't know that off the top of my head.

Q.

Did you tell the Lewiston Police Department that you

were John Taylor?
A.

I definitely did not and I had a witness by me at all

times. And he called me by name when he was downstairs, so I
don't know why -- there was no way I would do that.
Q.

Have you seen the police report?

A.

I saw what you turned in here, yeah, I --

Q.

You saw that they reported that you identified yourself

as John Taylor?
A.

That's what they told me, I didn't read it. But I did

not report myself as John Taylor.
Q.

Now, Mr. Cressman had you look at Exhibit F, that's the

December 12th, 2006, letter from Mr. Moran to your brother,
F as in Frank. My question is, Mr. Taylor, isn't it true that

Services Corporation was in default? The first written --

A.

I think so.

191

189

1
2

check and it didn't say who it came from on the check?

3

goes in my account.

A.

No, I didn't really -- no, I didn't see a check. It

4

Q.

I thought you said you got a check?

5

A.

I received checks.

Q.

But you don't know who they came from?

6
7

8
9
10
11
12

A.

No, I don't come to think of it.

Q.

You don't. So you get checks and you don't know

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

17
18
19

got so much a month I got coming in. My accountant keeps track

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20

of~

W

whether you get them or not?
MR. CRESSMAN: Objection, your Honor, that's not
what he said.
THE COURT: Sustained.

13

BY MR. MCNICHOLS:

14
15

lock box, how do you know you haven't been paid more by AlA

16

Service Corporation?

21
22

23
24

25

Q.

So I guess if you don't know you got money from the

MR. CRESSMAN: Objection, argumentive.
A.

It has nothing to do with the lock box. I know I have

MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you. That's all the questions I
have, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Cressman, any questions in light of
those?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. CRESSMAN:
Q.

Mr. Taylor, with regard to the last question, did you

send a letter of default to AlA Services -- did your lawyer
send a letter of default to AlA Services in 1995 or early 1996
contending that the agreement reached in July of 1995 was in
default?
A.

Oh, in the down payment note, you mean?

Q.

Yes.

A.

I suppose there was on that. I don't recall exactly.

Q.

Did your brother respond to that letter and claim that

there was no default?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Are we talking about written
documents, your Honor, because I'm unaware of these documents,
and it seems to me if that they have documents, they should be
showing them to the witness and providing a copy to me.

MR. MCNICHOLS: So now you know --

21

THE COURT: Excuse me, I'm going to overrule your

22
23

documents with us today.

24

can, Mr. Taylor.

objection, Mr. Cressman.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Excuse me, you Honor.

25

BY MR. MCNICHOLS:
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MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, we don't have the

THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer that if you

A.

Now you are going back to '95 you say?
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1
2

recall specifically.

1
2
3
4
5

BY MR. CRESSMAN:

6

MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, prior to the restructure in
July of '96.

3

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

A.

That was all being accounted by the accountants and

attorneys so I assume there were letters on that, but I can't

Q.

Why did the agreement get restructured in July of 1996?

A.

They didn't have the money to pay me.

Q.

And 50 at that point in time there was a formal

8
9
10

restructu re 7

And we have put up a bond and we are happy to have
the bond continue to protect in the event of any damages or
expenses as a result of the issuing of the temporary
restraining order and the preliminary injunction.
So we believe that while the evidence is
controverted, there's no question there's issues of fact.
guess anybody who ever thought there was an appropriate motion
for summary judgment was certainly incorrect. Again, the
evidence I think overwhelmingly and clearly establishes that

A.

Correct.

11

we -- that status quo is that Mr. John Taylor and the current

Q.

With lawyers involved for both sides?

directors continue to manage the corporation, and the current

MR. MCNICHOLS: I have no re-cross, your Honor.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

THE COURT: Alright. Thank you. Mr. Taylor, you

23

I have cited in our materials. "Substantial likelihood of

24
25

entitled to relief they demanded cannot exist where complex

1

issues of law or fact exist which are not free from doubt." In

13
14

A.

Right.

Q.

And draftee of new documents?

15

A.

Right.

16
17

Q.

And who paid your attorney's fees?

18
19

7

injury.

MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm going to object that that's
repetitious and vastly outside the scope of the
cross-examination.

20

THE COURT: Sustained.

21
22
23
24
25

MR. CRESSMAN: That's all we have, your Honor.

may step down.
Mr. Cressman.

officers continue to manage the business of the corporations
and to preserve the status quo and to prevent irreparable
injury.
Thank you, your Honor.
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I want to start out
with the grounds for a preliminary injunction. And I want to
call the Court's attention to the burden on the person seeking
or entities seeking that injunction. A party is entitled to
such an injunction if he demonstrates substantial likelihood of
success at trial. The Harris case that both Mr. McNichols and

success necessary to demonstrate that the moving parties are

195

193

1
2

MR. CRESSMAN: We have no other witnesses, your
Honor.

3
4
5
6
7

not to argue and then have my worthy colleague make an

8

argument.

9
10
11
12

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. McNichols, any
argument you'd like to present?
MR. MCNICHOLS: Unless your Honor is concerned
about pOints, I would suggest we neither argue -- I'm reluctant

MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I would like to argue.
I think it's significant in light of this situation that
argument -- at least from my client's standpoint be made.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Well, then let me -- I guess I'm

13
14

will be brief. But we have presented both in written and oral

15

testimony evidence that the Plaintiff has taken this self-help

16

action in the middle of the night with security guards present

17
18
19

to change the locks, take over the control of the business and
which is not disputed.

20

irreparable, that both the -- the three defendants that I

the moving party, I should begin at least, your Honor, and I

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

13
14

my view -- in our view, your Honor, in the view of Mr. Reed
Taylor, he's been completely justified in the actions he is
taken. And because of that, there is no doubt and I believe
summary judgment would be appropriate here, and I'll go through
that in a second.
In terms of the operative facts and operative
issues which, as I indicated earlier this morning, is there a
default, and assuming there is a default, was Mr. Taylor,
Reed Taylor authorized in taking the action he did. And the
answers to both of those questions is yes.
I think it's also appropriate to consider with
regard to the injunction portion the comment, the case of Cory
-- or excuse me, Cooper versus Milam where the Court held that

21

represent and other innocent non parties will suffer irreparable

22

injury unless there is an injunction preserving the status quo.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

All we are asking your Honor to do is to enjoin the Plaintiff

23

Mr. Reed Taylor from acting in accordance with those votes, and

from the same behavior that you issued the temporary

24
25

that is inappropriate and improper.

We have also made a showing that we will suffer

restraining order and order to -- order to prevent irreparable
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after a vote of shares has been taken, the vote can not be
enjoined because the vote has already taken place. And that's
exactly the situation here. That's cited on page 3 of our
materials.
The status quo is the current situation which
occurred after the votes have taken place, not sometime prior
to that. And because those votes have taken place, the Court
has presently entered a restraining order enjoining

Now, with regard to the defaults, and we talked

55'1
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1
2
3
4
5

been paid August 1, 2005. No.2, the interest has not been

6

paid. The interest according to Aimee Gordon, the accounting

198

about this on Monday, but the stock pledge agreement, Exhibit

1

that there's been some kind of modification of this

C, Section 7, addresses this, and there are several significant

2
3
4
5

arrangement. The testimony was by Mr. John Taylor that near

defaults. No.1 default is the money. The principle of six
million dollars has not been paid. It was supposed to have

7

manager, is approximately two million one hundred thousand

8
9

dollars as set forth in Paragraph 5 of her affidavit. It has

prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting

14

principles. They clearly reflect, which I would maintain is

No. 1.
No.2 default, the company's insolvent. The Court
can look at the balance sheets, the testimony was they were

Mr. Reed Taylor would never sign up on the deal, he would never
sign up and, therefore, it didn't go anywhere. Then he

6
7
8

thereafter, or approximately three months maybe it's four,

9

reaches an oral deal that somehow modifies this agreement.

not been paid. So the money hasn't been paid, that's default

10
11
12
13

the end of year 2002 there was discussion involving lawyers but

10
11
12
13
14

testifies somehow miraculously he and his brother sitting in an
office -- in his offices in March of 2003 some three months

Now, this agreement was restructured in 1996 when
the company couldn't pay, it was restructured with the
assistance of lawyers. The company actually paid
Mr. Reed Taylor's fees to the tune of fifty-five -- or up to
fifty-five thousand dollars for that. At the end of 2002

15

the operative standard, the company is insolvent because its

15

lawyers were involved, Idaho -- BOise counsel as

16

liabilities exceed its assets. No.2, the company's insolvent

16

Mr. John Taylor indicated was involved. And yet somehow he

17
18
19

on the other normally accepted test of insolvency that the

17
18
19
20

would like us -- this Court to believe that an oral deal was

20
21
22
23
24
25

company cannot pay its bills, cannot pay Mr. Reed Taylor's
debt.
There are other defaults, the failure to provide

reached in March of '03 between he and his brother with no
witnesses.
Weli, first of all, such an arrangement vioiates

financial statements, the failure to guarantee -- this is a

21

the statute of frauds as we have set forth in our materials.

significant default, not the failure to guarantee, the

22
23
24
25

It Violates the bold legend on the promissory note Exhibit A

guarantee of an unrelated company's fifteen million dollar debt
which presently is at five million dollars which is presently
in default per the terms of that loan agreement because of the

referring to that statute of frauds. And for that reason
alone, it's barred. Secondly -- and firstly, it never took
place. Secondly -- and for that reason alone, they are not

197

199

1

inability of AlA Insurance to pay its debts and AlA Insurance's

1

entitled -- I mean because of this issue, and if there's any

2

insolvency. So that is a significant default.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

doubt about what the position is, we believe it's clearly --

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

NOW, we have also heard testimony today of the
commingling of affairs. We have heard testimony that the
chairman and -- excuse me, Chief Executive Officer and
President of AlA gets paid by AlA, doesn't get paid for
Crop USA and he owns 40 percent and is the largest single
shareholder of Crop USA. The employees of AlA also work for
Crop USA. Improper.
Now, what I would submit is occurring is that

10

and it's a summary judgment issue in favor of Mr. Reed Taylor.
One, there wasn't an agreement; and, two, if there was, it was
barred by statute of frauds -- No.1, there wasn't an
agreement; No.2, it's barred by the statute of frauds; and
No.3, the burden, if the statute of frauds doesn't apply, is
that Mr. John Taylor must prove this agreement with clear and
convincing evidence.
Now, the Court has heard the witnesses, there is

11

no clear and convincing evidence under the facts that I have

Insurance to Crop USA to get out from under the debt of his

12

just related. And because there is no clear and convincing

brother, and he's done a very good job of that because of the

13

eVidence, Mr. John Taylor and the defendants In question are
not entitled to any preliminary injunction because they haven't

Mr. John Taylor is attempting to shift the business of AlA

present situation of this company today versus what it was more

14

than ten years ago when Mr. Reed Taylor was the majority

15

demonstrated their likelihood of their success at trial. In

shareholder. The Court can comment or can review its own view

16

fact, quite to the contrary, Mr. Reed Taylor, I believe, has

of the credibility of Mr. Taylor, John Taylor.

indicated the likelihood that he will succeed at trial.

agreement Exhibits C. The financial statements, they were

17
18
19
20

of special meeting of shareholders, his lawyer Patrick Moran

required to provide audited statements, they were not provided.

21

out of Bellevue sent that to Mr. John Taylor. That notice

Commission statements, weekly, monthly and other data as the

22
23
24
25

clearly stated his Intent to call -- he called a special

There is also the default for failing to provide
the information required by Section 4 of the stock pledge

testimony indicated was not provided.
Now, let me now address -- before I address
entitlement to vote the shares, the position of the defendants
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Now, I want to address the right to vote the
shares, your Honor. Mr. Reed Taylor signed a 12-12-06 notice

meeting for December 26th. He indicated in his notice the
purpose of the meeting was to replace the board of directors
and thereafter convene a board meeting and replace the

9.40
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13

a sole shareholder or shareholders to consent to the action if

forth in the brief in the exhibits, that meeting was rebuked,
not allowed to happen, told him he couldn't show up.

3

Mr. Taylor did. He had given two notices or more than that

Thereafter he set up another meeting for February

5 with a

notice transmitted in January.
There were numerous letters, there was a response
from Miss Duclos. Hard for me to believe the testimony of
Mr. John Taylor that she acted on her own with regard to that.
She responded that it required a 20 percent of the shareholders
to approve that and that the shareholder was AlA Services and
he didn't have a right. Mr. Taylor responded with an

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

they are acting unanimously. And that is exactly what

because the letters that he sent and his lawyer sent also
indicated what his desire was. There was no misunderstanding
what he was asking for. And he was trying to do it with a
meeting and the defendants said no, no. We are stonewalling
you, we sent -- DUclos writes a letter that's written by a
lawyer in Chicago, a Crop USA lawyer that says, you know, you
don't have a right to call a meeting. When he did have a right
to call a meeting. He very clearly had a right to call a

appropriate letter when she said to produce your authority. He

12

meeting. If the Court remembers, and l'm not going to go

did. And he had other correspondence in response to that.

through this at length, but Exhibit C, paragraph section 7 --

interest in AlA lnsurance and may have the right to take the

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

14

After his February 1 letter, he had a February 2 letter. In

15

all instances, reiterating his desire and his intention to

16
17
18
19

202

1
2

officers. That -- 1 won't belabor the details that are set

replace the board at this special meeting. His brother even
commented in his letters that he may have a right to do that.
In the Exhibit AE, second paragraph, first
sentence, "We acknowledge that Reed Taylor has a security

excuse me section 6 is very clear on the rights. And these
rights were bargained for and they're contractual rights as to
Mr. Reed Taylor's voting rights. On the occurrence or
continuation of a default, pledgor's right to exercise such
voting rights shall immediately cease and terminate and all
voting rights with respect to the pledged collateral shall rest

20
21
22

actions outlined in your letter to Mr. Moran." And Exhibit AF,

21

The foregoing sentence shall constitute and grant to the

Mr. John Taylor states, last sentence, ''If negotiations

22

secured party an irrevocable proxy coupled with an interest to

23

eventually fail, I fully recognize that Mr. Taylor may take

23

vote the pledged collateral upon the occurrence and

24

actions he deems appropriate including calling a special

24

continuation of default.

25

shareholder's meeting."

25

solely and exclusively in Reed Taylor. J'm substituting words.

It could not be more clear. He had an absolute

201

1
2

And again, 1 posit the question I asked to
Mr. John Taylor, why was he even having negotiations if he had

203

1

right to vote those shares. And he had a right as soon as

2
3
4

there was a default and he did so. He called for a meeting,

5

move forward.

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

review all the company's cash records and disbursements." He

11

such documents as pledgor's attorney in fact. And if there's

12

had that right anyway. 1 find that very interesting. And in

12

any question, that's what Mr. Taylor did when he signed those

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

each instance, his effort was rebuked.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

consents when he had that meeting. Again, such power of

common stock. And that's not there but it was all the stock as

and l'm reading from my brief, and I think we have got a typo

21

testified by John Taylor. Standing in the name of the

there, your Honor. But it basically says written demands

22

undersigned on the books of AlA lnsurance, lnc., and
represented by certificate numbers 10 and 11.

20
21
22

such an amended deal with his brother? Why was he negotiating?
And in response to -- in Exhibit AE 1 find it very interesting
on the third page. He says, John Taylor's letter to Mr. Moran
of January -- or excuse me, December 21, ''If Mr. Taylor
withdraws his request for a shareholder's meeting, we would
agree -- if Mr. Taylor withdraws his request, he's going to -if he withdraws it, we will allow Mr. Taylor to be apPointed to
the board." He had that right anyway. "Allow Mr. Taylor to

Now, 1 want to call the Court's attention to the
statute, ldaho Code 30-1-7021(b) which specifically says that a
corporation shall hold a special meeting of shareholders if the
holders of at least 20 percent of all the votes entitled to be
cast on any issue propose to be considered. And it says if the
holders of at least 20 percent of all the votes Signed, date
and deliver to the corporation one or more de -- corporation,

6
7
8
9
10

23

describing the purposes for the meeting will be held. That was

23

24

done, it was refused.

24

25

And then the consent action under ldaho law allows

25
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the meeting was rebuffed two times and then he exercised his
rights as a sole Shareholder to utilize a consent procedure to

1 think it's also appropriate for the Court to
conSider Section 1 point -- excuse me, 11.2 on page 11 of
Exhibit C, which says that pledgor will sign such additional
documents, et cetera. And second sentence, "Pledgor hereby
grants the secured party a power of attorney to execute any

attorney is coupled with an interest and shall be irrevocable
until the secured obligations have been fully and finally paid.
And attached is the assignment separate from the
certificate signed by John Taylor that the underSigned,
John Taylor, on behalf of AlA Services Corporation, hereby
assigns and transfers to Reed J. Taylor all of the shares of

1 understand the Court's concern over the events
that happened last Sunday, but this was a very frustrating

5l.4L

206

204
situation for Mr. Reed Taylor. He had the right, a lot of

2

money was paid to lawyers to draft these documents, and he had

3

the absolute right to vote those shares, to have those

4
5

meetings. Those rights were denied and then he had the
absolute right to consent and take the action as the only

6

person authorized to vote those shares. And he has done that,

7
8

he has dismissed the board, he has dismissed the officers, and
they have no authority to act any longer. That is the status

9

quo. Now, they somehow would like the Court to undue that,

10
11
12
13
14
15

that would take a mandatory injunction to undo that. That the
Court can't do without a very high burden. The act has taken
place, it is done as the case that we cite on page 3 of our
brief talks about.
I think the Articles of Incorporation are
particularly appropriate. Article 10, Sections 3 and 4, "Any

16

and all of the directors of the corporation may be removed at

17
18

issued and outstanding voting stock of the corporation."

19

Paragraph 4, "The board of directors is especially authorized

20
21
22
23
24
25

to remove at any time, with or without cause, any officers of

any time with or without cause by the holders of a majority of

the corporation." This is the governing corporate document.
So in short, there have been defaults, there have been
significant defaults. Mr. Reed Taylor had the power and
authority to take the actions he took and was rightful when he
did it. The actions have taken place, he is the sole director,

1
2

Services Corporation or AlA Insurance in person, by telephone

3
4

that, but obviously Mr. Taylor, should the Court determine, we

5
6
7

that should not -- that should not be necessary.

argument, believe that an injunction should issue, the bond

8
9

million dollars and he's being denied the opportunity -- and

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

or by written communication." Frankly, there is no need for

believe inappropriately, to issue a preliminary injunction,

Now, with regard should the Court, contrary to my

must be very substantial because Mr. Taylor is owed eight

he's being denied the opportunity to even investigate and
determine what's been going on with Crop USA where we believe
the assets of AlA have been siphoned. And, in fact, he cannot
even protect -- do anything, he can't see what's gone on, he
has to -- the only recourse he has is through very expensive
legal proceedings. He cannot bring an action on behalf of the
corporation unless he as an officer's authorized to do that,
which we maintain he is. So a preliminary injunction would be
very detrimental to the interest of Mr. Reed Taylor.
We have demonstrated that the Defendants have not
met their burden of proof. The Defendants will not be -- one
of the -- they have to demonstrate that they are likely to
prevail but they also have to demonstrate irreparable harm, and
they have not demonstrated that either. There is no
irreparable harm. Based on the status of this company, it
might be better off for Mr. Reed Taylor to go in and do

207

205

1

he is the sole officer, and the Court cannot issue a

1

something inappropriate because he's the only one that could

2
3
4

preliminary injunction that is incredibly broad. And bear with

2

satisfy a judgment. He's -- he will accept full fiduciary

me while I look at the proposed order. "That he not vote or
attempt to vote shares of stock in AlA Insurance." That is

5

directly contrary to Article 7 of the stock pledge agreement.

6

"He not vote or attempt to vote shares of stock in AlA

3
4
5
6

the money for this company. He made it what it was at one

7
8
9

Insurance." Well, he had that right, they gave it to him, it's

7

point in time. He knows how to sell these insurance products,

very clear. There has been a default. The Court's being asked

8
9

he's demonstrated it time and time again. He's a wealthy man

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

to take away rights that he bargained for and take away his
contractual rights. There is no indication that these folks

10

are likely to prevail on the merits.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

"Not to act or attempt to act as a director or
officer of AlA Insurance." Well, he's taken the acts necessary
to accomplish that and he's done so rightfully. And to change
the cou rse of history here, when those acts have been done, the
Court cannot do.

17
18

Corporation." Well, if he can't do that, he can't do anything

19

in terms of operating this business as the on Iy authorized

20
21
22
23
24
25

person to act in the corporate governance at this time.

"Not to enter the premises of AlA Services

Now, actually the last one is actually something
we probably can agree to, I mean assuming there is an
injunction, "not to harass or annoy." Now, annoy might be a
problem because sometimes we do annoy people when we don't mean
to, but "harass directly or indirectly any employee of AlA
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responsibility for his actions as an officer and director, and
is willing to do that. He successfully ran this company for
many years. He operated it, he was the champion, he brought in

because of it. He's very talented. He is an American dream
story from selling encyclopedias -- this guy can sell anything.
He's an honest straight-forward man and there is going to be no
irreparable harm should he run this company. The only thing
that will occur is that the company will run, it will operate.
It will operate appropriately with Mr. Reed Taylor at the helm.
It will do better than it's done, and he will very much have at
least a chance of recouping some of the eight million dollars
when he essentially sold out to his brother in 1995. And his
brother has taken full advantage of that since that time.
Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cressman.
Mr. McNichols, anything further?
MR. MCNICHOLS: I will be very brief, your Honor.
First of all, the Harris case deals with a
mandatory injunction and we are not seeking that. We have
proposed a consent order that will provide Mr. Taylor with all

5(0'254 of 55 sheet
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1
2

suggest to your Honor that actions speak louder than words.

3

There is certainly an irreconcilable conflict between the

4

testimony of Mr. Reed Taylor and Mr. John Taylor. But for

5

example on the lock box, for ten years they haven't had a lock

6
7

box agreement. And would the Court now find that
Mr. John Taylor was in default for not having -- or not

8
9

haven't had a lock box agreement in ten years. For four years,

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

kinds of protection against any improper conduct. And I would

Mr. John Taylor, but the corporation is in default because they

almost four years the corporation -- AlA Services Corporation

10

has been performing, making the reduced payments as agreed.

11

That's the evidence. Those are the actions. That money has

12
13
14
15
16

been paid and accepted and no default claimed for four years.
That, your Honor, we suggest is the best evidence to show that
there is -- that the agreements were amended. There is no
default.

17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

And the concern, I trust for your Honor and for my
Clients is that if you don't enjoin Mr. Reed Taylor, he will be
back. We know what he will do. We know that he will hire, at
his statement, three security people from Coeur d'Alene and
bring two others in the middle of the night to change the
locks. We know what he will do.
Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you Mr. McNichols.
Well, a lot has happened here in the last few days

him.
THE COURT: Anything else then, Mr. Cressman?
MR. CRESSMAN: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Alright. Thank you. This matter is
under advisement then until further order of the court. And
thank you, gentlemen, for your presentations today.
MR. CRESSMAN: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you, your Honor.
(Thereupon, the hearing was in recess at 5:06
p.m.)

17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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1
2

and now I have heard a substantial amount of testimony today in
support of the request for the preliminary injunction. I want

3

to have the opportunity to review these documents and

4

additionally the memorandums that the parties submitted to me

5

yesterday, I think in advance of this hearing. At this time

6
7
8
9

then the request for the preliminary injunction is going to be

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

under advisement. The temporary restraining order that I
entered on Monday will remain in effect until I rule on the
request for the preliminary injunction, and by that ruling
either dissolve that temporary restraining order or issue a
preliminary injunction in the same or some modified fashion.
With that then, this matter is under advisement.
Mr. McNichols, do you have anything else for the record at this
time?

1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

MR. MCNICHOLS: Nothing, your Honor.

17

THE COURT: Mr. Cressman, anything for the record

18
19
20
21

at this time?
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, Mr. Bond would like me to
make one more argument, your Honor. Do you want to hear it?
THE COURT: No, I gave you your shot.
MR. CRESSMAN: He's been chomping at the bit all
day, your Honor. I would actually make it for him.
THE COURT: Usually you only let one person do it.
MR. CRESSMAN: I understand, your Honor. I failed
to pick up one of his pOints, I'm sorry, and I apologized to

22
23
24
25
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,
PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S MOTION
FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;

WITH ORAL ARGUMENT

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court for a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the Defendants from paying any retainers, payments, and

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - 1

814

ORIGINAL

posting any collateral or security for the payment of any and all attorneys' fees and costs
incurred by any of the Defendants R. John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, or Bryan Freeman in
this action:
I. INTRODUCTION

The Defendants' sole defense thus far in this action has been that Reed Taylor
entered the offices of AlA Insurance to change the locks when he had not been paid the
$8,000,000 owed to him.

Based upon this flawed argument, Defendants were able to

persuade the Court to maintain what they contend is the status quo over vehement
objections from Reed Taylor based upon the significant corporate malfeasance which
defines the status quo.
While disingenuously representing to the Court at the time of the hearing on
Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction that AlA Insurance would be operated
under the normal course of business, the Defendants unilaterally elected to unlawfully
circumvent proper corporate governance by scheduling a shareholder meeting of AlA
Services to gain approval to pay their attorneys' fees and costs without approval from
Reed Taylor or the Court. Not only would the payment of such funds constitute a
fraudulent transfer, illegal dividend, and unlawful transfer of funds Reed Taylor holds a
valid security interest, but the Defendants' actions occurred without notice to the Court or
Reed Taylor. Their actions are simply another of a long list of reasons why what they
maintain is the status quo cannot be maintained.
The Defendants should be retrained from paying funds, providing retainers, or
posting any security or collateral which are derived in any way from AlA Insurance for
the payment the attorneys' fees and costs in this action incurred by R. John Taylor, JoLee

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - 2

Duclos and Bryan Freeman.
II. RELIEF REQUESTED

Reed Taylor requests that the Court enter an order restraining the Defendants
from tendering any funds or assets of AIA Insurance, Inc. for retainers or payments
(including any assets which could be pledged for the security for the foregoing) for any
and all attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action by the Defendants R. John Taylor,
JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman.
III. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON

Reed Taylor relies on this Motion, the Court's file and all prior filings (including,
without limitation, the transcript of the hearing held on March 1, 2007, attached to the
Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Motion for Reconsideration), the Affidavit
of Reed J. Taylor in Support of Temporary Restraining Order, and the Affidavit of
Roderick C. Bond in Support of Temporary Restraining Order.
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Reed Taylor's Second Amended Complaint expressly prays for the following
relief:
Enjoining the Defendants from using or transferring any funds, assets or services
of AIA Insurance for the purpose of providing any retainers or payment for legal
services for R. John Taylor, Bryan Freeman, JoLee Duclos and Connie Taylor.
Second Amended Complaint, p. 20,

~

14.5(h).

Reed Taylor' Second Amended

Complaint also specifically prays for the following relief:
For a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants from
transferring, encumbering or otherwise disposing of any improperly and/or
fraudulently obtained and/or transferred assets under I.e. § 55-916, et seq. and/or
other applicable legal authority.
Second Amended Complaint, pp. 22-23, ~ 14.5.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - 3

Under the tenns of the Amended and Restated Security Agreement, AlA Services
and AlA Insurance, provided Reed Taylor a security interest in "all of their right, title and
interest in and to the Commission Collateral." See Plaintiffs Exhibit E to the Hearing
held on March 1, 2007, p. 2 § 2; Second Amended Complaint, p. 5, , 2.11. Reed Taylor
has a perfected security interest in all of AIA Services and AIA Insurance's commissions
and proceeds of such commissions and priority over all others. Affidavit of Roderick C.
Bond, Ex. 2.
Under the tenns of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, AIA
Services agreed to "not loan funds to any affiliate other than its wholly owned
Subsidiaries or as authorized by its existing Articles of Incorporation ... " See Plaintiffs
Exhibit C to the Hearing held on March 1, 2007, p. 6, § 4.8.
On December 12, 2006, counsel for Reed Taylor advised AIA Insurance, AIA
Services and R. John Taylor that AlA Insurance or AIA Services were not authorized to:
pay dividends, make distributions, increase wages, pay bonuses, enter into any
material contracts or take any other actions outside the ordinary course, or the
result of which may materially adversely impact the business without the written
consent of Reed Taylor.
See Plaintiffs Exhibit F to the Hearing held on March 1,2007, p. 2.
On February 25, 2007, Reed Taylor wrote a letter to Michael McNichols
demanding that no funds from AlA Insurance, Inc. be expending representing the
Defendants. See Plaintiffs Exhibit N to the Hearing held on March 1, 2007. Prior to
February 25, 2007, counsel for Reed Taylor advised Michael McNichols and David
Gittins that Reed Taylor would not consent to AIA Insurance's funds being used to pay
the attorneys' fees and costs of the Defendants R. John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan
Freeman. Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond,
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
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The Defendant John Taylor executed a letter on behalf of AIA Services dated
March 16, 2007, to the shareholders of AIA Services regarding a special shareholder
meeting for the purposes of obtaining approval to pay the attorneys' fees and costs
incurred in this action by the Defendants R. John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan
Freeman. A copy of the foregoing letter is incorporated by reference into this Motion and
attached as Exhibit A.
The Defendant JoLee Duclos executed the Notice of Special Meeting of
Shareholders of AIA Services dated March 16, 2007. A copy of the foregoing Notice is
incorporated by reference and attached as Exhibit B.
The Defendant John Taylor executed a letter to the Directors and Shareholders of
ALA Services and AIA Insurance regarding his request for fees dated March 1, 2007. A
copy of the foregoing letter is incorporated by reference into this Motion and attached as
Exhibit C.

The Defendant IoLee Duclos executed a letter to the Directors and Shareholders
of AIA Services and AlA Insurance regarding her request for the payment of fees dated
March 16, 2007. A copy of the foregoing letter is incorporated by reference into this
Motion and attached as Exhibit D.
The Defendant Bryan Freeman executed a letter to the Directors and Shareholders
of AIA Services and AIA Insurance regarding his request for the payment of fees dated
March 16, 2007. A copy of the foregoing letter is incorporated by reference into this
Motion and attached as Exhibit E.
Also enclosed with the above documents were letters of resignation for JoLee
Duclos and Bryan Freeman as directors of ALA Insurance and ALA Services. Copies of
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the foregoing letters are incorporated by reference into this Motion and attached as
Exhibit F.

The Defendants never provided Reed Taylor notice or copies of the documents
regarding the Special Shareholder Meeting of AlA Services. Affidavit or Reed Taylor,
2.

~

Reed Taylor has not authorized or consented to the payment of attorneys' fees and

costs incurred in this action by John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos.
Counsel for the Defendants never provided notice or copies of the documents
regarding the Special Shareholder Meeting of AIA Services to Reed Taylor's counsel.
Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond, ~ 3.
V. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the
adverse party or the party's attorney if:
(1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified
complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the
applicant before the adverse party or the party's attorney can be heard in
opposition, and
(2) the applicant's attorney certified to the court in writing the efforts, if any,
which have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting the party's
claim that notice should not be required.
LR.C.P. 65(b). The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to "maintain the status

quo during the interim and until a hearing can be held after notice to the adverse party on
the application for a preliminary injunction." Wood v. Wood, 96 Idaho 100, 101, 524
P.2d 1072 (1974).
The present status quo is to not permit any funds, assets or security from AlA
Insurance or derived from AIA Insurance for being diverted or utilized in any way for the
purpose of paying the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action by the Defendants
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
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John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman.

In addition to the status quo, the

arguments below provide additional authority why a restraining order should be entered.

A.

AlA Insurance May NOT Make any Dividends or Distributions.

Authorizations for the advance of expenses for directors must be approved by
disinterested directors or by the shareholders.

I.e. § 30-1-853.

AIA Insurance's board of directors would need to approve any dividends and
because the board is comprised of only interested parties, Reed Taylor's vote would be
required to declare any dividends from AlA Insurance to AIA Services. Through his
Affidavit, Reed Taylor has expressly stated that he votes against all such actions.
Even if AIA Insurance was not required to obtain Reed Taylor's vote, it is not
permitted to make a dividend to AlA Services.

Under

I.e.

§ 30-1-640, a board of

directors may authorize a corporation to make dividends to its shareholders, provided
that:
No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect: (a) The corporation would
not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business; or
(b) The corporation's total assets would be less than the sum of its total
liabilities ...

Le. § 30-1-640(3).

Because AIA Insurance and AlA Services are unable to pay their

debts as they become due and/or their assets are worth less than their total liabilities, no
money may be distributed or diverted from AlA Insurance for any purpose, including,
without limitation, for the payment of the John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, and Bryan
Freeman's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action.

III
III
III
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B.

The Defendants May NOT Make Any Self-Dealing Transactions or
Transfers to Accommodate Their Improper Requests for the Payment
of Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

Directors and officers of a corporation hold corporate funds in trust, and any
attempt by them to divert such funds to their personal interest is violative of the trust.
Riley v. Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho 525, 155 P. 665 (1916). Corporate directors are
fiduciaries and may not appropriate corporate assets or opportunities for their own gain
and close scrutiny is given to all corporate actions in which directors have a financial
interest. Kidwell ex reI. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1292 (Ct. App. 1979).
John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos are all shareholders of Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc. All of them are benefiting from the resources, funds and assets of
AIA Insurance which have been improperly and unlawfully utilized to the detriment of
Reed Taylor. These Defendants are not entitled to indemnification for their actions and
are not entitled to have their attorneys' fees and costs paid with AIA Insurance funds.

C.

The Defendants May NOT Make Any Fraudulent Transfers to
Accommodate Their Requests for the Payment of Their Attorneys'
Fees and Costs.

Any attempt to delay or defraud a creditor is void against all creditors. I.C. § 55906. Transfers are fraudulent as to present and future creditors when:
(1) A transfer is made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor.. .if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (a) With the
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor or the debtor. ..
I.C. § 55-913(1). Under I.C. § 55-914, transfers are fraudulent to present creditors when:
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation
and the debtor was insolvent at the time or the debtor became insolvent as a result
of the transfer or obligation.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
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(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose clam arose
before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an
antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had
reasonable cause to be1iefthat the debtor was insolvent.
I.C. § 55-914(1)-(2). "A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater
than all of the debtor's assets, at fair valuation ... or. .. [when a debtor] is generally not
paying his or her debts as they become due ... " I.C. § 55-911(1)-(2).
Creditors have the right to avoid fraudulent transactions, attach against assets and
to obtain an injunction against further disposition of assets. I.C. § 55-916.
Here, AIA Services and AIA Insurance are insolvent and the Defendants are
attempting to utilize funds or assets from AIA Insurance to delay, hinder, and/or defraud
Reed Taylor by attempting to unlawfully use said funds to pay the attorneys' fees and
costs of John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman. However, the Defendants are
barred from doing so by I.e. § 55-901, et seq.

D.

Reed Taylor Is Entitled to Take Possession of the Commission
Collateral.

Upon a default, a secured party "may take possession of the collateral..." I.C. §
28-9-609(a). A secured party may proceed under I.e. § 28-9-609(a) pursuant to judicial
process. I.C. § 28-9-609(b).
Here, Reed Taylor has a valid security interest in the Commission Collateral of
AIA Services and AIA Insurance and has the right to take possession of the collateral.
AIA Services is in default of the Amended and Restated Security Agreement (plaintiff s
Exhibit E to the Hearing held on March 1, 2007), the Amended and Restated Stock
Pledge Agreement (plaintiff's Exhibit C to the Hearing held on March 1, 2007), and the
Promissory Note (Plaintiffs Exhibit A to the Hearing held on March 1, 2007).
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
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Reed Taylor has the right under Idaho law and the parties' various agreements to
take possession of all the Commission Collateral, together with the right to prevent any of
such funds from being utilized for the payment of the legal fees of the Defendants. Reed
Taylor has exercised his rights as a secured creditor and the Defendants should be
restrained from using any funds or assets derived from AIA Insurance to pay any of the
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action by John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and
JoLEe Duclos.

E.

Reed Taylor Should NOT Be Required To Post Security for the
Temporary Restraining Order.

Under I.R.C.P. 65(c), the court must order a party to provide security for the
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.

I.R.C.P. 65(c). This rule is

mandatory unless "the trial court makes a specific finding based upon competent
evidence that no such costs, damages or attorney fees will result to the restrained party as
a result of wrongfully issuing of the injunction or order." Hutchins v. Trombley, 95
Idaho 360, 364, 509 P.2d 579 (1973).
Here, Reed Taylor has a valid security interest in AIA Services and AIA
Insurance's

Commission Collateral-the same funds

the Defendants wish to

inappropriately and unlawfully divert to pay their attorneys' fees and costs. No bond or
security should be required as Reed Taylor has a legal right to the possession of such
funds. In addition, the Defendants' actions are unlawful under all of the authority set
forth above.
Moreover, no bond should be required because Reed Taylor is owed over
$8,000,000 and the relief requested only bars funds from AIA Insurance to be used to pay
the legal fees and costs ofthe Defendants John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
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VI. CONCLUSION
Under anyone or more of the above arguments, the Court should restrain the
Defendants from paying any funds, providing any retainers or pledging any security or
assets for the payment of the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action by John
Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman. Reed Taylor has a valid security interest in all
such funds and has refused to permit such transfers. No bond or security should be set
because no damages will result to the Defendants by way of the temporary restraining
order and, if damages did result, they could be simply offset from the $8,000,000 owed to
Reed Taylor.
If any funds were paid for the attorneys' fees and costs of the Defendants John
Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman, the Court should order the Defendants and
their counsel to return any funds paid or provided for as payment or retainer for their
attorneys' fees and costs by AIA Insurance or AIA Services to AIA Insurance.
DATED this 28 th day of March, 2007.

SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC

AHLERS &
By.

=SS7:~:"

~

Roderi~ond

Ned A. Cannon
Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and
correct copy of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Proposed Restraining Order on the following party(s) via the methodes) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for AIA Services Corporation, AIA
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Signed this 28th day of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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AlA Services Corporation
One Lewis Clark Plaza

PO Box 538

AlA Services

Lewiston,ldaho 83501·0536
(206) 799-9000 FfV!. (206) 746-8159

March 16, 2007

Dear Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation.
As President and Chairman of AlA Services Corporation, I am calling a special meeting
of the shareholders. I ask you for your support in defending the Company, its whollyowned subsidiary, AlA Insurance, Inc., its directors and shareholders from a lawsuit that
has been filed by the former majority shareholder, Reed J. Taylor.
The former majority shareholder has filed suit in the 2nd District Court of Idaho against
the Company, AlA Insurance, Inc., directors, Jolee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, and me.
The former majority shareholder alleges that the company is in default of its obligations
to him, that the directors have thwarted his efforts to allow him to legally take control of
AlA Insurance, Inc., and for other acts that have allegedly diminished the assets of AlA
Insurance to his detriment.
The Company and other defendants deny the accusations and have pledged to
vigorously defend the Company and themselves against the allegations. The Company
intends to file counterclaims against the plaintiff for damages for his continuous and
nefarious interference with the operations of the Company, inappropriate and damaging
actions with regard to the Company's agency force, and for slander against the business
to the public and the associations which we represent.
This special meeting has been called to authorize payment of attorneys' fees for the
current Board of Directors, John Taylor, Jolee Duclos and Bryan Freeman. Since the
former majority shareholder has sued all the current directors, we are asking for
shareholder authorization to expend corporate funds to defend against the action.
Idaho Code 30-1-853 provides that a corporation may advance funds to pay the
reasonable expenses incurred by a director who is a party to a proceeding because
he/she is a director. Usually this authority to advance funds for defending against
lawsuits is granted by the disinterested directors of the Board of Directors. In this case,
the entire Board is named in the suit. Therefore, through this vote of the shareholders,
we ask for your support of the resolution.
If you would like a copy of the complaint filed in this matter, please contact me at
208.799.9000. Thank you very much.
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EXHIBIT A

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION
111 Main Street
Lewiston, ID 83501

NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS
TO BE HELD March 28, 2007
10:00 a.m. (Pacific Time)

To Shareholders:
A Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation will be
held at the offices of AlA Insurance, 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho, in the
second floor conference room, at 9:00 a.m. (pn on Wednesday, March 28,
2007, for the following purpose:
1)

Authorization of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 301-853(3)(b) for R. John Taylor, JoLee K. Duclos and Bryan
Freeman.
.

By ore;, of the Boc.: .rd of Directors,

9?t~~i'Jf/vd;,;eJ
JoLee K. Duclos
Corporate Secretary
March 16,2007
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R. JOHN TAYLOR
2020 Broadview
Lewiston,ID 83501

March 1, 2007
AlA Services Corporation
P.o. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 83501
Re:

Reed J. Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et. al.

TO: Directors and Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation
I'm writing this letter. pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-1-853 and the Articles of
Incorporation and ARTICLE XI of the By-Laws of the corporation. I have bcen named
in this litig~tion as a defendant in my capacity as an officer and director of AIA Services
Corporation.
I'm writing to affinn my good faith belief that I have met the relevant standard of
conduct described in Idaho Code § 30-1-851; any conduct in my official capacity was in
the best interest of the corporation and in all cases that my conduct was never opposed to
the best interests of the corporation, that indemnification is permissible under the Articles.
ofIncorporation of AIA Services Corporation and with respect to any employee plan, that
I reasonably believed that my actions were in the best interests of the participants and
beneficiaries of the plan.
I promise to repay any funds advanced for my defense if I am 110t entitled to mandatory
indemnification under § 30-1-852 and it is ultimately determined under § 30-1-854 or 301-855 that I have not met the relevant standard of conduct described in § 30-1-851, Idaho
Code.
Very trulY"yours,
/

,1
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loLee K. Duclos
2345 Reservoir Road
Clarkston, WA 99403

March 16, 2007

TO:

R. lohn Taylor
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AIA Services Corporation
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AIA Insurance, Inc.

Dear Sirs:
I have enclosed a copy of the following documents:

>
);>

Resignation as a Director of AlA Services Corporation; and
Resignation as a Director of AlA Insurance, Inc.

As you are aware, the above corporations, as well as me individually, are defendants in a
lawsuit filed in Nez Perce County under Case number CV-07-00208. I am writing this
letter pursuant to Idaho Code §30-1-853 and the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of
the above corporations. I have been named in this litigation as a defendant in my
capacity as an officer and director of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.
I am writing to affirm my good faith belief that I have met the relevant standard of
conduct described in Idaho Code §30-1-851; any conduct in my official capacity was in
the best interest of the corporation and in all cases my conduct was never opposed to the
best interests of the corporation; and that indemnification is permissible under the
Articles of Incorporation of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc.

I promise to repay any funds advanced for my defense if I am not entitled to mandatory
indemnification under §30-1-852 and it is ultimately determined under §30-1-854 or §301-855 that I have not met the relevant standard of conduct described in §30-1-8S1, Idaho
Code.
Sincerely,

1 . ee

. Duclos
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Bryan Freeman
425 Crestline Circle Drive
Lewiston,ID 83501

March 16,2007

TO:

R. John Taylor
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AIA Insurance, Inc.

Dear Sirs:
I have enclosed a copy of the following documents:

»
»

Resignation as a Director of AlA Services Corporation; and
Resignation as a Director of AlA Insurance, Inc.

As you are aware, the above corporations, as well as me individually, are defendants in a
lawsuit filed in Nez Perce County under Case number CV-07-00208. I am writing this
letter pursuant to Idaho Code §30-1-853 and the Articles ofIncorporation and Bylaws of
the above corporations. I have been named in this litigation as a defendant in my
capacity as an officer and director of AIA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc.
I am writing to affirm my good faith belief that I have met the relevant standard of
conduct described in Idaho Code §30-1-851; any conduct in my official capacity was in
the best interest of the corporation and in all cases my conduct was never opposed to the
best interests of the corporation; and that indemnification is permissible under the
Articles ofIncorporation of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc.
I promise to repay any funds advanced for my defense if I am not entitled to mandatory
indemnification under §30-1-852 and it is ultimately determined under §30-1-854 or §301-855 that I have not met the relevant standard of conduct described in §30-1-851, Idaho
Code.
Sincerely,

S30
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Resignation as Director of
AlA Insurance, Inc.

TO:

The Board of Directors of AlA Insurance, Inc.

I hereby tender my resignation as Director of AlA Insurance, Inc., effective
5:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, February 22,2007.
Dated this 22 nd day of February, 2007.

Bry

Freeman

5~(
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Resignation as Director of
AlA Services Corporation

TO:

The Board of DIrectors of AlA Services Corporation

I hereby tender my resignation as Director of AlA Services Corporation,
effective 5:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, February 22, 2007.
Dated this 22 nd day of February, 2007.

B
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Resignation as Director of
AlA Services Corporation

TO:

The Board of Directors of AlA Services Corporation

I hereby tender my resignation as Director of AlA Services Corporation,
effective 5:00 p.m. Pa.cific Standard Time, February 22,2007.
Dated this 22 nd day of February, 2007.

Jo
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Resignation as Director of
AlA Insurance, Inc.

TO:

The Board of Directors of AlA Insurance, Inc.

I hereby tender my res"ignation as Director of AlA Insurance, Inc., effective
5:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, February 22,2007.
Dated this 2Znd day of February, 2007.

Jfflk(~tduAJ
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RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISB #7563
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;
Case No.: CV 06-02855
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

v.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)
) ss:
)
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I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, am competent to testify in court, and

am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff Reed Taylor in this action. I make this Affidavit
on my personal knowledge.
2.

On March 28, 2007, counsel for all of the Defendants in the above-entitled

action were served with copies of Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,
the Affidavit of Reed Taylor in Support of Temporary Restraining Order, this Affidavit
and Plaintiff's Proposed Restraining Order. On March 27, 2007, notice was provided to
counsel for the Defendants (Michael McNichols, Jonathan Hally and David Gittins) via
email and the hearing date in time is the same date and time that 2 other motions are
scheduled to be heard. A copy of my email to the Defendants' counsel is attached as
Exhibit 1. In Exhibit 1, I also advised Mr. McNichols that Reed Taylor had a valid

security interest in the funds, that he did not consent to any action to pay any of the
Defendants' attorneys' fees and costs, and that any such payment would be inappropriate
and illegal.
3.

None of the Defendants' counsel provided me or my co-counsel with

copies of the documents pertaining to the Special Shareholder Meeting of AlA Services
or notice that such meeting had been scheduled.

They also never requested Reed

Taylor's consent, approval or vote.
4.

I have previously advised Michael McNichols and David Gittins that Reed

Taylor would not consent to the payment of attorneys' fees and costs incurred by any of
the Directors of AlA Insurance or AlA Services and that AlA Insurance would be
bringing claims against John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman at such time as
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TRO - 2

Reed Taylor is able to take control of AlA Insurance. I also reiterated on numerous
occasions that it would inappropriate for Mr. McNichols to represent AlA Services, AlA
Insurance and John Taylor.
5.

Attached as Exhibit 2 is a copy of Reed Taylor's perfected security

interests in the commissions of AlA Services and AlA Insurance, which I obtained from
my Access Idaho sUbscription. The result summary shows Reed Taylor's previous Lien
filed in 2002 and his present Lien, both of these documents are attached as Exhibit 2. A
subsequent amendment filing was made to correct the incorrect listing of AlA Insurance
as a secured party. This amendment was filed by me and is also attached as Exhibit 2. I
also filed another amendment to add AlA Insurance as a debtor and this amendment is
also attached as Exhibit 2. All of the foregoing documents were accessed, obtained and
printed by using my paid subscription to Access Idaho. Through my search, I was able to
confirm that no other parties had valid security interests in AlA Services and/or AlA
Insurance's commissions.
DATED: This 28 th day of March, 2007.

Roderick C. Bond

Residing at: L..eu.rr5tzrn
My commission expires:
i/2.tJ2lJ12.
AFFIDA VIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and
correct copy of the Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order against the Defendants on the following party(s) via the
methodes) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, AlA
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Signed this 28 th day of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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Roderick C. Bond
From:

Roderick C. Bond

Sent:

Tuesday, March 27, 2007 2:25 PM

To:

'Michael McNichols'; 'David A. Gittins'; 'jhally@clarkandfeeney.com'

Cc:

'pcressman@ac-Iawyers.com'

Subject: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al.
Mike:
As you know, we obtained copies of AlA Services' proposed special shareholder meeting to attempt to obtain
payment of John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos' attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action. This
is yet another example of how abnormal the present status quo is at AlA.
Any funds transferred from AlA Insurance must be approved by Reed Taylor's vote, which notice is hereby
provided to you that Reed Taylor will vote in opposition to any meeting or corporate action involving the payment
of attorneys' fees and costs of the above-named defendants.
Reed Taylor does not consent to the use of any funds or assets derived from AlA Insurance to pay the attorneys'
fees and costs of the above-named defendants. Any transfer, loan, advance or conveyance of AlA Insurance
funds or assets to AlA Services or any other party constitutes a fraudulent conveyance, illegal dividend,
inappropriate corporate action, the unlawful distribution of funds in which Reed Taylor holds a valid security
interest and a continuation of the ongoing conflicts of interest and associated legal ramifications pertaining to your
representation of AlA Services, AlA Insurance and John Taylor.
This email also confirms that you never advised us of your clients' action and never provided us with copies of the
documents pertaining to the alleged Special Shareholder Meeting.
Finally, we attempted to obtain a time tomorrow with the Court to hear the TRO to no avail. This email serves as
formal notice that Reed Taylor will be filing a Motion tomorrow for Temporary Restraining Order to prevent the
payment of such attorneys' fees and costs to be heard at 10 am on Thursday with the other previously scheduled
motions.
Rod
By: RoderickC. Bond
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth S1.
Lewiston, 10 83501
Tel: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
rod@scblegal.com
This email and any attachments may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information, which only the
authorized recipient may receive and/or view. If you are not an intended recipient, please promptly delete this
message and contact the sender at the above address. Thank you.
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EXHI IT 1,

IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE

02/11/2002 85:00
CK: CASH CT: 1177 DR: 4454£3
1 @ 6.88 = 6.88 utel FILE» 2

uce FINANCING STATEMENT
OllOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and backl CAREFULLY
A. !-lAME & PHONE OF CONTACT AT FILER [opUonaJ]

6

Filing ~lbeT:
200e-0~17222-5

(208) 799-9043

JoLee Duclos
B. SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address)

Reed J. Taylor
7498 Lapwai Road
Lewiston, ID 83501

L

THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR fiLING OFFICE USE ONLY
DEBTOR'S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME - In.ert onlYlllllI deblor name (1B or 1b} - do not _!>breviale orcombino name.
1a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME

AlA insurance. Inc.
OR 1 b. INDIVIOUAL'S LAST NAME

FIRST NAME

MIODLE NAME

SUFAX

1c. MAIUNG ADDRESS

CITY

STATE

COUNTRY

111 Main Street
1d. TAXID#:

SSN OR EIN

I=~ZAllON Ipe.Corporation
;-OO'lINFO RE

TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

Lewiston

ID

11. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION

I Idaho

rOSTALCODE

83501

USA

19. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #.Irany

I C54973

I" NONE

2 ADDITIONAL DEBTOR S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME - In••rtonlylllHl deblorname (2" or 2b)- do nolabbrevlala or combine names
28. ORGANIZATION'S NAME

AlA Services Corporation
DR

2b. INDIVIDUAl'S LAST NAME

2c. MAILING ADDRESS

111 Main Street
2d. TAX ID #:

SSN OR EIN

I

,ADD'LINFO RE \2 •. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

SECURED PARTY'S NAME

MIDDLE NAME

CITY

STATE

Lewiston

~~o:rllON 1 Corporation

3

FIRST NAME

ID

83501

COUNTRY

USA

2g. ORGANIZA1l0NAL 10 #. if any

21. JURlSDICTIONOF ORGANIZATION

I Idaho

rOSTALCODE

SUFFIX

C74568

I

I

NONE

(or NAME ofTOTAL ASSIGNEE of ASSIGNOR SIP} -Iosert on~ ,,,cured party name (38 or3b)

3a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR

FIRST NAME

3b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME

Taylor

STATE

ID

Lewiston

7498 Lapwai Road

SUFFIX

J.

CITY

3c. MAILING ADDRESS

4. Thl. FINANCING STATEMENT covers tho follOWing

MIDDLE NAME

Reed

IPOSTALCODE

83501

COUNTRY

USA

collateral

All of Debtors' right. title and interest in and to aU commissions from the sale of insurance or reUated services
received by. or on behalf of or payable to either Debtor or any subsidiaries of either Debtor, and any interest thereon.

FlUNG OFFICE COpy - NATIONAL UCC RNANCING STATEMENT (FORM UCC1) (REV. 07129198)

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTFF'S MOTION FOR TRO

IDAfiO FlU.ABLE FORM REV. 07r:tQC.'

5qf)

EXHI IT 2-

IDSOS UCCl Ol\.TLlNE FIL

: B 2006-1016766-7

Page 1 of 1

UCC FINANCING STATEMENT
ELECTRONIC FILlNG*

ft\. NAME, PHONE, EMAIL, FAX OF CONTACT AT FILER:
RODERICK C. BOND

I

L rod@scblegal.com I

208-743-9428

IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE

208-746-8421

12/11/2006 11 :05:35

B. SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address)

$3.00
Filing Number:

SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 8TH STREET
LEWISTON, ID 83501

B 2006-1016766-7
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY

1. DEBTOR'S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME: - insert only one debtor name (la or lb) - do not abbreviate or combine names
la. ORGANIZATION'S NAME:
OR

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION
1 b. LAST NAME:

.

le. MAILING ADDRESS:

111 MAIN STREET
~r'NFORE ,; le. TYPE OF ORG:

ld. TAX ID #: SSNORTIN

~~~TlONi CORPORATION

FIRST NAME:

MIDDLE NAME:

SUFFIX:

CITY:

STATE] POSTAL CODE:

COUNTR'

LEWISTON

ID

USA

' 1f. JURISDICTION OF ORG:

IDAHO

83501

'lg. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #: (if any)

; C74568

3. SECURED PARTY'S NAME: (or NAME of TOTAL ASSIGNEE of ASSIGNOR SIP) - insert only one secured party name (3a or 3b)
3a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME:
OR

3b. LAST NAME:

FIRST NAME:

MIDDLE NAME:

TAYLOR

REED

J

CITY:

STATE: rOSTAL CODE:

COUNTR'

LEWISTON

ID

USA

3c. MAILING ADDRESS:

7498 LAPWAI ROAD

83501

SUFFIX:

4. ThiS FINANCING STATETMENT covers the follOWing collateral.

ALL COMMISSIONS FROM THE SALE OF INSURANCE OR RELATED SERVICES, TOGETHER WITH THE
PROCEEDS THEREOF.
5. ALTERNATIVE DESIGNATION (if applicable):
[

] LESSEE/LESSOR

[

] CONSIGNEE/CONSIGNOR

[

] BAILEE/BAILOR

[

6. [ ] This FINANCING STATEMENT is to be filed (for record) (or recorded)
if a Jicable
in the REAL ESTATE RECORDS. Attach Addendum

] SELLER/BUYER

. CheCK to REQUEST SEARCH REPORT(S) on Debtor(s)
[ ] All .Debtors [ ] Debtor 1 [

(ADDITIONAL FEE) (optional)

] Debtor 2

8. OPTIONAL FILER REFERENCE DATA:
'Electronically generated from original XML Document

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTFF'S MOTION FOR TRO
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IDSOS UCC3 ONLINE

Page 1 of 1

: B 6479385

UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT
ELECTRONIC FILlNG*
A, NAME, PHONE, EMAIL, FAX OF CONTACT AT FILER:

RODERICK C. BOND
746-8421

I

208-743-9428

I

rod@scblegal.com

I

IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE

208-

12/11/200611:59:35
$3,00
Filing Number:

B, SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address)

SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 8TH STREET
LEWISTON, 10 83501

B 6479385
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY

la, INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENT FILE #

1b,
This FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT is to be
[ ] filed (for record) (or recorded) in the REAL ESTATE
RECORDS,

r

B 200610167667
2, [

] TERMINATION: Effectiveness of the Financing Statement identified above is terminated with respect to security interest(s) of the Secured Party authorizing this Termination

Statement.

3, [

] CONTINUATION: Effectiveness of the Financing Statement identified above with respect to security interest(s) of the Secured Party authorizing this Continuation Statement
continued for the additional period provided by applicable law,

4, [

] ASSIGNMENT (full or partial): Give name of assignee in item 7a or 7b and address of assignee In item 7c; and also give name of assignor in item 9,

[X]

5, AMENDMENT (PARTY INFORMATION): This Amendment affects

Debtor ~ [

] Secured Party of record, Check only one of these two boxes,

Also check one of the following three boxes!IDll provide appropriate information in items 6 and/or 7,
[ ] CHANGE name andlor address: Give current record name In item 6a or 6b; also [ ] DELETE name: Give record
name to be deleted in Item 6a or
give new name (if name Change) in Item 7a or 7b and/or new address (if address
change) in item 7c,
6b,

[Xl ADD name: Complete item 7a or 7b, and al
item 7c; also complete items 7d - 7g (if
applicable),

6 CURRENT RECORD INFORMATION'
6a, ORGANIZATION'S NAME:
OR

6b, LAST NAME:

FIRST NAME:

MIDDLE NAME:

SUFFIX:

FIRST NAME:

MIDDLE NAME:

SUFFIX:

CITY:

STATE:

LEWISTON

10

7, CHANGED (NEW) OR ADDED INFORMATION:
7a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME:
OR

AlA INSURANCE, INC.
7b, LAST NAME:

7c, MAILING ADDRESS:

111 MAIN STREET

7d, TAX ID #: SSN OR TINfofD'L INFO RE 7e, TYPE OF ORG:7f. JURISDICTION OF ORG:

D~~;~~~ATION CORPORATION' 10
e

I

POSTAL CODE:

COUNTF

83501

USA

7g, ORGANIZATIONAL ID #: (if any)

: C54973

,

8. AMENDMENT (COLLATERAL CHANGE), check only one box,
Describe collateral [

Jdeleted or

[

Jadded, or give entire

[

] restated collateral deSCription, or describe collateral [

] assigned,

9. NAME OF SECURED PARTY OF RECORD AUTHORIZING THIS AMENDMENT (name of assignor, II this is an Assignment). If this is an Amendment authorized by a
Debtor which adds collateral or adds the authorizing Debtor, or if this is a Termination authorized by a Debtor, check here [
Amendment.

] and enter name 01 DEBTOR authorizing this

9a, ORGANIZATION'S NAME:
OR 9b. LAST NAME:

TAYLOR

FIRST NAME:

MIDDLE NAME:

REED

J

SUFFIX:

10, OPTIONAL FILER REFERENCE DATA:
13. Use this space for additional information,

ADDITION OF DEBTOR
'Electronically generated from original XML Document
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IDSOS UCC3 ONLIN""E FIL

Page 1 of 1

: B 6479384

UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT
ELECTRONIC FILlNG*
A. NAME, PHONE, EMAIL, FAX OF CONTACT AT FILER:

RODERICK C. BOND
746-8421

I

208-743-9428

I

rod@scblegal.com

I

IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE

208-

12/11/2006 11 :59:35
$3.00

B. SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address)

Filing Number:

SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 8TH STREET
LEWISTON, 10 83501

S 6479384
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY

la. INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENT FILE #

b.

r
[

S 200610167667

This FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT is to be
] filed (for record) (or recorded) in the REAL ESTATE
RECORDS.

2.

[
] TERMINATION: Effectiveness of the Financing Statement identified above is tenninated with respect to security interest(s) 01 the Secured Party authorizing this Tennination
Statement.

3.

[
] CONTINUATION: Effectiveness 01 the Financing Statement identified above with respect to security Interest(s) of the Secured Party authorizing this Continuation Statement
continued for the additional period provided by applicable law.

4.

[

] ASSIGNMENT (full or partial): Give name of assignee in item 70 or 7b and address of assignee In item 7c; and also give name of assignor in item 9.

5. AMENDMENT (PARTY INFORMATION): This Amendment affects [ ] Debtor ~ [X] Secured Party of record. Check only ~ 01 these two boxes.
Also check one of the following three boxes and provide appropriate infonnation in items 6 andlor 7.
] ADD name: Complete item 7a or 7b, and al
[
] CHANGE name andlor address: Give current record name In item 6a or 6b; also [X] DELETE name: Give record
give new name (il name change) in item 7a or 7b andlor new address (il address
name to be deleted in item 6a or
item 7c; also complete items 7d - 7g (if
applicable).
change) in item 7c.
6b.
6 CURRENT RECORD INFORMATION'
6a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME:
OR

6b. LAST NAME:

FIRST NAME:

MIDDLE NAME:

SUFFIX:

FIRST NAME:

MIDDLE NAME:

SUFFIX:

7e. MAILING ADDRESS:

CITY:

STATE:

7d. TAX ID #: SSN OR TlNfor'L INFO RE7e. TYPE OF ORG:
RGANIZATION
DEBTOR:
:,

.7f. JURISDICTION OF ORG:

AlA INSURANCE, INC.
7. CHANGED (NEW) OR ADDED INFORMATION:
7a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME:
OR

7b. LAST NAME:

~>

i

I

POSTAL CODE:

COUNTF

:7g. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #: (if any)

,
i

8. AMENDMENT (COLLATERAL CHANGE): check only one box.
Describe collateral [

] deleted or [

] added, or give entire [

] restated collateral description, or describe collateral [

] assigned.

9. NAME OF SECURED PARTY OF RECORD AUTHORIZING THIS AMENDMENT (name 01 assignor, ilthis is an Assignment). If this Is an Amendment authorized by a
Debtor which adds collateral or adds the authOrizing Debtor, or if this is a Tennination authorized by a Debtor, check here [
Amendment.
9a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME:
OR 9b. LAST NAME:

TAYLOR

] and enter name of DEBTOR authorizing this

FIRST NAME:

MIDDLE NAME:

REED

J

SUFFIX:

10. OPTIONAL FILER REFERENCE DATA:
13. Use this space for additional information.

REMOVE SECURED PARTY
'Electronically generated from Original XML Document
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Page 1 of2

IDSOS Search Result Summar

IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE
Search Result Summary
Ben Ysursa, Secretary of State

lien Search Results
[ New Search ]

This page shows results 1 through 2

Lien 8200610167667,

filed 11 Dec 2006

Type: Basic
Status: CURRENT
2 Debtors: AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, filed 11 Dec 2006
111 MAIN STREET
LEWISTON, ID USA
AlA INSURANCE, INC., filed 11 Dec 2006
111 MAIN STREET
LEWISTON, ID USA

2 Secured Parties: AlA INSURANCE, INC.
REED J TAYLOR

Lien 8200209172225,

filed 11 Feb 2002

Type: Basic
Status: LAPSED-ACTIVE
2 Debtors: AlA INSURANCE, INC., filed 11 Feb 2002
111 MAIN STREET
LEWISTON, ID 83501
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, filed 11 Feb 2002
111 MAIN STREET
LEWISTON, ID 83501

1 Secured Party: REED J. TAYLOR

Subscriber Options
Transaction Reports

Look at charges related to the UCC/Lien search,
and any other Access Idaho application, that
you have been billed for.

Eree Segfch

Use the free search to experiment with different
types of searches. Then return to the premium
search for details.

UCCl and UCC3 fili7(l

File UCC-l and UCC-3 Financing Statements

AFFIDA.VI I OF RODERIC C. BOND IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTFF'S MOTION FOR TRO
https:/lwww.accessidaho.org/secure/sos/liens/search.html
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Page 1 of 1

rDSOS Viewing Lien Detail

IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE
Viewing Lien Detail
Ben Ysursa, Secretary of State

Detailed View of 6200209172225
[ Summary] [New Search]

Lien 8200209172225,

filed 11 Feb

2002, expires 11 Feb 2007

View document
(TIFF format)
Help Me Print/View
TIFF

Type: Basic
Status: LAPSED-ACTIVE
2 Debtors:
AlA INSURANCE, INC., filed 11 Feb 2002
111 MAIN STREET
LEWISTON, ID 83501

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, filed 11 Feb 2002
111 MAIN STREET
LEWISTON, ID 83501
1 Secured Party:
REED J. TAYLOR, filed 11 Feb 2002
7498 LAPWAI ROAD
LEWISTON, ID 83501

Subscriber Options
Transaction Reports

Look at charges related to the UCCjLien search,
and any other Access Idaho application, that
you have been billed for.

Free Search

Use the free search to experiment with different
types of searches. Then return to the premium
search for details.

UCCl and UCC3 filing

File UCC- l and UCC-3 Financing Statements
online.

Business Entity Search

Search for an Idaho business entity online, and
purchase a certificate of existence from the
Idaho Secretary of State.

Log out

Log out from Access Idaho

Comments, questions or suggestions can be emailed to: sosinfo@sos.idaho.gov

51<;"
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FILED
1fIl{ f1YIR

za

IlP\ 10 1Z

RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISB #7563
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3lO0
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;
Case No.: CV 06-02855
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

v.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR
IN SUPPORT OF TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER - 1

)
) ss:
)

ORIGINAL

I, Reed Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, am competent to testify in court, and

am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action.

I make this Affidavit on my personal

knowledge.
2.

None of the Defendants or their counsel provided me with notice or copies

of the Special Shareholder Meeting Scheduled for AlA Services Corporation on March
28,2007.
3.

The Defendants' actions an attempt to improperly take action to prevent

me from voting the shares pledged to me. All actions taken without permitting me to vote
the shares are causing repairable injury to me.

The Defendants are continuously

thwarting my right to vote the shares, while falsely representing to the Court that the
business will be ran appropriately.
4.

In addition, I am owed over $8,000,000 by AlA Services and have claims

against the other Defendants in this action.

As the value of AlA Insurance is

approximately $2,000,000 as established by the testimony of John Taylor, there is no
assurances that any the Defendants will be able to pay any judgment over the value of
AlA Insurance. Every dollar that the Defendants are able to use for other purposes and
not pay to me is likely money that I will never see which will cause me irreparable injury.
Damages will not likely provide me with any relief because the collectability of any
judgment against the Defendants is questionable at best.
5.

I have a valid security interest in all of AlA Services and AlA Insurance's

commissions and have perfected my security interest by filing financing statements with

AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR
IN SUPPORT OF TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER - 2

Secretary of State ofIdaho. All of AlA Services' funds are derived from AlA Insurance.
To legally transfer funds from AlA Insurance to AlA Services, AlA Insurance must
declare a dividend.
6.

This Affidavit may be relied upon by any party as a proxy for my vote of

all of the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance against resolution or proposal to authorize
any and all payments, dividends, and distributions from AlA Insurance to AlA Services,
or any other entity and any person for the purpose of paying any attorneys' fees, costs or
expenses incurred in this action by John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos.
DATED: This 28 th day of March, 2007.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of March, 2007.

Notary Public or the State ofIdaho
Lenn'otzry)
Residing at:
My commission expires: 1./24-/2.04.2.

AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR
IN SUPPORT OF TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER - 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and
correct copy of the Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Support of Plaintiffs Motion
Temporary Restraining Order on the following party(s) via the methodes) indicated
below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
eX) Hand Delivered
e ) Overnight Mail
e ) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, AlA
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor

Via:
e ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
eX) Hand Delivered
e ) Overnight Mail
e ) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
e ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
eX) Hand Delivered
e ) Overnight Mail
e ) Facsimile

Signed this 28 th day of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.

Roderic

AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR
IN SUPPORT OF TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER - 4

Michael E. McNichols
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
321 13th Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 743-9295 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 993
Attorneys for Defendants
AlA Services Corporation,
AIA Insurance, Inc. and
R. John Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;

)
)

Plaintiff,

Case No: CV 07-00208

)
)

vs.

)
)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER

)

Defendants.

)

Defendants AlA Services Corporation and John Taylor submit this
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

-1-

I.
IDAHO CODE
Idaho Code § 30-1-853 permits corporations to advance funds for the
defense of corporate directors who provide a written undertaking. A copy is attached as
Exhibit A.
II.
BYLAWS
Article XI of the NEW RESTATED BYLAWS OF AlA SERVICES
CORPORATION, copy attached as Exhibit B, requires the corporation to advance the
expenses to defend its directors, officers, employees and agents upon receipt of an
undertaking.
III.
UNDERTAKING
Bya letter dated March 1, 2007, John Taylor submitted to AlA Services
Corporation the undertaking required by Idaho Code § 30-1-853 and Article XI of the
NEW RESTATED BYLAWS OF AlA SERVICES CORPORATION.

A copy is

attached as Exhibit C.
IV.
CONCLUSION
John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman are entitled to, and AlA
Services Corporation is obligated to pay for the costs of defending them in this case.

Cio/
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

-2-

Respectfully submitted this 28 th day of March, 2007.
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

BY:~~~~~~~~&~
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28 th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Jf.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, WA 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

U.S. MAIL
- - - - HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
----=,--_ _X_ _ TELECOPY (FAX)

~.Jt

Michael E. McNichols

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
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p. 1080.J

* :30-1-852, as added by 199'7, ch. ;i66, * 2,

I(i:l.ho Cod
described
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(a) By the
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vote of al
purposes
COIlUllitt(
a vote; 01
(ii) If thl
necessar:

Sec. to st'c. ref. T'hi~ section is r'efl'rn-d to
in §§ :lO- H~53. :10- t -854. :10· t ·856, :10-I-A58,
and 30·1·1621.

ABA OFFICIAL COMMENT
Section 851 dd"rrninps wh"lhE'r indE'mnifimtion may be mad" voluntarily by a corporation
ifit elpcts to do so . Section 852 detprmines whpthpr!.\ corporation mllst indl,mnify a dirpctor for
his expenses; in other words, section 852 creatpR !.\ statutOl,' right of indemnification in fa\'or
ofthe director who meets the rpquirements of that section . Enforcement of thill right by judicial
proceeding is specifically contpmplated by spclion R54111( a 1. Section 85412 1givE'S thp diN-etor a
statutory right to recover expenses incurrpd by him in enforcing his statutory right to
indemnification under section 852.
The basic standard for mandatory indemnification is that the director haR bpen "wholly
successful. on the mprits or otherwise: in the defensp of the proceeding. The word "wholly" is
added to avoid the argument accepted in Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wol(Hon, ,~21 A.2d
138 mel. 1974), that a dpfendant may be entitled to partial mandatory indemnification if, by
plea bargaining or otherwise, he was ahle to obtain the dismissal of some but not all counts of
an indictment. A dAfl.'ndant is "wholly successful" only if the I'ntire proceeding is disposed of on
a basis which does not involve 11 finding of liability. A director who is prpcludPd from mandatory
indemnification by this requirement may still be tmtitled to pnrmissible indemnification under
section 85H U or court-orderAd indemnification under section 85411)( c I.
The language in earlier versions of the Model Act and in many other state statut!;.; thllt thl'
basis ofsucccss may be "on the merits or otherwise" is retained . WhilH this Rtandard rna)' result
in an occasional defendant becoming entitled to indt·mnificution bf'cause of proc(,dural deft-nses
not relaind to th" merits, e.g., the statute of limitations or disqualification of the plaintiff, it ii;
unreasonable to mquire a defendant with a valid procedurul defense to I.Indeq('o a pOl'sibly
prolonged and expensive trial on the mel'ii~ in order to l,stablish ,!ligibility lor mandatory
indemnification .
If the corporation indemnifieR or advances !'x,wnses to a director in confll,ction with u
derivative proceeding, the corporation mu~t ff'port that fact to the shaff·holder prior to their
next meeting. See section 1621(1).

IDAHO REPORTER'S COMMENT
The only real Hub6tHlltivl' changl~ here from prior I.e. § 30-1-5Iel is nil' addition ofthl' adw'rb
"wholly" to avoid the urgulllenl that a defendant IIlOY be entitled to paltial mandato,',Y
indernnifkation ifablt. to oht.uin dillmi!;sal OfllOIllP hut lIot al\ counts of lin indiclnll~nl. A din-clor
who is pn,clud"d frum lllandatory indemnification by this "I'qIlJI'(,IllI'nl mny still be entitled to
permisHible inti,'mnifical.ion undf'r lwction 8511 1 I or court-ordprod ind.,mnilic:atwil lindt-I"
section 854( 1)I c I.

30·1·853. Advance for expenses. - (1) A cOI'Poration may, before
final riisposition of a proceeding. auvance funds to pay for or reimburse tlw
reasonahle pxpenses incurred by a director who is a party to a proceeding
becHuse hf; is a director if he delivers to the corporation:
(11) A written afIirmatiun of his good faith belief that Iw haR mel til!:'
relf'v:tnL standa I'd of eonduct dest:ribed in section ~iO-l-HG 1. Idaho Code, 01'
that t.hf> prcH'(·('ding involvpH conduct for which liahility has l)('en eliminatt~d under a provision of the al'ticl(~s of inl'ul'por:d.iofl as :Illthorizt~d by
sel'lion 30-1-:W~Cl)(d), Iduho Codt!; and
(h) His wrilLpll undpl'Laking to I'<'pay any ('unds ad\':1ncl!d if'lw i... not
entitled to lllandatory indl'lllnification undt'1' ~('ttion :.lO-1-85~, fdaho
Code, and it is ultimatel'y Jelel'lnined undl-I" st'clion ;jO-] -HG·t 01' ;1O-l-~!j!),
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Idaho Code, that he has not met the relevant standard of conduct
described in section 30-1-851, Idaho Code.
(2) The undertaking required by subsection (l)(b) oft.his section must be
an unlimited gpneral obligation of the director but need not be secured and
may be accepted without reference to the financial ability of the director to
make repayment.
(3) Authorizations under thi8 section shall be made:
(a) By the board of directors:
(il If there are two (2) or more disinterested directors, by a majority
vote of all the disinterested directors, a majority of whom shall for such
purposes constitute a quorum, or by a majority of the members of a
committee of two (2) or more disinterested directors appointed by such
a vote; or
Iii) If there are fewer than two (2) disinterested directors, by the vote
necessary for action by the board in accordance with section 30-1824(3), Idaho Code, in which authorization directors who do not qualify
as disinterested directors may participate; or
(bl By the shareholders, but shares owned by or voted under the control
of a director who at the time does not qualify as a disinterested director
may not be voted on the authorization. II.C., § 30-1-853, as added by
1997, ch. 366, § 2, p. 1080.]
Sec. to sec. ref. Thi~ Rection is refe ITed to
in §§ 30-1-850,30-1-854 • .'30-1-858, and 30-11621.

ABA OFFICIAL COMMENT
Section 85.'3 authorizes, but does not require, a corporation to pay for or reimburse, in
advance, A rlirr,ctor's reasonable expenses if two conditions are met. This authorization is
RU\)jf'ct to :my limitations Ret forth in the articles of incorporation pursuant to section 858(3i.
Section R53 recognizes nn important difference between indemnification und nn advance for
"Xp<HlHCS: Indnmnification is retrospective and. thl!rf·fore, enables the persons dutl'rmining
whether to indpmnify to do HO on the basis of known facts, including the outcome of the
pl'oct"eding. Advance for expenses is npcessllrily prOfJpective nnd the individuals making thl'
rlo'cblion whether t~ advllnce expenses gl'llerully havf! fewer known facts on which to base their
IIl'ciflion. Indmnnification mAy include reimburBpment for non-advunccd nxpenses.
Section 853 rellects u determination thut it is Round public policy to permit the corporation
to advonce (by direct payment or by reimbursemenO the defense expenses of 11 director so long
IlS the direl'lor bf.'lipvf!s in good faith that he was ncting in accordance with the relevl1nt
standard for indrmnificution set forth in section 851 or that the proceeding involves conduct for
wnich linhility has 1"'l'n ("imina\.l'e1 pursuant tu section 202(211<1) !lnd agrl'f~s to rf!pny any
:(mounts adv:tJ1(·( ·d If It i~ ultimllt£'ly df'lnrmilll'c1lhat he is nut f:!ntiUed to indemnificution. This
policy is bllsed upon the view that a pl'rson who Hf'I'Ves fin entity in a rr.prpRentativ(, capacity
should lIot bl' 1'I''1uirpd to finance hil:! own oefpnsI· . MOrt·'IVf:!r. :1I!t·qIW\t· leglll /'('pl'I 's('ntution
olll'n 1't''1uin's suh~t.antiall'xJlenRlls during t.ht! prm'I'l'ding nnel many individual!' are willing to
~I'rvl' as ,'irf'rtor~ only ifth ... y hav .. th .. aRHur:m~e t.hat lh .. corporat.ion hal' thl' puw"r In :nh alH' !'
th,'~~· I'xpensl's. In fad , many corporat.ions cont.ractually obli~Htf' fh"nl:lI,lv"s Ih,\'" flrovi~i()n in
fill' ;,,·t ides 01' hylawl! or uthl'rwisl' I to advance p.xl)f'nl!e~ fol' din.clor~ . Sen Bt-ction H!)l\t 11 .
S"ction Rn:lt 11 rt''1"in's;( wril1l'n affirmatioll by tht' din'clor uf hi~ good fnith b"lif!f thatlw
has 1111'1 t h" rl'll'\' a nt slandarrlof l'onciul'l nt,("p~Rary for inrll'mnilka t iOI1 o.\' f hI' corpor:lf.inn and
" wrill,'n IIJldt'rtaking II.\' thp dirf'dor to n·pa.\' nn.v fUllfIl! ar1\ancpd if it is IIltul1atf'ly
r1"'I ·nltillt·d lhal he has Ilot melllw s tandard of l'olldlll·t. . A ~ill~It' IInch,rtakint: l1\a." ClIver all
fllilds ;"I\'anl'l'oI in ('ol1lll'l'IiOJl with Uw Pl·ol'l'E'din~ . End!'r I<f>dion Hfi:J(2I, thp IJlu!.'rtaking ,1t'r.d
flot hi' SI'I'uI'I",1 ,,/Hi linallrial ahilitr to n'ra)" is not. :1 pl'l'rf!ljuisilr· . TtH! th"llrY I /oIh · rlyin~ thi~
I'LJb~l'd 1<1/1 is that. wl'alt.hy t1iret'lors should Ilot IJI' favof'f'li o\'ur diI'Pctl)l'!! whoSI! financial
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time, in its absolute discretion, think proper as a reserve or reserves
to meet contingencies, or for equalizing dividends, or for repairing or
maintaining any property of the corporation, or for such other purpose as
the Board of Directors shall think conducive to the interests of the
corporation; and the Board of Directors may modify or abolish any such
reserve in the manner in which is was created.
ARTICLE XI
INDEHNInCATIOR or DIREC'l'ORS I ORlCERS,
EMPLOYEES AND 0'l'BER AGENTS
,

Section 11.1 Directors and Executive Officers The corporation
shall indemnify the directors and executive officers of the corporation
or another enterprise to the full extent permitted by the Idaho Business
Corporation Act, as the same exists or may hereafter be amended (but, in
the case of any such amendment, only to the extent that such amendment
permits the corporation to provide broader indemnification rights than
siad Act permitted the corporation to provide prior to such amendment);
provided, however, that the corporation may limit the extent of such
indemnification by individual contracts with its directors and executive
officers; and provided, further, that the corporation shall not be
required to indemnify any director or executive officer in connection with
any proceeding (or part ·--thereof) initiated by such person or any
proceeding by such person against the corporation or its directors,
officers, employees or other agents unless (a) such indemnification is
expressly required to be made by law; (b) the proceeding was authorized
by the Board of Directors of the corporation or (c) such indemnification
is provided by the corporation under the Idaho Business Corporation Act.
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-5(a),(b».
Section 11.2 Other Officers, Employees and Agents. The corporation
shall have the power to indemnify other officers, employees and other
agents of the corporation or another enterprise as set forth in the Idaho
Business Corporation Act. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-5(a),(b».
Section 11.3 Good raith. For purposes of any determination under
this Bylaw, a director, officer, employee or other agent of the
corporation or another enterprise shall be deemed to have acted in good
faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to
the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any criminal
action or proceeding, to have had no reasonable cause to believe that his
conduct was unlawful, if his action is based on the records or books of
account of the corporation or another enterprise, or on information
supplied or reports made to him by the officers of the corporation or
another enterprise in the course of their duties, or on the advice of
legal counsel for the corporation or another enterprise or on information
or records given or reports made to the corporation or another enterprise
by an independent certified public accountant or by an appraiser or other
expert selected with reasonable care by the corporation or another
NEW RESTATED BYLAWS OF
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enterprise. The provisions of this Section 11.3 shall not be deemed to
be exclusive and/or to limit in any way the circumstances in which a
person may be deemed to have met the applicable standard of conduct set
forth by the Idaho Business Corporation Act. (Idaho Code Sections 30-15(a).(b); 30-1-35).
Section 11.4 Another Enterprise. The term "another enterprise" as
used in this Article XI shall mean any other corporation, partnership,
joint venture, trust or other enterprise, including any employee benefit
plan, or which a person is or was serving at the request of the
corporation as a director, officer, employee or other agent. (Idaho Code
Section 30-1-5(a),(b».
Section 11.S Expenses. The corporation shall advance. prior to the
final disposition of any proceeding, promptly following request therefor,
all expenses incurred by any director, officer, or employee or other agent
of the corporation or another "enterprise in connection with such
proceeding upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of such person
to repay said amount i f it should be determined ultimately that such
person is not entitled to be indemnified under this Article XI or
otherwise. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-5(e».
Notwithstanding the foregoing, unless otherwise determined pursuant
to Section 11.6. no advance shall be made by the corporation i f a
determination is reasonablY and promptly made (a) by the Board of
Directors by a majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors who were
not parties to the proceeding, or (b) if such quorum is not obtainable or.
even if obtainable, a quorum of disinterested directors so directs. by
independent legal counsel in a written opinion that, based upon the facts
known to the decision-making party at the time such determination is made,
such person acted in bad faith or in a manner that such person did not
believe to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation,
or, with respect to any criminal proceeding, such person believed or had
reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful. (Idaho Code
Section 30-1-5(d».
Section 11.6 Enforcement. Without the necessity of entering into
an express contract, all rights to indemnification and advances under this
Article XI shall be deemed to be contractual rights and to be effective
to the same extent and as if provided for in a contract between the
corporation and the person who serves as a director. officer, employee or
other agent of the corporation or another enterprise at any time while
this Article XI and relevant prOVisions of the Idaho Business Corporation
Act and other applicable law, i f any, are in efefct.
Any right to
indemnification or advances granted by this Article XI to any person shall
be enforceable by or on behalf of the person holding such right in any
court of competent jurisdiction if (a) the claim for indemnification or
advances is denied. in whole or in part, or (b) no disposition of such
claim is made within ninety (90) days of request therefor. The claimant
in such enforcement action. if successful in whole or in part. shall be
entitled to be paid also the expense of prosecuting his claim. It shall
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be a defense to any such action that the claimant has not met the
standards of conduct which make it permissible under the Idaho Business
Corporation Act for the corporation to indemnify the claimant for the
amount claimed; but the burden of proving such defense shall be on the
corporation. Neither the failure of the corporation (including its Board
of Directors, independent legal counselor its stockholders) to have made
a determination prior to the commencement of such action that
indemnification of the claimant is proper in the circumstances because he
has met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in the Idaho Business
Corporation Act, nor an actual determination by the corporation (including
its Board of Directors, independent legal counselor its stockholders)
that the claimant has not met such applicable standard of conduct, shall
be a defense to the action or create a presumption that claimant has not
met the applicabe standard of conduct.
Section 11.7 Hon-exclusivity of rights. The rights conferred on
any person by this Article XI shall not be exclusive of any other right
to which such person may now or hereafter be entitled under any statute,
provision of the Articles of Incorporation, 'or Bylaws, agreement, vote of
stockholders or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to action
in his official capacity and as to action in another capacity while
holding office. The corporation is specifically authorized to enter into
individual contracts with any or all directors, officers, employees or
other agents of the corporation or another enterprise respecting
indemnification and advanceS~ as provided by law. (Idaho Code Section 301-5(f)}.
Section 11.8 Survival of rights.
The rights conferred on any
person by this Article XI shall continue as to a person who has ceased to
be a director, officer, employee or other agent of the corporation or
another enterprise and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors
and administrators such a person. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-5(i».
Section 11.9
Amendments.
Any repeal or modification of this
Article XI shall only be prospective and shall not affect the rights under
this Article XI in effect at the time of the alleged occurrence of any
action or omission to act that is the cause of any proceeding against any
agent of the corporation or another enterprise.
Section 11.10 Savings Clause. If this Article XI of the Bylaws or
any portion hereof shall be invalidated on any ground by any court of
competent jurisdiction, then the corporation shall nevertheless indemnify
each agent to the full extent permitted by any applicable portion of this
Article XI that shall' not have been invalidated, or by any other
applicable law.
ARTICLE XII

NOTICES
Section 12.1 Notice to Stockholders.
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R. JOHN TAYLOR
2020 Broadview
Lewlston,ID 83501

March I, 2007
AIA Services Corporation

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 83501
Re:

Reed 1. Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et. al.

TO: Directors and Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation
I'm writing this letter pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-1-853 and the Articles of
Incorporation and ARTICLE XI of the By-Laws of the corporation. I have been named
in this litigf!.tion as a defendant in my capacity as an officer and director of AlA Services
Corporation.
I'm writing to affirm my good faith belief that I have met the relevant standard of
conduct described in Idaho Code § 30-1-851; any conduct in my official capacity was in
the best interest of the corporation and in all cases that my conduct was never opposed to
the best interests of the corporation, that indemnification is permissible under the Articles
of Incorporation of AlA Services Corporation and with respect to any employee plan, that
I reasonably believed that my actions were in the best interests of the participants and
beneficiaries of the plan.

I promise to repay any funds advanced for my defense if I am not entitled to mandatory
indemnification under § 30-1-852 and it is ultimately determined under § 30-1-854 or 301-855 that I have not met the relevant standard of conduct described in § 30-1-851, Idaho
Code.
Very trulY,yours,
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Michael E. McNichols
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
321 13th Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 743-9295 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 993

DEF;!

Attorneys for Defendants
AlA Services Corporation,
AIAInsurance,Inc. and
R. John Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)
)

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;

Case No: CV 07-00208

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION OF
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS
TO WITHDRAW AS
COUNSEL FOR
AlA SERVICES
CORPORATION AND AlA
INSURANCE INC.

)

Defendants.

)

Michael E. McNichols moves the Court, pursuantto Rule Il(b )(2) LR.C.P.,
for leave to withdraw as counsel for defendants AlA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance Inc., on the grounds that, while there is no current or reasonably anticipated
conflict of interest between the corporations and John Taylor, there is a possible future
MOTION OF MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS
TO WlTHDRA W AS COUNSEL FOR
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION AND
AIA INSURANCE INC.
-1-

conflict between them and they have agreed that Michael E. McNichols should continue
to represent John Taylor but no longer represent the corporations.
DATED March 28,2007.
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston,ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, W A 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

_ _ _ _ u.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
-----OVERNIGHTMAIL
_ _X
TELECOPY (FAX)

Michael E. McNichols

MOTION OF MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS
TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FOR
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION AND
AIA INSURANCE INC.
-2-
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I
Michael E. McNichols
r, •
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS,tf}.A,;-':' T~J
Attorneys at Law
--", , c - _ :
th
321 l3 Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 993

,'1.

Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services Corporation,
AIA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;
Plaintiff,
vs.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
Corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR AND
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof:
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person:
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Nez Perce

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV 07-00208

AFFIDAVIT OF
R. JOHN TAYLOR

)
: ss.
)

I, R. John Taylor, being duly sworn, state:
1.

I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify

as a witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge.

AFFIDAVIT OF
R. JOHN TAYLOR

IJtI

2.

In March of 2007, I purchased a used 2005 Porsche Cayenne from Lyle

Pearson in Boise, Idaho. The vehicle is registered in my name. Neither AIA Services
Corporation nor AIA Insurance, Inc. purchased or leased this vehicle for me.

f'

Dated March 28, 2007.

(

R. John Taylor

/

\

.. ,Iv
;1.(6
day ofMirch, 2007.
i'

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to this

)
..

Notary Public in and for the State ofIdaho,
Residing at Lewiston, therein.
My Commission Expires: ;{)- 19 - if

AFFIDA VIT OF
R. JOHN TAYLOR

(P/Z.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston,ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, WA 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston,ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

_ _ _ _ _ U.S. MAIL
- - - - - HAND DELIVERED
- - - - - OVERNIGHT MAIL
_ _-,-,-X_ _ TELECOPY (FAX)

Michael E. McNichols

AFFIDA VIT OF
R. JOHN TAYLOR

LE

351 Auto Drive
Boise, Idaho 83709
Phone: (208) 377-3900
PURCHASER'S
NAME
PHONE

VEHICLE
BUYERS
ORDER

ACURA • JAGUAR' LAND ROVER' MERCEDES-BENZ' PORSCHE • VOLVO

DATE.:....:..-'-__~~'_'_',- -________

,Ii

,'!. ,. ; i "" i', ,i "
i ,,'::,; I . ,,'
',,:, 'r:
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;

ZIP

';
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PLEASE ENTER MY ORDER FOR THE FOLLOWING
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Attorneys for Defendants
AIA Services Corporation,
AIA Insurance, Inc. and
R. John Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;

)
)

Plaintiff,

Case No: CV 07-00208

)
)

vs.

)
)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

ANSWER OF AIA SERVICES
CORPORATION, AIA
INSURANCE, INC., AND
R. JOHN TAYLOR
TO SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT
and
COUNTERCLAIM
and
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

)

Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor
("these defendants"), answer plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint as follows:

ANSWER OF AlA SERVICES CORPORATION,
AlA INSURANCE, INC., AND R. JOHN TAYLOR
TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
and COUNTERCLAIM and DEMAND FOR
-1JURY TRIAL

I.
These defendants deny all of the allegations in plaintiff s Second Amended
Complaint except for those allegations which are expressly admitted.

II.
These defendants admit paragraphs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4,1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8 and 2.1.
III.
These defendants deny paragraphs 2.3, 2.4, 2.13, 2.l6, 2.17, 2.28, 2.30, 3.2,
3.3,4.2,4.3, 5.2, 5.3, 6.2, 6.3, 7.2, 8.2, 8.3,9.3,9.4, 10.2, 10.3, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 12.2 and
13.4.
IV.
These defendants reallege and incorporate their admissions and denials to the
paragraphs incorporated by paragraphs 3.1,4.1,5.1,6.1,7.1,8.1,9.1,10.1,11.1,12.1 and
13.1.
V.
Answering paragraph 2.2, these defendants admit the first and third sentences,
admit that this action involves claims which accrued prior to the divorce and deny all the
other allegations.
VI.
Answering paragraph 2.5, these defendants admit the first sentence and the
third sentence and allege that in 1995 Reed desired to retire and have AlA Services
Corporation redeem his stock, and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.5.

ANSWER OF AlA SERVICES CORPORATION,
AlA INSURANCE, INC., AND R. JOHN T AYLOR
TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
and COUNTERCLAIM and DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL
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VII.
Answering paragraph 2.6, these defendants admit that AlA Insurance, Inc., is
a wholly owned subsidiary of AlA Services Corporation, admit that AlA Insurance is a lessee
of the office building located at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho, and deny all the other
allegations of paragraph 2.6.

VIII.
These defendants admit paragraph 2.7 but allege that the agreements were
amended at a later time.
IX.
These defendants admit paragraph 2.8 but allege that the Promissory Note
provided that it was subordinate to the payment of redemption obligations owed by AlA
Services Corporation to Donna Taylor and that the agreements were amended at a later time.

X.
Answering paragraph 2.9, these defendants admit that AlA Services
Corporation agreed to execute a Security Agreement and Stock Pledge Agreement, admit the
second sentence of paragraph 2.9 and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.9.

XI.
Answering paragraph 2.1 0, these defendants admit that, in 1996, AlA Services
Corporation, AlA and plaintiff agreed to modify the Stock Redemption Agreement and
executed the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement and executed an Amended and
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and an Amended and Restated Security Agreement but
allege that the agreements were amended at a later time and deny all the other allegations of
paragraph 2.1 0.

ANSWER OF AlA SERVICES CORPORATION,
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XII.

These defendants admit paragraph 2.11, but allege that the agreements were
amended at a later time.
XIII.

Answering paragraph 2. 12, these defendants allege that the Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement speaks for itself, and deny all of the other allegations of paragraph
2.12.
XIV.
Answering paragraph 2.14, these defendants allege that the Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement speaks for itself and deny all of the other allegations of paragraph 2.14.

xv.
Answering paragraph 2.15, these defendants admit that plaintiffwas the largest
creditor of AlA Services Corporation and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.15.
XVI.
Answering paragraph 2.18, these defendants admit that plaintiff, through his
counsel, claimed that AlA Services Corporation was in default and deny all the other
allegations of paragraph 2.18.
XVII.
Answering paragraph 2.19, these defendants deny that they have failed to
comply with the agreements as amended and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.19.
XVIII.
Answering paragraph 2.20, these defendants admit that plaintiff attempted
to schedule a special shareholder meeting for December 26, 2006, a date on which the
offices of AlA Insurance, Inc., were scheduled to be closed, admit that no special
ANSWER OF AlA SERVICES CORPORATION,
AlA INSURANCE, INC., AND R. JOHN TAYLOR
TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
and COUNTERCLAIM and DEMAND FOR
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shareholders meeting was held, and deny all of the other allegations of paragraph 2.20.
XIX.

Answering paragraph 2.21, these defendants admit that the quoted words are
part of one of the sentences in one of the paragraphs of a letter from John Taylor to
plaintiff's legal counsel.

xx.
Answering paragraph 2.22, these defendants allege that the documents speak
for themselves, deny that plaintiff had a right to call a shareholders meeting of AIA
Insurance Inc., allege that AIA Insurance Inc., properly declined to hold a special
shareholder meeting and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.22.
XXI.

These defendants deny paragraph 2.23, and allege that none of them is in
default under the terms of any of the agreements as amended.
XXII.

Answering paragraph 2.24, these defendants deny that they were in default,
deny that plaintiff had a right to vote the pledged shares and deny that plaintiff had the
authority to take the action he purportedly took, and deny all the other allegations of
paragraph 2.24.
XXIII.

Answering paragraph 2.25, these defendants admit that AIA paid
$1,510,693.00 to purchase Series C Preferred Shares in AIA Services Corporation from
an entity in which John was the single largest shareholder but allege that the stated value
of the Series C Preferred Shares, together with mandatory accumulated dividends likely
exceeded $3,000,000.00 and that the transaction was substantially beneficial to AIA
ANSWER OF AlA SERVICES CORPORATION,
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Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. These defendants admit that the 401(k)
plan of AlA Services Corporation held Preferred C shares and that no shares were
purchased or redeemed from the plan and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.25.
XXIV.
Answering paragraph 2.26, these defendants admit that John purchased a
parking lot and rents the parking lot to AlA Insurance, Inc., for $1,250.00 per month and
deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.26.

xxv.
Answering paragraph 2.27, these defendants deny the first sentence and deny
the second sentence for lack of information and belief.
XXVI.
Answering paragraph 2.29, these defendants admit that plaintiff executed a
Consent in Lieu of Board Meeting, allege that the Consent speaks for itself, allege that
p laintiffhad no right to execute the Consent, admit that these defendants refused to recognize
the Consent as binding on them and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.29
XXVII.
Answering paragraph 9.2, these defendants admit that as of2002 or 2003 John
owed AlA Services Corporation $307,271.00 and allege that in 2002 or 2003 John and
plaintiff entered into an agreement to extinguish John's debt to the corporation and to reduce
the corporation's debt to Reed by an amount of$307,271.00 and other sums, as a part ofa
proposed transaction between Reed, John and AlA Services Corporation which Reed later
repudiated and refused to complete, and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 9.2.
XXVIII.
Answering paragraph 13.2, these defendants allege that the documents speak
ANSWER OF AlA SERVICES CORPORATION,
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for themselves, allege that the documents have been amended, allege that they are not in
default of any provisions in the documents as amended and deny all the other allegations of
paragraph 13.2.
XXIX.

Answering paragraph 13.3, these defendants admit that they have refused to
comply with plaintiffs demands and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 13.3.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

On July 1, 1996, plaintiff, AlA Services Corporation and Donna 1. Taylor
entered into a SERIES A PREFERRED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT which provides
that no principal payments may be made by AlA Services Corporation to plaintiff until the
entire redemption price due Donna Taylor is paid in full. The redemption price due Donna
Taylor has not been paid in full. Therefore, no principal payments are due to plaintiff.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

At different times since the written agreements were executed, plaintiffs and
some defendants have orally modified the written agreements. The modifications include,
without limitation, an agreement that the interest payable to plaintiff from AlA Services
Corporation would be paid in installments of $15,000.00 per month (together with the
assumption of responsibility for other expenses). AlA Services Corporation has paid
plaintiff the sum of $15,000.00 per month and has assumed responsibility for the other
agreed expenses in accordance with the modified agreements since they were entered into
and plaintiff has accepted those payments. None of these defendants is in default of the
modified agreements with plaintiff.
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THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The claims of the plaintiff are barred by applicable statutes of limitation,
including Idaho Code §§ 5-216,5-218,5-224 and 5-237.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is estopped from asserting his claims against these defendants.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff has waived his right to assert claims against these defendants.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims against these defendants are barred by the equitable doctrine
of unclean hands.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims in his THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION violate Rule 9(b)
I.R.c.P.

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff s claims are barred by the doctrine of laches.

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to state a claim for a shareholder's
derivative action, plaintiffs claims are barred because he failed to give the notice required
by Idaho Code § 30-1-742.

These defendants counterclaim against the plaintiff as follows:

FIRST COUNTERCLAIM
In 1995, plaintiffwas the majority shareholder of AlA Services Corporation.
AlA Services Corporation was the sole shareholder of AlA Insurance, Inc.
ANSWER OF AlA SERVICES CORPORATION,
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In 1995, AlA Services Corporation redeemed plaintiffs interest in AlA
Services Corporation through a corporate redemption of the plaintiff s stock.
After the purchase of plaintiff s stock, plaintiff intentionally undertook a course
of action to injure AlA Insurance and to devalue the businesses of AlA Services Corporation.
Plaintiffs intentional course of action included intimidating the management of the
businesses of AlA Services Corporation, inducing AlA Insurance, Inc., employees and agents
to terminate their employment and contracts with AlA Insurance, Inc., and to accept
employment and contracts with plaintiff and/or his controlled organizations. Plaintiff, with
the former employees and former agents of AlA Insurance, Inc., engaged in business
competitive with AlA Insurance, Inc., and seriously damaged the business and value of AlA
Insurance, Inc., and the value of the businesses of AlA Services Corporation.
Because of plaintiff s intentional injury to the business of AlA Insurance, Inc.,
AlA Services Corporation was unable to pay plaintiff all of the amounts of money due at the
times due, prior to the amendment of the agreements. Before the agreements were amended
plaintiff threatened to sue AlA Services Corporation and to foreclose and take over AlA
Insurance, Inc., and threatened and coerced these defendants into employing friends and
relatives of plaintiff and paying plaintiff s friends and relatives salaries and compensation
substantially in excess of the value of their services. Plaintiff also told those friends and
relatives that they were not obligated to report to or take direction from these defendants'
management.
Plaintiffhas intentionally breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
implied in the agreements with these defendants and has damaged these defendants in
amounts to be proved at trial.
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SECOND COUNTERCLAIM
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Plaintiff has intentionally inflicted emotional distress on John Taylor and
damaged John Taylor in an amount to be proved at trial.

THIRD COUNTERCLAIM
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE
ECONOMIC ADVANTAGEIINTENTIONAL INDUCEMENT
OF TERMINATION OF CONTRACTS WITH COMPANIES
OWNED IN PART BY R. JOHN TAYLOR
Plaintiff has damaged these defendants by intentionally causing businesses to
terminate contracts with companies owned in part by these defendants and therefore
diminishing the value of these defendants' investment in those companies. Plaintiff has
damaged these defendants in an amount to be proved at trial.

FOURTH COUNTERCLAIM
DECLARATION OF INVALIDATION OF PROXY
The written agreements provide that plaintiff will have an irrevocable proxy
from AlA Services Corporation to vote the stock of AlA Insurance, Inc., in the event and
only in the event of an uncured default by AlA Services Corporation.
Plaintiff claims that AlA Services Corporation is in default and has thus
claimed the right to act as AlA Services Corporation proxy and to vote its shares in AlA
Insurance, Inc. Defendants deny that AlA Services Corporation is in default.
Plaintiffhas stated in writing his intention to vote AlA Services Corporation's
shares in AlA Insurance, Inc., to remove all of the current directors of AlA Insurance, Inc.,
and then to cause new directors to be appointed to remove all of the officers of AlA
Insurance, Inc.
The immediate removal of all of the directors and officers of AlA Insurance,
Inc., would result in catastrophic losses to AlA Insurance, Inc., all to the substantial
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detriment of AIA Insurance, Inc., and AlA Services Corporation.
A proxy is an agent of his principal and owes a fiduciary duty to his principal.
Plaintiff seeks to act as a proxy for AlA Services Corporation but has announced his
intention to do serious and catastrophic damage to his principal, AlA Services Corporation.
Because of plaintiff s announced intention to violate his fiduciary duty to AlA
Services Corporation and to take actions which will result in catastrophic losses to AlA
Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., the Court should find, order and determine
that plaintiff does not have a right to act as a proxy for AlA Services Corporation in the
voting of its shares of AlA Insurance, Inc.
FIFTH COUNTERCLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on Sunday, February 24,2007, without notice to
any defendants, plaintiff and several individuals entered the offices of AlA Insurance, Inc.,
and AlA Services Corporation at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho.
Accompanying plaintiff and his security personnel was a locksmith whom
plaintiff directed to begin to change the locks on the offices of AlA Services Corporation and
AlA Insurance, Inc., for the purpose of preventing access to those offices by their current
management and employees.
The action and conduct of plaintiff and his associates constituted a trespass
upon the property of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., which, if it had been
successful, would have caused irreparable injury to both AlA Services Corporation and AlA
Insurance, Inc.
Plaintiff should be enjoined from harassing and/or interfering with the
management ofthe business known as AlA Insurance, Inc., and AlA Services Corporation.
Plaintiff should be enjoined from entering upon the premises of AlA Insurance, Inc., and
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AlA Services Corporation without the express permission of John Taylor. Plaintiff should
be enjoined from acting or attempting to act as a director or officer of AlA Insurance, Inc.
Plaintiff should be enjoined from harassing or annoying, directly or indirectly, any employee
of AlA Services Corporation or AlA Insurance, Inc., in person, by telephone, or by written
communications.
SIXTH COUNTERCLAIM

In the early morning hours of Sunday, February 25, 2007, plaintiff and several
of his associates entered the offices of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance Inc.,
without notice and without permission, which constitutes an intentional trespass on the
property of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance Inc., which caused those
corporations damages in amounts which will be proved at trial.
NOTICE OF INTENT TO AMEND

These defendants hereby give notice of their intention to request the Court to
permit them to amend these counterclaims to include a claim for punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, these defendants request the Court:
1. To dismiss the First Amended Complaint of the plaintiff, with prejudice and
to award these defendants their costs and reasonable attorneys fees.
2. To award these defendants damages for plaintiffs breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in the amounts proved at trial.
3. To award John Taylor damages for plaintiffs intentional infliction of
emotional distress, in the amounts proved at trial.
4. To award these defendants damages for plaintiffs intentionally causing
businesses to terminate contracts with companies owned by him in amounts to be proved at
trial.
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5. To find, order and declare that plaintiff did not have a right to act as a proxy
for AlA Services Corporation in the voting of its shares of AlA Insurance, Inc.
6.

To enjoin the plaintiff from harassing and/or interfering with the

management of the business known as AlA Insurance, Inc., and AlA Services Corporation
and to enjoin the plaintiff from entering upon the premises of AlA Insurance, Inc., and AlA
Services Corporation, without the express permission of John Taylor and to enjoin the
plaintiff from acting or attempting to act as a director or officer of AlA Insurance, Inc., and
to enjoin the plaintiff from harassing or annoying, directly or indirectly, any employee of
AlA Services Corporation or AlA Insurance, Inc., in person, by telephone, or by written
communications.
7. To award these defendants damages for plaintiffs trespass.

3. For such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just.
Dated: March 30, 2007.
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

By:
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
These defendants demand a trial by jury of all of the issues in this case that are
triable to a jury.
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

By:
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, WA 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston,ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

U.S. MAIL
- - - - HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
-----=-:;-_ _X _ _ TELECOPY (FAX)
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RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston,ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISB #7563
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,

v.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN T AYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;

PLAINTIFF REED 1. TAYLOR'S
RESPONSE TO MOTION OF MICHAEL E.
MCNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS
COUNSEL FOR AlA SERVICES
CORPORA TION AND AlA INSURANCE,
INC.

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") submits this Response to Motion of
Michael E. McNichols to Withdraw as Counsel for AlA Services Corporation and AlA

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
MOTION TO WITHDRAW-l

~2~

ORIGINAL

Insurance, Inc.
I. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
A.

There Is A Current Conflict of Interest Which Requires Michael E.
McNichols to Withdraw as Counsel for AlA Services and AlA
Insurance.

The First Amended Complaint contains significant claims against John Taylor,
Bryan Freeman and JoLee Taylor as directors and officers of the corporations.

See

Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Emergency Motion, pp. 26-29. Thus,
Michael E. McNichols is taking the action required by the Rules of Professional Conduct
and should be permitted to withdraw as counsel for AlA Services and AlA Insurance.
B.

The Court Should Require Mr. McNichols' Files Be Held Inviolate
Until Further Order of the Court to Protect the Interests of Reed
Taylor, AlA Services Corporation, and AlA Insurance, Inc.

"Leave to withdraw as counsel of record may be granted by the court for good
cause shown and upon such conditions or sanctions as will prevent any delay in
determination and disposition of the pending action and the rights of the parties."
LR.C.P. 11(b)(2).

Mr. McNichols' files in this action represent the interests of John Taylor, Reed
Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance. Mr. McNichols is in no position to determine
how to separate his files, information and notes regarding privileges owed to all of the
above parties. Thus, the Court should enter an order requiring Mr. McNichols to keep all
of his files inviolate and that he may not purge or separate the files in any way until
further order from the Court.
III
III

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
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II. CONCLUSION
The Court should permit Michael E. McNichols to withdraw as counsel for AlA
Services and AIA Insurance and require that all of Michael E. McNichols' files
pertaining to this action be held inviolate and no information in the files be purged or
separated until further order from the Court.
DATED this 5th day of April, 2007.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

BY~_
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
l, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and
correct copy of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Response to Motion of Michael E. McNichols to
Withdraw as Counsel for AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. on the
following party(s) via the methodes) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
e ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
eX) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, AlA
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
eX) Hand Delivered
e ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Signed this 5th day of April 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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JONATHAND. HALLY
CLARK and FEENEY
Idaho State Bar No. 4979
1229 Main Street
P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston,ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9516
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160
Attorneys for Defendant Connie Taylor
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REED 1. TA YLOR, a single person,
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vs.

14

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person
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NOTICE OF NON-OBJECTION TO
MOTION OF MICHAEL E. MCNICHOLS
TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FOR AlA
SERVICES CORPORATION AND AlA
INSURANCE, INC.

Defendant.

20

21

COMES NOW the defendant CONNIE TA YLOR, by and through her attorney of record,

22

Jonathan Hally ofthe law firm of Clark and Feeney, and hereby notifies the Court and counsel that

23

defendant CONNIE TAYLOR has no opposition to defendant's Motion of Michael E. McNichols

24

25
26

to Withdraw as Counsel for AIA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc.
NOTICE OF NON-OBJECTION TO MOTION OF MICHAEL
E. MCNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 1
LA W

OFFICES OF

CLARK AND FEENEY
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501

DATED this

II

day of April, 2007.
CLARK and FEENEY

1

2
afuan D. Hally, an as iate of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Connie W. Taylor

3
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5

I HEREB Y CERTIFY that on the
I day of April, 2007, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
7 following:
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9
10
11

12
13
14

Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith and Cannon
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneysfor Reed Taylor
Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Ave., Ste. 3100
Seattle, WA 98104
Attorneys for Reed Taylor

15
16
17
18
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20
21

Michael McNichols
Clements, Brovvn & McNichols
321 13 th Street
PO Box 1510
Lewiston, ID 83501
David A. Gittins
Law Offices of David A. Gittins
843 7th Street
PO Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorneys for Duclos and Freeman

o
o

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

o
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)
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Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
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Overnight Mail
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afuan D. Hally, an a ciate of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Connie W. Taylor
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Michael E. McNichols
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
321 13th Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 993
Attorneys for Defendants
AIA Services Corporation,
AIA Insurance, Inc. and
R. John Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;
Plaintiff,
vs.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV 07-00208
ORDER GRANTING MOTION
OF MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS
TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL
FORAIA SERVICES
CORPORATION AND AlA
INSURANCE, INC.

The MOTION OF MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS
COUNSEL FOR AlA SERVICES CORPORATION AND AlA INSURANCE INC., came
on for hearing, pursuant to Notice, on Thursday, April 12, 2007, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
Plaintiff was represented by Ned A. Cannon and Roderick C. Bond ofthe firm
of Smith, Cannon & Bond. Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance Inc., and

ORDER GRANTING MOTION OF MICHAEL E.
McNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL
FOR AlA SERVICES CORPORATION AND
AlA INSURANCE, INC.
-1-

R. John Taylor were represented by Michael E. McNichols of the firm of Clements, Brown
& McNichols.

The Court heard the arguments of counsel.
IT IS ORDERED that the MOTION OF MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS TO

WITHDRA W AS COUNSEL FOR AlA SERVICES CORPORATION AND AlA
INSURANCE INC., is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no documents in the files of Michael E.

McNichols regarding this case may be destroyed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael E. McNichols shall serve a copy

of this Order on AIA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance Inc., as required by Rule
11(b)(3) LR.C.P.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to Rule 11(b)(3) LR.C.P., that AlA

Services Corporation and AlA Insurance Inc., appoint another attorney to appear within
twenty (20) days from the date of service or mailing of this Order to AlA Services
Corporation and AlA Insurance Inc. If AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance
Inc., fail to file an additional written appearance through a newly appointed attorney
within twenty (20) days of the mailing ofthe Order of withdrawal to them, their failure
shall be sufficient ground for entry of default and default judgment against them, without
further notice.
DATED this 13th day of April, 2007.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION OF MICHAEL E.
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AIA INSURANCE, INC.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of April 2007, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, W A 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Michael E. McNichols
Clements, Brown & McNichols
P.O. Box 1510
Lewiston,ID 83501
Facsimile: (208) 743-9295

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160
AlA Services Corporation
P.O. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 83501
U.S.MAIL
/
----"'--- HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
- - - - TELECOPY (FAX)
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EL E.
McNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL
FORAIA SERVICES CORPORATION AND
AIA INSURANCE, INC.
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AlA Insurance Inc.
P.O. Box 538
Lewiston,ID 83501

Michael E. McNichols
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
321 13th Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 743-9295 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 993
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DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendants
AlA Services Corporation,
AlA Insurance, Inc. and
R. John Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
)
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and )
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
)
community property comprised thereof;
)
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
)
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No: CV 07-00208
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify
as a witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge.
2. On April 13, 2007, I mailed a copy of the ORDER GRANTING MOTION
OF MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FOR AlA SERVICES
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

-1-

L
I

CORPORATION AND AlA INSURANCE INC., by certified mail to P.O. Box 538,
Lewiston, Idaho, 83501, which is the last known address most likely to give notice to AlA
Services Corporation and AlA Insurance Inc.
3. I also mailed copies of the ORDER GRANTING MOTION OF MICHAEL
E. McNICHOLS TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FORAIA SERVICES CORPORATION
AND AlA INSURANCE, INC., to counsel for all the other parties to this case.
4. A copy of the U.S. Postal Service Receipt for Certified Mail notice is
attached and incorporated by reference.
DATED: April 13th, 2007.

Michael E. McNichols

Notary Public in and for the State of
Idaho, residing at Lewiston, therein.
My Commission Expires: 10/19/11
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of April, 2007, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston,ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, WA 98104-4088
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston,ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-9160

X
U.S. MAIL
- - --HAND DELIVERED
- - - - - OVERNlGHT MAIL
_ _ _ _ TELECOPY (FAX)

Michael E. McNichols

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
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GaryD. Babbitt ISB No. 1486
D. John Ashby ISB No. 7228
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
Email: gdb@hteh.com
j ash@hteh.com
Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services Corporation
and AIA Insurance, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

Case No. CV-07-00208

)
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

)
)

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Fee Category: I(1a)
Filing Fee: $58.00

)

Defendants.

)
)

------------------------------)
TO:

REED J. TAYLOR, PLAINTIFF ABOVE NAMED, AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF
RECORD
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Gary D. Babbitt and D. John Ashby, members ofthe firm

of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, P.O. Box 1617, Boise, Idaho 83701, hereby enter an

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 1
43369.0002.920656.1

appearance as Attorneys of Record for Defendants AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc.
DATED THIS;;;!-

day of April, 2007.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

C
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GaryD.B~No.1486

Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of April, 2007, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by the method indicated below, and
addressed to each of the following:
_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

----t-

Paul R. Cressman, Jf.
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, WA 98104-4088
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
-L Telecopy

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
~ Telecopy

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
~ Telecopy

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Defendant Connie Taylor]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
Telecopy
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Gary D. Babbitt ISB No. 1486
D. John Ashby ISB No. 7228
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
Email: gdb@hteh.com
j ash@hteh.com
Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services Corporation
and AIA Insurance, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

Case No. CV -07 -00208

)

MOTION TO DISMISS

)
)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)
)

---------------------------)
AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., by and through their counsel of

record, Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, LLP, hereby moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs
Second Amended Complaint pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6).

MOTION TO DISMISS - 1
43369.0002.926521.1

This motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed
concurrently herewith.
DATED THIS

~ day of May, 2007.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

shby I
omeys for Defendants AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.

MOTION TO DISMISS - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

n.

day of May, 2007, I caused to be served a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS by the method indicated below, and addressed to
each of the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
LEmail

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, W A 98104-4088
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
-LEmail

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman]

__ u. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
-t:-Email

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor]

_ _ US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
-t.-Email

Jonathan D. Hally
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Defendant Connie Taylor]

_ _ US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Email

X
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Gary D. Babbitt ISB No. 1486
D. John Ashby ISB No. 7228
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
Email: gdb@hteh.com
j ash@hteh.com
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Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services Corporation
and AIA Insurance, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
)
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
)
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
)
community property comprised thereof;
)
BRYAN FREEMAN a single person; and
)
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

Case No. CV-07-00208
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

---------------------------)
I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

According to Plaintiffs complaint, which must be assumed as true for purposes of a
motion to dismiss, Plaintiff, the former founder and majority shareholder of AIA Services,
entered into various agreements with AIA Services to have his 613,494 shares of common stock

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 1
43369.0002.922920.3

in AlA Services redeemed. Second Amended Complaint, 'Il2.5. The original contracts -- the
Stock Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement -- were
executed on or about July 22, 1995. Id. at 'Il2.7. Then, in 1996, Plaintiff entered into various
amended agreements, including the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, Amended and
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, and the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
(collectively, the "Amended Agreements"). Id. at 'Il2.l0. According to Plaintiff, those contracts
provided that AlA Services would, among various other contractual obligations, make monthly
interest payments on the $6,000,000 principal debt. Id. at 'Il2.11.
Plaintiff further asserts that, according to the terms of the various Amended Agreements,
AlA Services would be in default if it failed to make timely interest payments; became insolvent;
failed to maintain a Lock Box to hold insurance commissions; failed to keep Plaintiff on AIA
Services' Board of Directors; or several other events of default. Id. at 'Il2.12.
According to the Complaint, AIA Services has never been in compliance with the terms
of the various agreements, and has been in breach since the Amended Agreements were entered
into. Id. at 'Il'll2.13 - 2.16. For example, Plaintiff alleges:
Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Reed
was required to be a member of the board of directors of AIA
Services until Reed was paid in full or sufficient security was
posted to ensure the payment of the Promissory note. AIA
Services never posted bonds or other security for the payment of
the Promissory Note. In excess of six years, AIA Services, John
Duclos and/or Freeman have intentionally refused to appoint Reed
to the Board as required.

Id. at ~ 2.13.
Indeed, Plaintiff further alleges that AIA Services has been in breach of the various
contractual obligations ever since the contract was entered into:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 2
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Because AIA Services has failed to timely and properly pay Reed
as required during all relevant times, John Duclos and/or Freeman
owe Reed special obligations because of his status as AIA
Services' largest creditor.
.... During all relevant times, the value of AIA Services was less
than the aggregate amount of its debts, which constitutes AIA
Services' insolvency. During all relevant times, AIA Services was
in default of various provisions of the agreements with Reed,
insolvent and/or unable to timely pay its debts to Reed. During all
relevant times, AIA Services has failed to comply with the terms of
the promissory note.
Id.

at~'

2.14 - 2.16 (emphasis added).

Despite that fact that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have been in breach of the various
contractual provisions since 1996, Plaintiff waited until January 29,2007 -- more than 10 years
after the alleged breaches, to file his complaint. Plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action
accrued ten years ago and has long since been barred by the five-year statute oflimitations for
breach of contract.
Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because all of Plaintiffs causes
of action hinge on the underlying claim that Defendants are in breach of the Amended
Agreements.
Moreover, although Plaintiff s Complaint contains ten separate causes of action, the
remaining causes of action should be dismissed for a variety of reasons particular to those causes
of action. Those causes of action are no more than an improper attempt to turn a simple breach
of contract claim into something that it is not, and several ofthe so-call "causes of action" are
not causes of action at all.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 3
43369.0002.922920.3

II. ARGUMENT
1.

First Cause Of Action Alleges Breaches of Contract Which Are Barred By
The Statute Of Limitations.

Plaintiffs "breaches of contract" cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations because Idaho Code § 5-216 provides that any "action upon any contract, obligation
or liability founded upon an instrument in writing" must be brought within five years from the
time the cause of action accrues. A cause of action for breach of contract accrues upon the
breach ofthe contract. Balivi Chemical Corp. v. Industrial Ventilation, Inc., 131 Idaho 449, 451,
958 P.2d 606, 608 (Ct. App. 1998). Stated differently, "The cause of action [for breach of
contract] accrues, and the statute oflimitation begins to run, when a party may sue another."
Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc. 103 Idaho 912, 915, 655 P.2d 119,122 (Ct. App. 1982). Indeed the
cause of action accrues upon the breach even though no damage may occur until later." Mason v.
Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 436,871 P.2d 846, 853 (Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that
the statute of limitations began to run when an erroneous transcript "was first delivered" because,
"At that time, Mason could have brought an action for specific performance").
In this case, the alleged breaches of contract occurred much more than five years before
Plaintiff filed his Complaint. Here, Plaintiff s own complaint alleges that AIA services was in
breach of various provisions ofthe Amended Agreements virtually since the time they were
executed in 1996. See Second Amended Complaint, '1['1[ 2.15 - 2.16 ("AIA Services has failed to
timely and properly pay Reed as required during all relevant times"; "During all relevant times,
AIA Services was in default of various provisions of the agreements with Reed, insolvent and/or
unable to timely pay its debts to Reed"); see also id. at '1[ 2.13 ("In excess of six years, AIA
Services, John, Duclos and/or Freeman have intentionally refused to appoint Reed to the Board
as required.") (emphasis added).

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 4
43369.0002.922920.3

Although Plaintiff alleges that AIA Services has been in breach ofthe Amended
Agreements and otherwise in default for over ten years, Plaintiff failed to bring suit until January
29,2007, well beyond the five-year statute oflimitations. Plaintiffs breach of contract cause of
action is, therefore, barred.
The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179,484 P.2d 728
(1971) is controlling here. In Skaggs, the parties entered into a written leasing agreement in
1961 for the rental of an appliance store in the Overland Shopping Center located in Burley,
Idaho. The leasing agreement contained a restrictive provision prohibiting the lessors from
renting space in their shopping center to any other party engaged in the sale of major appliances.
In 1962, the lessors, the Jensens, leased a portion of their property to a Montgomery Ward Store
which sold appliances and, in 1969, the lessors entered another leasing agreement with Sears
Roebuck and Co., which also sold appliances. Despite the fact that the lease had been violated
since 1962, the lessees, Skaggs, did not file suit until 1969. In affirming the lower court's
holding that the statute of limitations barred the action related to the lease to the Montgomery
Ward Store, the Idaho Supreme Court explained:
In 1962, the Jensens rented space to Montgomery Ward in
violation of the first leasing agreement. Suit was not commenced,
however, until 1969. Thus it is evident that more than five years
elapsed between the time the cause of action accrued and the time
suit was instituted. The Jensens (lessors) were entitled to rely on
the statute of limitations as a defense to the Skaggs' (lessees') claim
since actions in contract must be brought within five years in this
jurisdiction. See also Toellner v. McGinnis, 55 Wash. 430, 104 P.
641 (1909) where the Washington Supreme Court held an action
on a lease covenant was barred after six years even though the
lease itself was intended to run for fifteen. In view of the length of
time that Skaggs rested on their rights, it would be inequitable
in this Court's opinion to allow them to now bring suit. By
failing to object within a reasonable time after they felt their
rights were being violated, they ratified and modified the
restrictive provision, thus vitiating its force.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 5
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Id., 94 Idaho at 180,484 P.2d at 729 (emphasis added).

Here, Plaintiffs breach of contract claim alleges that Defendants have been in breach at
all times for far more than the five-year statute oflimitations. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs did not
bring suit to enforce their rights within five years of the alleged breaches. By failing to do so,
they are now barred from bringing those claims by the statute oflimitations. In the words of the
Idaho Supreme Court, "By failing to object within a reasonable time after they felt their rights
were being violated, they ratified and modified the restrictive provision[sJ, thus vitiating [their]
force." Id. (emphasis added).1

A.

The Second Through Tenth Causes Of Action Are Also Barred
Because Each Cause Of Action Hinges On Claims Occurring More
Than Five Years Ago.

The remainder of Plaintiff s claims should be dismissed for the same reason as the breach
of contract claim. Idaho Code § 5-216 provides that any "action upon any contract, obligation or
liability founded upon an instrument in writing" must be brought within five years from the time
the cause of action accrues. All of Plaintiffs causes of action arise from the alleged breach of
obligations set forth in the Amended Agreements. As set forth above, Plaintiff is barred by the
statute of limitations from now asserting that those contractual obligations have been breached.

1

The Skaggs decision makes clear that a breach of contract cause of actions arises from the
time of the first breach. See also Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 436,871
P.2d 846, 853 (Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that the statute oflimitations began to run when
an erroneous transcript "was first delivered" because, "At that time, Mason could have
brought an action for specific performance") (emphasis added); Hoglan v. First Sec. Bank of
Idaho, NA., 120 Idaho 682, 819 P.2d 100 (1991) ("An action on a written contract must be
commenced within five years. I.C. § 5-216. The earliest act which could be considered the
basis for a breach of contract claim occurred in March of 1983, when First Security stopped
sending the monthly statements") (emphasis added).
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For example, the Second Cause of Action for fraudulent transfer alleges that Defendants
fraudulently transferred assets to avoid paying Plaintiff the money due under the Amended
Agreements. Given that Plaintiff cannot enforce the alleged obligations under the Amended
Agreements, Defendants cannot face liability for fraudulent transfer.
Another example ofa contract-based action is Plaintiffs Tenth Cause of Action for
"Enforcement of Rights." Defendants presume that this is an attempt to plead a declaratory
judgment cause of action. That cause of action seeks declaratory relief based on contract
breaches along the following lines:
Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security
Agreement, and Restructure Agreement, Reed is entitled to vote
the pledged shares of AIA Insurance (and all ancillary rights,
including, without limitation, to vote the shares to remove the
board and take all actions related in any way to his right to vote the
pledged shares), sell that shares of AIA Insurance at public or
private sale, judicially sell the pledged shares in AIA Insurance,
entitled to timely receive audited financial statements and financial
information, and/or seize all of the AIA Insurance and AIA
Services' commissions in the required Lock Box. When AIA
Services became in Default, it lost its right to vote the pledged
shares of AIA Insurance and the right vested exclusively in Reed.
Second Amended Complaint, ~ 13.2. (emphasis added).
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Plaintiffs Tenth Cause of Action, like the others, is founded on alleged breaches of the
written agreement that first occurred over ten years ago, and the cause of action is now barred by
the statute of limitations. 2
A cursory review of the causes of action show their dependence and reliance on breaches
of contract. There are, however, substantial legal defects with the other causes of action which
will also be briefed next.

B.

Third Cause of Action -- MisrepresentationlFraud.

LR.C.P. 9(b) provides that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, or violation of civil or
constitutional rights, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake, or violation of civil or
constitutional rights shall be stated with particularity." The Idaho courts explain that "[t]he party
alleging fraud must support the existence of each of the elements of the cause of action for fraud
by pleading with particularity the factual circumstances constituting fraud." Estes v. Barry, 132
Idaho 82, 86, 967 P.2d 284,288 (1998). Failure to plead fraud with particularity results in
dismissal of the fraud cause of action. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233,
240, 108 P.3d 380, 387 (2005) (dismissing fraud cause of action where "there were no facts
alleged which demonstrated Larry's reliance on any representations made to him, which in tum,
resulted in some injury"); Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 Idaho 123, 127, 106
P.3d 449,453 (2005) (dismissing fraud cause of action that contained only "utterly general

2

Indeed, all of Plaintiffs causes of action are founded on alleged breaches of contract that
occurred over ten years ago, requiring that every single cause of action be dismissed. This
brief uses the Second and Tenth causes of action as examples to demonstrate that all causes
of action rely on the time-barred alleged contractual breaches. Moreover, this brief uses the
Second and Tenth causes of action as examples because the Third through Ninth Causes of
action should each be dismissed for independent reasons as set forth below, in addition to
their reliance on time-barred alleged contractual breaches.
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averments" directed at fraud and "fail [ed] to allege anything other than the elements of the prima
faci e case 0 f fraud.").
The Ninth Circuit describes the strictures of the nearly identical federal rule as follows:
Rule 9(b) demands that. .. the circumstances constituting the
alleged fraud be specific enough to give defendants notice of the
particular misconduct so that they can defend against the charge
and not just deny that they have done anything wrong. Averments
of fraud must be accompanied by the "who, what, when, where,
and how" of the misconduct charged. A plaintiff must set forth
more than the neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction.
The plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a
statement, and why it is false.
Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
Put differently, the complaint must set forth the "time, place, and specific content of the false
representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentation." Edwards v.
Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
Here, Plaintiff's complaint does not contain any specific allegations of fraud. Plaintiff's
complaint does not allege even a single specific representation, much less explain the falsity of
any representations or how Plaintiff relied on any representations to his detriment. The third
cause of action should, therefore, be dismissed for failure to plead fraud with particularity.

C.

Fourth Cause of Action -- Conversion.

Plaintiff's conversion cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Conversion is defined as "a distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over another's
personal property in denial of or inconsistent with rights therein. Peasley Transfer & Storage Co.
v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 743, 979 P.2d 605,616 (1999).

Plaintiff's complaint makes it clear that Plaintiff's relief, if any, lies in a breach of
contract claim, but not for conversion. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants have taken
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anything from Plaintiff's possession, but, rather, that Defendants have not paid Plaintiff money
allegedly due to him under the various contracts cited in Plaintiff's complaint. See Second
Amended Complaint, ~ 6.2 ("AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman's
conduct constitutes willful interference with Reed's property and money which should have been
paid to him, without lawful justification, which deprived Reed ofthe possession of such money
and/or property.") (emphasis added).
The failure to pay money due under a contract is actionable in contract, but, as a matter of
law, does not constitute conversion. See, e.g., South Trust Bank v. Donely, 925 So.2d 934, 942
(Ala. 2005) ("Donely has alleged that SouthTrust has failed to pay her a debt, and the proper
action for that claim is a breach-of-contract action, not a conversion action."); Alex Hofrichter,

PA. v. Zuckerman & Venditti, PA., 710 So.2d 127, 128, n.3 (Fla. App. 1998) ("a mere refusal to
pay money owed under a contract does not, without more, amount to conversion or civil theft.").
A cause of action for conversion requires and affirmative act, i.e., that the defendant takes
property from the plaintiff's possession. See e.g., Peasley Transfer & Storage Co., 132 Idaho at
743 ("A [conversion] right of action accrues in favor of the owner of property as soon as the
property is wrongfully taken from his possession or wrongfully converted.") (emphasis added);
18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 21 ("Some affirmative act on the part ofthe defendant is usually
regarded as necessary to constitute a conversion... Even where it results in the loss of the
property, the failure to perform an act made obligatory by contract will not amount to a
conversion."). Here, plaintiff alleges that he was not paid funds due to him, not that any property
has been taken from his possession.
Plaintiff's remedy, if any, lies in his breach of contract action, and his conversion cause
of action must be dismissed.
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D.

Fifth Cause of Action -- Alter Ego.

Plaintiff s Fifth Cause of action -- "Alter Ego" -- is not a cause of action at all, and must
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As set forth in the
leading treatise on corporations:
A claim based on the alter ego theory is not in itself a claim for
substantive relief, but rather to disregard the corporation as a
distinct defendant is procedural. A fmding of fact of alter ego,
standing alone, creates no cause of action. It merely furnishes a
means for a complainant to reach a second corporation or
individual upon a cause of action that otherwise would have
existed only against the first corporation. An attempt to pierce the
corporate veil is a means of imposing liability on an underlying
cause of action, such as a tort or breach of contract.
Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS, § 41.10 (1999).
Courts consistently hold that "alter ego" is not a cause of action. See, e.g., Local 159,
342, 343 & 444 v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 185 F.3d 978,985 (9th Cir. 1999) ("A request to
pierce the corporate veil is only a means of imposing liability for an underlying cause of action
and is not a cause of action in and of itself."); Gallagher v. McClure Bintliff, 740 S. W.2d 118,
119-120 (Tex. App. 1987) ("An attempt to pierce the corporate veil, in and of itself, is not a
cause of action but rather is a means of imposing liability on an underlying cause of action such
as a tort or breach of contract."); Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v.

Brumm, 264 F.Supp.2d 697, 701 (N.D. Ill. 2003) ("Piercing the corporate veil, however, is a
doctrine to be applied in an underlying cause of action; it is not an action itself.").
Given that alter ego is not an independent cause of action, Courts routinely dismiss "alter
ego" causes of action and permit the factual allegations of alter ego to be pled as part of the
underlying causes of action. See, e.g., Green Atlas Shipping S.A. v. Us., 306 F.Supp.2d 974,
977 (D. Or. 2003) ("[P]ierced corporate veil is not a separate cause of action and I will dismiss
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the fifteenth claim but allow the United States to make its alter ego allegations in the context of
the remaining underlying substantive claims for liability in this action."); Fiber Consultants, Inc.
v. Fiber Optek Interconnect Corp., 792 N.Y.S.2d 89, 91 (N.Y.A.D. 2005) (dismissing separate
alter ego cause of action because it is not a separate cause of action, and granting leave to assert
facts to support alter ego liability as part underlying causes of action).
Here, even if alter ego were a separate cause of action, the complaint does not state a
claim for alter ego liability. In general, the stockholders of a corporation are not personally
liable for corporate obligations, and the corporate veil will be pierced only under limited
circumstances. "[T]wo requirements for application of the [alter ego] doctrine are (1) that there
be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and
the individual no longer exist and (2), that if the acts are treated as those of the corporation an
inequitable result will follow." Chick v. Tomlinson, 96 Idaho 483, 485, 531 P.2d 573,575
(1975). "Factors which influence whether the corporate veil will be pierced (and a subsidiary
deemed an 'alter ego' of the parent) include the obvious under-capitalization of the subsidiary;
the failure of either the parent or subsidiary to adhere to corporate formalities; and the formation
of the subsidiary to perpetrate a fraud." Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 114 Idaho 817, 845, 761 P.2d
1169, 1197 (1988).
Plaintiff does not allege any reason for which the corporate veil should be pierced.
Rather, he merely asserts that "Because ofthe fraudulent, wrongful and/or inappropriate acts
and/or omissions of John, Duclos, Freeman and/or other shareholders of AlA Services, the
corporate veil of AIA Services should be pierced thereby holding John, Duclos, and/or Freeman
and/or certain shareholders of AIA Services personally liable for all indebtedness to Reed as
equity requires such action." See Second Amended Complaint, 1 5.2.
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Thus, Plaintiff asserts that the alter ego theory permits him seek recovery from individual
shareholders for the contractual obligations of the corporations. Plaintiffs cause of action under
the alter ego theory is for breach of contract. However, as set forth in Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF
CORPORATIONS,

§ 41.85, courts are very reluctant to pierce the corporate veil in contract causes

of action:
The alter ego doctrine and its criteria are applicable to impose
substantive liability whether that liability is in causes of action in
tort, in contract, or both, although mere breach of contract is
generally not sufficient to justify a disregard of the corporate
entity. In other words, courts usually apply more stringent
standards to piecing the corporate veil in a contract case than they
do in tort cases. This is because the party seeking relief in a
contract case is presumed to have voluntarily and knowingly
entered into an agreement with a corporate entity, and is expected
to suffer the consequences of the limited liability associated with
the corporate business form, while this is not the situation in tort
cases. Further, one who has contracted with a selected party and
received the promise bargained for should not be allowed to look
to another merely because he or she is disappointed in the selected
party's performance. Thus, under contract law, the disappointed
one may not hold the other liable without additional compelling
facts.
Id. at p. 691-93.

"[A] finding of fraud is an essential element of an alter ego determination in contract
cases, while no finding of fraud is required in tort cases." Id. at p. 693. This is because, unlike
in a tort claim, "the injured party in contract cases had the opportunity to select the entity with
whom he or she contracted .... Accordingly, absent very compelling equitable considerations,
courts should not rewrite contracts or disturb the allocation of risk the parties have themselves
established." Id. Two central factors courts consider to determine whether a Plaintiff in a
contract cause of action should be permitted to pierce the corporate veil are: (1) the sort of
contract involved -- i.e., small creditors, like consumers, are unlikely to do a full investigation or
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negotiate guarantees, but a large creditor should be expected to do so; and (2) "is the nature of
the activity complained of something of which the plaintiff can be considered to have assumed
the risk." Id. at p. 694.
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege the fundamental requirements to pierce the corporate veil.
He does not allege inadequate capitalization, nor does he make (much less with the requisite
particularity) any allegations of fraud that warrant piercing the corporate veil. Moreover, if ever
there were a plaintiff that entered into contractual obligations with a corporation with full
knowledge ofthe risk associated with the contract, it is Plaintiff here. As set forth in Plaintiffs
own pleadings, Plaintiff "was the founder and majority shareholder of AlA Services." See
Second Amended Complaint, ~ 2.5. Plaintiff entered into certain contractual obligations (over
$7.5 million according to Plaintiff) with AIA Insurance and AlA Services, not with any
individual shareholders and without any individual guarantees. More than anybody else,
Plaintiff himself was intimately familiar with the financial status of the corporations, the extent
to which they were fully capitalized, and their ability to pay a $6 million debt. Especially given
Plaintiffs familiarity with the financial position of AlA Services and AlA Insurance and failure
to state a claim for fraud, Plaintiff fails to state any basis for alter ego liability or otherwise
permit him to pierce the corporate veil.
This case involves no more than a claimed breach of contactual obligations to pay a debt
and Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action (if one even existed) to pierce the corporate veil.
E.

Sixth Cause of Action -- Equitable Indemnification.

Plaintiff s cause of action for equitable indemnification fails as a matter of law.
Equitable indemnification is a tort cause of action that simply does not apply in this contract
case. Equitable indemnification provides a remedy whereby one tortfeasor seeks indemnity from
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another tortfeasor. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Valerio, 124 Idaho 283, 285, 858 P.2d 822, 824 (Idaho
App. 1993) ("An indemnity relationship between tortfeasors exists when the parties share a
common liability for the same hann"); Miller v. Ellis, 103 Ca1.AppAth 373,379-380, 126
Ca1.Rptr.2d 667, 672 (2002) ("The doctrine of equitable indemnification allows liability to be
apportioned between wrongdoers based on their relative culpability. It is premised upon the
principle that as a matter of fairness, joint tortfeasors should share the burden of discharging the
legal obligation to the injured party for the damages caused by their mutual negligence.").
The doctrine of equitable indemnity does not apply unless both parties are jointly liable to
a third party in tort. See, e.g., 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indemnity, § 20 ("For indemnification implied-inlaw, more an equitable remedy than an action in and of itself, there must be an underlying injury
sounding in tort, and the party seeking indemnity must have imputed or derivative liability for
the tortious conduct from which indemnity is sought. ... The doctrine of equitable indemnity
applies only among defendants who are jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff.").
Plaintiffs cause of action fails for at least two reasons. First, Plaintiff and Defendants
are not joint tortfeasors in any way, nor does Plaintiff allege that they are. This is yet another
example of Plaintiff attempting to create a cause of action where, other than his breach of
contract claim (which, itself, is time-barred), one does not exist. As stated by one court:
In short, "This is an improper attempt to recast a breach of contract
cause of action as a tort claim. Nor is there any social policy that
would demand resort to tort remedies. Without any action
sounding in tort, there is no basis for a finding of potential joint
and several liability on the part of [cross-Jdefendant[BTMG],
thereby precluding a claim for equitable indemnity."

Stop Loss Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Brown & Toland Medical Group, 143 Ca1.AppAth 1036, 1041-42,
49 Ca1.Rptr.3d 609, 613 (2006).
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Second, even if equitable indemnification were an applicable legal theory, an equitable
indemnification cause of action does not arise until Plaintiff makes payment to the underlying
injured party. See May Trucking Co. v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 319, 322, 543
P.2d 1159, 1162 (1975) (explaining that an indemnity cause of action arises at "the time of
payment or settlement by the indemnitee," and that, "[iJn this case the record is unclear as to
when, if ever, May Trucking Company paid Farmer for the damage"). Here, Plaintiffs own
complaint admits that Donna Taylor has yet to be paid:
8.2
Donna Taylor is the holder of Series A Preferred Shares in
AIA Services, and such shares were issued to her as a result of a
dissolution action between her and Reed. Ifnot for AIA Services,
AIA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman's fraudulent,
wrongful and/or inappropriate acts, Donna Taylor's Series A
Preferred Shares would have been redeemed by AIA Services
and/or AIA. As of the date of this Second Amended Complaint,
over $500,000 must be paid to Donna Taylor to redeem her Series
A Preferred Shares.
8.3
Reed is entitled to be equitably indemnified by AIA
Services, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman for any sums owed to
Donna Taylor because of AIA Services' failure to timely redeem
her Series A Preferred Shares as required.
See Second Amended Complaint, ~~ 8.2, 8.3 (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs cause of action for equitable indemnification should be dismissed both because
there is no joint tortfeasor relationship and because any indemnity cause of action has yet to
anse.
F.

Seventh Cause of Action -- Account StatedIMonies Due.

Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action -- "Account StatedIMonies Due" -- should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief rna y be granted. Plaintiff calls this an
"account stated" cause of action, but Plaintiff s own complaint establishes that his claim does not
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fit within the elements of the account stated cause of action. Idaho Courts require specific
elements to establish a cause of action for an account stated:
An account stated is "a document, a writing, which exhibits
the state of account between parties and the balance owed one to
the other, and when assented to, either expressly or impliedly, it
becomes a new contract. ... [T]he account, in order to constitute a
contract, should appear to be something more than a mere
memorandum; it should show upon its face that it was intended to
be a final settlement up to date, and this should be expressed with
clearness and certainty." .... The transaction must be understood
by the parties as a fmal adjustment of the respective demands
between them and of the amount due.

Modern Mills, Inc. v. Havens, 112 Idaho 1101, 1105-06, 739 P.2d 400, 404-05 (Ct. App. 1987)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
A casual perusal of Plaintiffs complaint finds that several of these elements are lacking.
First, although an account stated cause of action requires a writing, Plaintiff does not allege that
any writing exists at all, much less a writing that shows "upon its face that it was intended to be a
final settlement up to date." Id.; see also Kugler v. Northwest Aviation, Inc., 108 Idaho 884, 887,
702 P.2d 922,925 (Ct. App. 1985) (noting that "[a]n account stated requires a writing," and
concluding that "the theory of an account stated is inapposite here" because "[n]o such writing
appears in the record").
Moreover, an account stated cause of action requires that the writing demonstrate mutual
assent between the parties and a "final adjustment of the respective demands between them and
of the amount due." Modern Mills, 112 Idaho at 1106 (emphasis added). Rather than allege that
the parties reached a written agreement as to any specific amount due, the complaint alleges that
the account stated "remains unpaid, along with any others which may have occurred but which
Reed is unaware of at this time, the dates and exact amount of which will be proven at trial." See
Second Amended Complaint, ~ 9.2. Plaintiffs complaint makes clear that there is no writing
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setting forth a specific amount due. Rather, it admits that Reed is not aware of any writing and
that he is not even aware of the exact amount allegedly due.
The Sixth Cause of action fails to state a claim for account stated, and must be dismissed.

G.

Seventh Cause of Action -- Unjust Enrichment.

Plaintiff's unjust enrichment cause of action should be dismissed for several reasons.
First, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the elements of unjust enrichment. The required elements of an
unjust enrichment claim are that: "(1) a benefit is conferred upon defendant by plaintiff, (2)
appreciation by the defendant of the benefit, and (3) acceptance of the benefit under
circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment
of the value thereof." Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88, 982 P.2d
917,923 (1999) (emphasis added).
Here, no benefit has been conferred upon AIA Services, AIA Insurance, or any other
defendant by Plaintiff. See also Holladay v. Lindsay, 152 P.3d 638, 641 (Ct. App. 2006) ("The
essence of a cause of action for unjust enrichment is 'the claim that the defendant has been
enriched by the plaintiff and that it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain that benefit
without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit. "') (emphasis added) (quoting

Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663, 666, 619 P.2d 1116, 1119 (1980)). Rather,
Plaintiff asserts that:
AIA Services,AIA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman have
retained the benefit of their fraudulent, wrongful, improper and/or
overreaching conduct and/or transfers.
John and/or anyone or more ofthe other Defendants would be
unjustly enriched if allowed to retain the benefit of the assets,
securities, loans, advances and/or other services received through
ALA Services and/or ALA Insurance, all of which funds should
have been paid to Reed.
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See Second Amended Complaint, ~ 10.2 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff does not allege that he conferred a benefit upon Defendants. Rather, he is
simply alleging that funds "should have been paid to Reed." As is the case with many ofthe
other causes of action, Plaintiff is attempting to squeeze a simple breach of contract cause of
action into something that it is not.
Second, Plaintiff is precluded from bringing an unjust enrichment cause of action because
Plaintiff alleges that there is a valid contract between the parties governing the Defendants'
obligations to Plaintiff. (see generally Second Amended Complaint, setting forth the various
agreements under which Plaintiff alleges he is entitled to payment). The precise issue presented
here was addressed as follows in Wilhelm v. Johnston, 136 Idaho 145, 152,30 P.3d 300, 307 (Ct.
App.2001):
A right of recovery in quasi-contract, also known as unjust
enrichment, occurs where "the defendant has received a benefit
which would be inequitable to retain at least without compensating
the plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust." ... This doctrine
may not be appropriately applied in the present case because 9:
recovery for unjust enrichment is not permissible where there is an
enforceable express contract between the parties covering the same
subject matter. ... Here, the existence of an enforceable
promissory note and deed of trust, which define the parties' rights
and responsibilities, precludes application ofthe unjust enrichment
doctrine.

Id.
Just like in Wilhelm, various agreements govern the rights ofthe respective parties in this
action, and a claim for unjust enrichment is, therefore, precluded. See id.; Mannos v. Moss,
Idaho _

(February 22,2007) ("where parties have entered into a contract, a claim for unjust

enrichment will be precluded"); Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 191,
108 P.3d 332, 338 (2005) ("Because quantum meruit is a species of implied contract, such
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recovery will not normally lie where there is an express contract governing the relationship of
the parties."); Iron Eagle Development v. Quality Design Sys., 138 Idaho 487 (2003) ("When
parties enter into an express contract, a claim based in equity is not allowed because the express
contract precludes enforcement of equitable claims.").

H.

Eighth Cause of Action -- Constrnctive Trust.

Plaintiff's cause of action for constructive trust must be dismissed for the same reasons as
the "alter ego" cause of action. "Constructive trust" is not a cause of action at all, but, rather, a
remedy. See, e.g., Gulf States Steel, Inc. v. Lipton, 765 F.Supp. 696, 704 (N.D. Ala. 1990) ("In
fact, the court's research has revealed no case in any jurisdiction that supports GSS' argument
that constructive trust constitutes a cause of action. Rather, the case law indicates unanimously
that a constructive trust is a remedy imposed to prevent the enjoyment of a fraud or of a breach
ofa fiduciary duty."); Stansfield v. Starkey, 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 76 (1990) ("In their third
amended complaint appellants alleged, as causes of action, a resulting trust and a constructive
trust. But neither is a cause of action (5

WITKIN,

CAL. PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1985) Pleading,

§§ 788-791, pp. 232-235), only a remedy."); Marion v. Benistar, Ltd., 2005 WL 563698, *1
(E.D. Pa. 2005) ("The claim based upon the assertion of a constructive trust, in Count II, will
also be dismissed. A constructive trust is a remedy, not an independent cause of action.").
Like the other improper causes of action, the constructive fraud cause of action should be
dismissed, leaving Plaintiff with the option of seeking the remedy ifhe prevails on any causes of
action that would entitled him to the remedy of a constructive trust. See, e.g, Fujisawa

Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor, 16 F.Supp.2d 941, 952 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ("A constructive
trust is an equitable remedy, not an independent cause of action.... Accordingly, while the
claim is dismissed, it is understood Fujisawa may attempt to prove a constructive trust is an

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 20
43369.0002.922920.3

appropriate equitable remedy should it prevail on other claims."); 3Corn Corp. v. Electronics
Recovery Specialists, Inc., 104 F.Supp.2d 932,942 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("Therefore, ifplaintiff

prevails on claims for which constructive trust is an appropriate remedy, it is free to argue that
such a remedy should be imposed.... Insofar as plaintiff alleges constructive trust as a separate
cause of action in count IX, that count is dismissed.").
I.

Ninth Cause of Action -- Director Liability.

Plaintiff s Ninth Cause of Action for "Director Liability" should be dismissed for failure
to state a claim. As an initial matter, "director liability," just like "alter ego" or "constructive
trust" is not a cause of action, but rather is a mechanism to hold directors individually liable for
the actions of a corporation. For that reason alone, the "director liability" cause of action should
be dismissed.
Second, Plaintiffs complaint does no more than assert the bald allegation that certain
directors should be held liable. See Second Amended Complaint, 112.2 ("John, Duclos, and
Freeman should be held personally liable for all fraudulent, wrongful, improper, overreaching
transactions, transfers, loans, advances, loan guarantees and fraudulent conveyances which
occurred during their tenure as member of the Board of Directors and as officers of AIA Services
and AIA Insurance."). Plaintiffs simple assertion that certain directors are individually liable,
absent any allegation setting forth a basis under which they should be held liable, does not state a
claim upon which relief should be granted.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs entire action is a belated attempt to recover under a contract that Plaintiff
alleges was breached over ten years ago. The entire action is barred by the five year statute of
limitations applicable to actions based upon "obligation or liability founded upon an instrument
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in writing." Additionally, most of the remaining causes of action either fail to state a claim
against Defendants or are not causes of action at all.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS

M day of May, 2007.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
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PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' LR.C.P. 12(b)(6)
MOTION

Defendants.

Plaintiff, Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor"), submits this Response to Defendants AIA
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance Inc. (collectively "Defendants") LR. C.P. 12(b)(6)
Motion ("Motion").
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1. INTRODUCTION
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss (collectively "Motion") for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted,
principally relying on the theory that the I.C. § 5-216 contractual statute of limitations (the
"Statute") has run, in an effort to preclude the Court from considering the significant evidence
that the Statute has not run.
Under Idaho law, motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are disfavored, viewed as
a potential waste of resources, and contrary to the primary objective of law.

Wackerli v.

Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 404, 353 P.2d 782 (1960). Granting Defendants' Motion when this
Court has already been presented evidence contradicting the legal assertions in Defendants'
Motion 'would fly in the face of the Idaho policy disfavoring such motions.
Reed Taylor's Response is based upon all of the pleadings filed to date in this action, and
the testimony and exhibits presented and considered at the March 1, 2007 Preliminary Injunction
Hearing ("Hearing").

The Court is requested to specifically consider the following to

demonstrate that Reed Taylor can prove facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to
relief and to therefore offer evidence in support of his claims:

1.

February 26, 2007
Motion;

Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Emergency

2.

February 27,2007 - Affidavit of John Taylor;

3.

February 28, 2007 - Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Support of
his Emergency Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and in Opposition
to Motion of John Taylor, AlA Insurance, and AlA Service for Preliminary
Injunction;

4.

February 28, 2007 - Affidavit of Aimee Gordon;
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5.

Testimony and Exhibits at March 1,2007 Hearing;

6.

March 1, 2007 - Affidavit of Ernie Dantini;

7.

March 12, 2007 - Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of
Reconsideration of Preliminary Injunction Against Reed J. Taylor;

8.

March 22,2007 - Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion to Compel Audit;

9.

March 28, 2007 - Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order seeking restraint of Defendants from taking collateral pledged to Reed
Taylor to pay attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Defendants;

10.

March 28,2007 - Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Plaintiffs Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order;

11.

April 2, 2007 - Reed Taylor's Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Audit;

12.

April 4, 2007 - Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Plaintiff Reed
Taylor's Motion to Compel Audit;

13.

May 29, 2007 - Affidavit of Paul R. Cressman, Jr. in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Protective Order; and

14.

May 29,2007 - Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Opposition to Moti6n to Dismiss.

Should the Court construe Defendants' Motion as one for summary judgment, Reed
Taylor objects to the lack of notice and improper noting the Motion. Further, should the Court
treat this Motion as one for summary judgment, Reed Taylor reserves the right to continue the
Motion to conduct discovery as provided by I.R.c.P. 56(f).

Defendants have to date thwarted

almost all of Reed Taylor's attempts to conduct discovery. Should the Court find that Reed
Taylor's pleadings are deficient in any respect, Reed Taylor further requests leave to amend
pursuant to LR.C.P. 15. Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611, 533 P.2d 730 (1975) (the
Court dismissed plaintiffs complaint, but allowed him 15 days leave to file an amended
complaint).
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Reed Taylor has not waived or given up any of his claims for unpaid interest or principal
owing by AIA Services pursuant to the August 1, 1995, Promissory Note ("Note") which
specifies that "the entire balance of all principal and any accrued but unpaid interest shall be due
and payable on" August 1, 2005.

Exhibit A, Hearing.

AlA Services, through its actions,

documents, and the testimony of its Chief Executive Officer and Director, John Taylor, and
Accounting Manager, Aimee Gordon, have continuously affirmed the obligations owing to Reed
Taylor pursuant to the Note.
On every annual financial statement covering the time period from December 31, 1995,
through December 31, 2006, AIA Services' management has listed the obligation of the
$6,000,000 Note as a liability on AlA Services' balance sheet as "Obligation to former majority
common stockholder," or "Obligation to Former Shareholder," in the case of the December 31,
2006, financial statements. Exhibits AL, AM, AN, AO, AP, AQ, X, AR, AS, and W to the
Hearing; the December 31, 2006, financial statements attached to AlA Services' Responses to
Plaintiffs First Request for Production of Documents; and Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Paul R.
Cressman, Jr. in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Protective Order and Motion
for Protective Order ("Cressman Affidavit").
An examination of the cash flow statements contained within AlA Services' financial

statements for the indicated year ends reveals the following amounts paid to Reed Taylor each
year:
III
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Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

"Repayment of Obligation
to Former Majority
Common Stockholder"
$229,689
$318,605
$325,687
$487,409
$311,471
$378,487
$344,382
$279,651
$322,502
$520,042

See Exhibits U, AM, AN, AO, AP, AQ, X, AR, AS, and W to Hearing, and the AIA Services

Consolidated Financial Statements for December 31, 2006, attached to AlA Services' Responses
to Plaintiff s Requests for Production of Documents, Exhibit A to Cressman Affidavit.
The summaries of AlA Services' Account No. 1951-00-0, pertaining to Reed Taylor's
Note, provided to Reed Taylor'S attorney, Roderick C. Bond, prior to the commencement of this
litigation, are also on point.

See Exhibit AJ to the Hearing.

These summaries detail the

payments and balances of principal and interest on the Note from January 2, 2002, through
December 31, 2006, as kept on the books and records of AlA Services. Hearing Transcript
("Transcript"), p. 120.

As testified by both John Taylor and Aimee Gordon, the year end

December 31, 2006, statement understated the principal sum owing by $307,271. Transcript,
p. 88; February 28, 2007, Affidavit of Aimee Gordon ("Gordon Affidavit"),

~

5. Ms. Gordon

further testified that John Taylor directed her to reverse the $307,271 reduction in the principal
amount of the Note, bringing the principal sum owing back up to $6,000,000. Gordon Affidavit,
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AlA Services has continued to make monthly payments of interest to Reed Taylor in
2007, and after suit was commenced in January 2007. Affidavit of Reed 1. Taylor in Opposition
to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
An additional AlA Services' document evidencing the obligations owing to Reed Taylor
pursuant to the Note is the AlA Services Term Sheet, provided to Reed Taylor's attorney,
Roderick C. Bond, prior to commencement of this litigation, which also details yearly payments
and the balance owing at year end 2006, $6,000,000 in principal and $2,197,114 in interest.
Exhibit 2 to February 26,2007, Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Emergency Motion.
AlA Insurance and AIA Services even went so far as to file a UCC Financing Statement
on February 11, 2002, within five years of the date Reed Taylor's suit was filed, which
Financing Statement ensured the continuation of Reed Taylor's security interest in "all of
Debtors' right, title and interest in and to all commissions from the sale of insurance or related
services received by, or on behalf of or payable to either Debtor or any subsidiaries of either
Debtor, and any interest thereon." Such continuation filing was made by JoLee Duclos, an
officer and board member of AIA Insurance, and at least a board member and shareholder of
AlA Services. Exhibit 2, March 28, 2007, Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order.
Correspondence from John Taylor further evidences the validity of the continuing
obligations owing to Reed Taylor by AlA Services pursuant to the Note. In his December 21,
2006, letter to Attorney Patrick Moran, John Taylor stated: "We acknowledge that Reed Taylor
has a security interest in AlA Insurance, Inc .... " Exhibit AB, Hearing.
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In his January 3, 2007, letter to Patrick Moran, John Taylor stated: "If the negotiations

eventually fail, I fully recognize that Mr. Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate,
including calling a special shareholders meeting." Exhibit AF, Hearing. Such statement is clear
evidence that John Taylor understood AlA Services' continuing obligations to Reed Taylor
under the Note shortly before suit was filed.
John Taylor's testimony at the Hearing is in accord:

Q.

Take a look at Exhibit A, would you please, in Volume 1. Is that the
promissory note dated August 1, 1995, in the amount of six thousand
dollars that remains unpaid to your brother?

A.

It appears to be a copy of the original promissory note.

Q.

And do you agree with the statement contained in Aimee Gordon's
declaration that the entire principal of$6,000,000 remains owing?

A.

Yes, I do. By Services, yes.

Q.

Do you also agree that in addition to the principal, at least according to her
calculations, $2,189,614 in accrued interest is also owing as of the end of
December 31, 2006?

* * *
A.

I believe that's probably an accurate representation, yes.

Transcript, pp. 52-53 (Emphasis added.)
It is also noteworthy that John Taylor testified at the Hearing that he orally modified the

obligations owing to Reed Taylor in March of 2003. Transcript, pp. 66-68 and 70-71. Although
Reed Taylor disputes that the transaction was ever modified, John Taylor's testimony affirms the
existence of the obligations owing to his brother in March 2003. John Taylor further testified
that "during 2005-2006 we had extensive discussions on restructuring," again affirming the
validity of the obligations owing to Reed Taylor in 2006. Transcript, p. 71.
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John Taylor further affirmed the obligations owing to his brother in his October 7, 2005,
e-mail to Reed Taylor's accountant, Ernie Dantini. Exhibit AI to March 1, 2007, Affidavit of
Ernie Dantini. In his e-mail, the subject line of which was "Reeds Note," John Taylor made
numerous statements of material fact affirming the obligations owing to Reed Taylor pursuant to
the Note:
I hope that you and he can come up with some specific proposals to modify the
debt ....

* * *
I am willing to explore all options, but will need a written proposal.
I propose that we enter into a joint cross agreement like the one we almost did
three years ago.

Alternatively: I would like to reverse the transaction of 10 years ago.

* * *
You need to be aware:

* * *
2.

Any default will freeze up all money to Reed, Donna (and likely
me) until all the GGMIT debt is paid.

* * *
6.

Three of the four investors of Crop know Reed personally. The
fourth is Jim Becks buddy and the major owner of the brokerage
house that does the bond deals. If the note is put in default, I will
not be able to keep any of them on board to do any type of buyout,
merger or deal with Reed.

Affidavit of Ernie Dantini, Ex. AI (Emphasis added).
John Taylor further testified that Reed Taylor was paid $274,729 in interest on the Note
in 2006. Transcript, p. 121.
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The record for the Hearing also reflects numerous non-monetary defaults in the
obligations owing to Reed Taylor, all of which occurred within five years of the filing of this
action. One of such defaults was the execution of the October 27, 2006, Loan and Security
Agreement by which AlA Insurance, Inc. guaranteed the $5,200,000 loan to CropUSA Insurance
Agency, Inc. (with a potential indebtedness of up to $15,000,000).
Hearing; Transcript, pp.84-87.

Exhibit R, Injunction

See Sections 4.9 and 4.10 of Amended and Restated Stock

Pledge Agreement, Exhibit C, Hearing on Preliminary Injunction.
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

As a preliminary matter, Defendants AIA Services and AlA Insurance have moved to
dismiss three claims, alter ego, director liability, and account stated / monies due, which they
lack standing to dismiss. Reed Taylor brings these claims against defendants John Taylor,
Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman, and/or JoLee Duclos, not Defendants AlA Services and AlA
Insurance. As a result, Defendants cannot move to dismiss these claims as they do not pertain to
them. Despite Defendants lack of standing to dismi,ss these claims, Reed Taylor demonstrates in
this Response that these claims are properly pled.
Motions to dismiss under LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) are viewed with disfavor because of the waste
of time in case of reversal, and because the primary objective of the law is to obtain a
determination of claims on the merits. Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 404, 353 P.2d 782
(1960). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle
him to relief. Id.
III
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On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court looks only at the pleadings,
and all inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137
Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002). "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately
prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Id. at 104.
"Every reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a complaint against a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim." Idaho Comm'n on Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215, 217,
506 P.2d 112 (1973).
Idaho has adopted a system of notice pleading. Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33,
13 P.3d 857 (2000). A pleading need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. .. " Id., quoting Durstler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230,
697 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1985). Under a notice pleading, "a party is no longer slavishly bound to
stating particular theories in its pleadings." Cook, 135 Idaho at 33.

All pleadings shall be so

construed as to do substantial justice. I.R.c.P. 8(f).
A.

When Questions Exist as to the Accrual or Tolling of the Statute of
Limitations, a Motion to Dismiss is Improper

Motions to dismiss complaints on the basis of statutes of limitation are generally viewed
with disfavor. Singleton v. Forster, 98 Idaho 149, 151, 559 P.2d 765 (1977), citing Duff v.
Draper, 96 Idaho 299, 527 P.2d 1257 (1974). When questions exist as to whether a cause of

action has accrued and the Statute has begun to run, dismissal under I.R.c.P. 12(b)(6) is
improper. Singleton, 98 Idaho at 151. Even accepting, arguendo, Defendants' contention that
the Statute began to run in 1996, the granting of an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion is inappropriate
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when reasons exist as to why the Statute may have been tolled. 1 Id. These reasons "need not
have been expressly set forth in the complaint." Id. No LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion can dismiss a
complaint for failure to state a claim merely because it does not negate any possible statute of
limitations defenses. Duff, 96 Idaho at 305.
1.

Reed Taylor's Complaint Alleges That the Breach of Contract Actions
Accrued in 2005, and It is Not His Obligation to Negate Statute of
Limitations Defenses In His Complaint

Defendants acknowledge that all allegations in the Complaint must be presumed true for
purposes of a Motion to Dismiss. Motion to Dismiss at 1. Reed Taylor's Complaint alieges
Defendants failed to pay $6,000,000, plus interest, on the Note which came due on August 1,
2005, in breach of the parties' contractual agreement. 2nd Am. Complaint, ,~ 2.7-2.8. August 1,
2005, is well within the five-year statute oflimitations. I.C. § 5-216.
It is not Reed Taylor'S obligation to negate each statute of limitations defense in his
Complaint. Duff, 96 Idaho at 305. The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint alone are
enough to resist Defendants' LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion as to the statute of limitations claims.
Nevertheless, an examination of the record reveals that the Statute has not

fUll.

For instance,

Defendant AlA Services paid Reed Taylor interest on the Note in excess of a quarter million
dollars every year between 2001 and 2006. Exhibits X, AQ, AR, AS, W, and the AlA Services
Conso Ii dated Financial Statements for December 31, 2006 attached as Exhibit A to Cressman
I Contrary to the Defendants' contentions, Reed Taylor merely alleges "during all relevant times" or "during a time"
or "during times" in his Second Amended Complaint pertaining to various breaches of the various agreements.. See
2nd Am. Complaint, CJCJ 2.15, 2.16, and 2.25-2.28. Reed Taylor's Second Amended Complaint does not allege
breaches in 1996 and all inferences must be granted Reed Taylor for purposes of Defendants' Motion. As the Idaho
Supreme Court held in Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611-12, 533 P.2d 730 (1975), for a complaint to be
dismissed on a I.R.C.P. 12(b)( 6) Motion based upon an affirmative defense, the affirmative defense must "appear on
the face of the complaint itself" Id. at 611 (Emphasis added). For this reason alone, the Defendants' Motion must
be denied. Nevertheless, in this Response, Reed Taylor addresses Defendants' wrongful contention that breaches
occurred as early in 1996.
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Affidavit. John Taylor has testified to this payment obligation and the sums owing. Transcript,
pp. 52-53 and 121. Further, Defendants filed a UCC Financing Statement ensuring continuation
of the security interest on this same debt within five years of Reed Taylor's suit. See Exhibit 2 to
March 28, 2007, Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order.. Defendants are asking this Court to determine that the Statute had run on Reed Taylor's
claims in the year 2001, four years before the principal payment was due on the Note, and that
the Statute was not tolled by the payments and the continuation statement filed by AlA Services. 2
Defendants' argument fails as a matter oflaw.
2.

Even if the Breach of Contract Statute of Limitations Began to Run in
1996, the Statute of Limitations Has Been Tolled3

Even accepting Defendants' contention that the Statute began to run in 1996, the granting
of an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion is improper when reasons exist as to whether the Statute had
actually accrued or has been tolled. Singleton. 98 Idaho at 151. As cited above, it is not Reed
Taylor's obligation to negate Defendants' statute of limitations defenses in his Complaint.
Nevertheless, the argument and legal theories set forth below demonstrate sufficient reasons why
Reed Taylor's causes of action did not accrue more than five years before suit was filed, or was
tolled if it had begun to run against some part of Reed Taylor's claim in 1996. 4 While Reed
Taylor does not concede that each of the following legal theories apply to this case, each legal
theory alone raises sufficient questions to warrant denial of Defendants' Motion as to the statute
of limitations.
III
2

3

4

See Footnote 1.
See Footnote 1.
See Footnote 1.

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'
LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) MOTION - 12

First, questions exist as to whether each cause of action accrues separately for each
installment under the installment contract between Reed Taylor and AlA Services.

Where

money is payable in installments, the Statute begins to run against those installments at the time
the installment comes due. Cassia Creek Reservoir Co. v. Harper, 91 Idaho 488, 492, 426 P.2d
209 (1967). The Note entered into by Reed Taylor and Defendants provided that installments of
interest would be paid monthly, with the principal and any unpaid interest due on August 1,
2005. Exhibit A, Hearing. Accordingly, while a separate and distinct cause of action may have
accrued for Reed Taylor upon breach of each installment, the terms of the Note provided that the
principal, in addition to any accrued but unpaid interest was due on August 1, 2005. In turn,
Reed Taylor's cause of action for the principal and unpaid interest did not accrue until August 1,
2005.
Second, questions exist whether Reed Taylor's cause of action accrued when Reed
Taylor never accelerated payment pursuant to the acceleration clause in the Note. When an
acceleration clause in a contract gives the option to declare the entire indebtedness due on default
in the payment of one installment, the Statute does not begin to run against the entire
indebtedness until an affirmative election is made to accelerate. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v.
Keith, 58 Idaho 471, 74 P.2d 699 (1937). The Note contains the following remedy should AlA

Services fail to pay after notice of default and a five day opportunity cure:
... the entire remaining balance of principal and interest and all interest accrued
thereon may, at the option of the holder hereof, be declared to be immediately
due and payable without notice (the "Acceleration") and the lien given to secure
its payment may be foreclosed.
Exhibit A, Hearing (Emphasis added). Based upon the optional acceleration clause in the Note,
Reed Taylor'S cause of action would not have accrued against Defendants until Reed Taylor
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accelerated the Note and the Defendants were provided the five day opportunity to cure. At no
time did Reed Taylor exercise his right to accelerate and, accordingly, at no time were the
Defendants provided an opportunity to cure, prior to the August 1, 2005, maturity date of the
Note. See May 29,2007, Affidavit of Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor had no right to sue on the Note
until the earlier of the date of acceleration and failure to cure, or the maturity date of the Note.
See Galbrath v. Vangas, Inc., 103 Idaho 912, 915, 655 P.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1998) ("The cause of

action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when a party may sue another").
Therefore, his cause of action did not accrue on the Note, and the Statute did not begin to run
until August 1, 2005. 5
Third, assuming that the Statue ran as the Defendants contend, questions exist as to
whether partial payments of interest to Reed Taylor tolled the statute of limitations. 6 Idaho law
provides that the Statute is extended when an obligor makes partial payment of a debt after the
Note is due, as such partial payment is deemed equivalent to a new promise by the obligor to
satisfy the debt. I.C. § 5-238; Thomson v. Sunny Ridge Partnership, 118 Idaho 330, 796 P.2d
539 (1990); Holland Bank v. Brockman et aI., 52 Idaho 324, 324, 14 P.2d 621, 621 (1932) ("By
the payment of interest, she invited and enjoyed respondent's indulgence, knowingly lulling it
into a sense of security").
In this case, Defendants contend that the Statute began to run in 1996, and it barred Reed
Taylor's causes of action in 2001. 7 Nonetheless, as stated above, Defendants proceeded to pay

5 Accordingly, Reed Taylor's remedies (including the right to vote the pledged shares in AlA Insurance) under the
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement also accrued when the principal and interest were due under the
Note on August 1, 2005, as the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement acts as security for the Note. See
also Foomote 1.
6 See Foomote 1.
7 See Foomote 1.
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Reed Taylor $311,471 in 2001, $378,487 in 2002, $344,382 in 2003, $279,651 in 2004,
$322,502 in 2005, and $520,042 in 2006, thereby knowingly lulling Reed Taylor into a sense of
security.

See Holland Bank, 52 Idaho at 324; Exhibits X, AQ, AR, AS, W, Hearing on

Preliminary Injunction and Exhibit A to Cressman Affidavit. Each of these partial payments is
deemed the equivalent of a new promise pursuant to § 5-238 of the Idaho Code, and the Statute
has not run on the obligations owing to Reed Taylor pursuant to the Note. 8
Lastly, Defendants assert as an affirmative defense in their Answer, that Reed Taylor and
AlA Services orally modified their agreement pursuant to the Note. While Reed Taylor rejects
this assertion of oral modification, Defendants' Second Affirmative Defense admits AlA
Services is currently paying interest to Reed Taylor, even if pursuant to these alleged oral
modifications.

Answer at p. 7.

("AlA Services Corporation has paid plaintiff the sum of

$15,000.00 per month and has assumed responsibility for the other agreed expenses in
accordance with the modified agreements since they were entered into and plaintiff has accepted
those payments.

None of these defendants is in default of the modified agreements with

plaintiff'). Regardless of how Defendants try to twist the facts, it is clear, through Defendants'
own admissions, that they recognize current payment obligations to Reed Taylor, and the Statute
has not run as to all sums and obligations owed to Reed Taylor.
While Idaho law does not require that Reed Taylor negate Defendants' claims that the
Statute has run, Reed Taylor has done just that. With respect to Defendants' assertion that the
Statute has run on Reed Taylor'S breach of contract claims, Defendants' Motion should be
8 Along with each new promise, Reed Taylor is entitled to all rights and remedies under the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended and Restated Security Agreement and Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement, e.g., the right to vote the pledged shares, the right to a security interest in the commissions, the right to
be on AlA Services' board, and the right to receive financial information. See Exhibits B, C, and E, Hearing.
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denied.
3.

The Contractual Statute of Limitations Does Not Apply to the
Remaining Causes of Action

In their Motion, Defendants attempt to piggyback a dismissal of all of Reed Taylor's

causes of action based upon their claim that the Statute had run on the breach of contract claims.
This contention by Defendants should be rejected not only because Reed Taylor has definitively
resisted Defendants' Motion, and Defendants cannot prevail in dismissing the contract claims
based on the Statute, but because Defendants have misapplied the law as to application of the
Statute to other claims. See, e.g., Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 99 Idaho 246, 247, 580 P.2d
849,850 (1978), quoting Hillock v. Idaho Title and Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 450, 126 P. 612,
616 (1912) (In detennining which statute of limitations applied, the court stated, "The test ... is
not whether the fraud or mistake occurred in a contract or independently of contract, but the test
rather is whether the action seeks relief from or on account of fraud or mistake"). The Statute
only applies when the breach is the cause of action upon which the claim is founded.
In Hillock, the court held that the fraud statute of limitations applied when material

misrepresentations were made to a prospective purchaser, who then entered into a contract to buy
land. Hillock, 22 Idaho at 450. This case is substantially similar in that many of Reed Taylor's
claims, e.g., fraudulent conveyance, conversion, and fraud, are not premised on Defendants'
breaches of contract, but on other actions that are unlawful. These causes of action did hot arise
until after Defendants allege the Statute had run on the breach of contract claim. To conclude
that the Statute had run as to these claims before they occurred is illogical and not supported by
law. This Court should follow other Idaho courts in their reluctance to dismiss pursuant to
LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) based upon the running of the statute of limitations, and deny Defendants'
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B.

Reed Taylor Has Pled Valid Causes of Action for Fraud and Constructive
Fraud.

A claim of fraud must be "stated with particularity ... " but "intent, knowledge, and other
conditions of mind of a person may be averred generally." LR.C.P. 9(b) (emphasis added).
The Defendants cite cases with facts significantly dissimilar to those before the Court in
this action. See e.g., Estes v. Barry, l32 Idaho 82,967 P.2d 284 (1998) (failure to plead fraud as
a specific cause of action); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 141 Idaho 233, 239-40, 108
P.3d 380 (2005) (dismissal of a fraud claim on summary judgment because "the original
complaint only generally alleged that Boise Cascade was involved in several false
statements ... [and] had failed to plead with particularity any of the other required elements ... ");
Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 Idaho 123, 127, 106 P.3d 449 (2005) (the

complaint did "not address representations, falsity, materiality, intent, reliance or injury based
upon representations"); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003)
(rejecting the argument that the Federal Rule 9(b) should not be applied to a state-law cause of
action in federal court); Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004)
(dismissal of a "mail fraud" claim because the plaintiff failed to comply the requirements
necessary for "mail fraud" and had already been provided the chance to amend and declined to
exercise it).
III

9 Defendants only challenge the Fraudulent Conveyance and Enforcement of Rights causes of action based upon

their assertion that the contract statute of limitations has run. Because Defendants' statute of limitations arguments
fail, and there are no other challenges to the Fraudulent Conveyance and Enforcement of Rights claims, the Court
must deny Defendants' Motion as to these claims.

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'
LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) MOTION -17

In sum, all of the cases cited by the Defendants are not on point and they are not
analogous to the facts and allegations set forth in Reed Taylor's Second Amended Complaint.
To successfully bring an action for fraud, a plaintiff must establish the existence of the
following elements:
(1) a statement or representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the
speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the
hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable
reliance; and (9) resultant injury.
Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007) (holding that misrepresentations

and discrepancies in corporate financial statements precluded summary judgment in buyer's
action for fraud).

Even representations of a third party conveyed through a defendant or a

defendant's silence constitutes actionable fraud. Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708,571 P.2d 769
(1977), overruled by Own v. Boydstun, lO2 Idaho 31, 624 P .2d 413 (1981 ) (overruled on other

points of law).
Idaho Courts have long recognized "constructive fraud" as an alternative cause of action
to common law "fraud" and that "constructive fraud" does not require a plaintiff to plead the
nine elements of common law "fraud." See e.g., McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 371, 353
P.2d 760 (1960) (Recognizing constructive fraud as an alternative cause of action to fraud and
that the requirement of pleading and proving all nine elements of fraud "is not the case");
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 61,415 P.2d 698 (1966)(a promise to build a house to certain

standards constitutes "constructive fraud" when the builder failed to do so).
Moreover, a cause of action under "constructive fraud" is discussed in significant detail
in numerous treatises (treatises which are frequently followed and cited by the Idaho Supreme
Court):
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Constructive fraud is a breach of duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares
fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive, to violate confidence, or to injure public
interests.
Constructive fraud is fraud that arises by operation of law from conduct, which if
sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage. It is a breach of legal or
equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral guilt of the fraud feasor, the law declares
fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate public or private
confidence, or to injure public interests. The legal duty may arise from a statute, a
contract, or a trust.
To establish constructive fraud, it is necessary only to prove acts of fraud. Neither actual
dishonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive is an essential element. Thus, a party whose
actions constitute constructive fraud might still have acted in good faith ...
37 C.J.S. Fraud § 5 (2007) (internal foot notes omitted) (Emphasis added).
Constructive fraud is defined as an act done or omitted that amounts to positive fraud, or
is construed as a fraud by the court because of its detrimental effect upon public interests
and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or omitted with an
actual design to perpetrate positive fraud or injury upon other persons. Otherwise stated,
"constructive fraud" arises by operation of law from a course of conduct which, if
sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage, irrespective of the
existence or evidence of actual intent to defraud. Constructive fraud, sometimes called
legal fraud, is nevertheless fraud, although it rests upon presumption and rests less upon
furtive intent than does moral or actual fraud. It is presumed from the relation of the
parties to a transaction or from the circumstances under which it takes place.
Constructive fraud arises on a breach of duty by one in a confidential or fiduciary
relationship to another that induces justifiable reliance by the other to his or her
prejUdice.
The conscience is not necessarily affected by it. Indeed, it has been said that constructive
fraud generally involves a mere mistake of fact. It requires neither actual dishonesty nor
intent to deceive, being a breach of legal or equitable duty that, irrespective of the moral
guilt of the wrongdoer, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive
others, to injure public interests, or to violate public or private confidence. In its generic
sense, constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions, and concealments involving a
breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence that results in damage to another.
Hence, the terms "constructive fraud" and "legal fraud" both connote that in certain
circumstances one may be charged with the consequences of his words and acts as though
he has spoken or acted fraudulently, although, properly speaking, his conduct does not
merit this opprobrium.

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'
LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) MOTION - 19

If there is any distinction to be found between the terms "constructive" and "legal" as
applied to fraud, it probably amounts to this: Breach of a fiduciary relationship or of a
contract uberrimae fidei is usually called "constructive fraud," whereas the term "legal
fraud" is generally used to characterize a misrepresentation made without knowledge of
its falsity. Constructive fraud may result from reckless and heedless representations,
although they are not made with a deliberate intent to deceive.
37 Am. Jr. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 9 (2007) (internal foot notes omitted) (Emphasis added).
Reed Taylor's Second Amended Complaint contains specific facts pled to support a cause
of action pertaining to the Defendants' common law fraud andJor constructive fraud:
AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Freeman, andJor Duclos made statements of fact
regarding pay, finances, transferCs), loan guarantees, andJor services provided to other
entities, transactionCs), payment of debts to Reed, andJor rights granted to Reed by AIA
Services or AIA Insurance, such statements of fact were false; such false statements were
material; AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos andJor Freeman knew or should
have known the falsity of such statements; AlA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos,
andJor Freeman intended to induce reliance; Reed was ignorant to the falsity of such
statements; and Reed relied on such statements; Reed had a right to rely on such
statements.
As a result of AlA Services, AlA [Insurance] [sic], John, Duclos andJor Freeman's acts,
false statements, andJor omissions, Reed was damaged as [a] [sic] consequence or
proximate result of such acts, false statements, andJor omissions.
2nd Am. Complaint, " 5.2-5.3 (Emphasis added). Significantly, Reed Taylor specifically pled
all nine required elements of fraud pertaining to pay, finances, transfers, loan guarantees, andJor
services provided to other entities, transactions, payment of debts, and rights granted to him.
Moreover, Reed Taylor "re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained
in the other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under [fraud]." 2nd Am. Complaint, ,
5.1.
As noted above, Reed Taylor's Second Amended Complaint alleges substantial facts
together with all nine elements of fraud as a basis for a cause of action of fraud against the
Defendants.

Because Reed Taylor has pled sufficient facts and the elements necessary for

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'
l.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) MOTION - 20

common law fraud, he has also pled facts sufficient for constructive fraud as the burden is
substantially reduced for constructive fraud.
Moreover, Reed Taylor incorporated other paragraphs in his Second Amended Complaint
to support his fraud cause of action. For example, Reed Taylor alleges the following (which
apply to either common law fraud or constructive fraud):
Because Reed has not been on the Board as required, all actions taken by AIA Services'
Board were not properly authorized and, therefore, not ratified by AIA Services; and such
acts are the personal actions of John, Duclos and/or Freeman during their tenure on the
Board of AlA Services.
2nd Am. Complaint, ~ 2.13 (e.g., Reed relied on the representation that he would be a member of
the board of directors).
AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman utilized funds that Reed had
a security interest in to make investments in, transfer assets to, or loan money to, or
provide services on behalf of John and/or entities operated and/or partially owned by
John.
Id.,

1 2.17

(e.g., Reed relied on the representation that he would have a security interest in all

commissions).
This transaction inappropriately and/or fraudulently transferred $1,510,693 of AIA
Insurance's funds to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. when such funds should have
been tendered to Reed ...
!d., 1 2.25 (e.g., Reed again relying on the fact that he had a valid and perfected security interest

in all of AIA Insurance and AlA Services' commissions).
Reed also discovered that John had purchased a parking lot and entered into a lease
agreement with AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance to lease the parking lot from him for
$1,250 per month. This transaction was also the transfer of funds to John, which should
have been paid to Reed during a time in which AIA Services was unable to service its
debt to Reed and was otherwise insolvent.
Id.,

~

2.26 (e.g., Reed relying on the Defendants' representations that the corporations would be
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operated in accordance with applicable legal standards).
Based upon the above-referenced acts, transfers and transactions, together with
transactions referenced in the foot notes to AlA Services and/or AIA Insurance's
fmancial statements, there are other unauthorized and inappropriate transfers, loans,
payments, advances and other actions which occurred during time AlA Services defaults
and inability to pay Reed ...
2nd Am. Complaint, , 2.27 (e.g., Reed relying on the fact, or omission thereof, that all available
sums would be paid on his Note and/or that the corporations would be operated in accordance
with legal standards).
John has used AIA Services and AlA [Insurance] [sic] as his personal source of funds
and/or assets, including, without limitation, acts in which John has transferred assets to
their name; taken advances that John never paid back; transferred assets and/or funds to
other entities partially owned or controlled by John ... made transfers and/or entered into
transactions which benefited John and/or anyone of more of the other defendants; and
provided services for entities partially owned by John and/or anyone of more of the other
Defendants without such actions being arms-length transactions ... All of the above acts
occurred during times in which AIA Services was not current with payments to Reed
under the Promissory Note, in Default of other provisions, and insolvent.

Id.,,2.28.
Reed has a valid security interest in AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance's commissions,
among other security interests. AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or
Freeman fraudulently, wrongfully and/or improperly used funds, which should have been
paid to Reed, for investments, personal use, inappropriate transactions, loans, advances,
.self-dealing, and/or other wrongful and/or inappropriate purposes.

Id·,111.2.
John, Duclos, and Freeman should be held personally liable for all fraudulent, wrongful,
improper, overreaching transactions, transfers, loans, advances, loan guarantees and
fraudulent conveyances which occurred during their tenure as members of the Board of
Directors and as officers of AIA Services and AIA Insurance.

Id.,112.2.
III
III
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All of the above allegations are incorporated by reference into Reed Taylor's fraud cause
of action and all support a cause of action for fraud or constructive fraud under Idaho law. IO 2nd
Am. Complaint, 1 5.1.
Other examples of fraud are set forth in the Affidavit of Reed Taylor and can be easily
ascertained from the specific facts set forth in the Second Amended Complaint.

For example,

AIA Insurance and AIA Services represented on their financial statements that AIA Insurance
held an investment in AIA Services worth approximately $1,500,000, when the investment is,
and was, worthless at all times (representations regarding finances). In addition, John Taylor, as
Chainnan and President of AIA Insurance and AlA Services, falsely represented that Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc. was being developed on behalf of AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance.
See John Taylor Affidavit dated February 28, 2007, Ex. A. There are other examples of fraud in

the Affidavit of Reed Taylor and in the exhibits in the record-all of which fall under the
representations raised in Reed Taylor's Complaint. 2nd Am. Complaint, 115.1-5.2.
But most significant is the fact that the Defendants are fully cognizant from Reed
Taylor's Second Amended Complaint that he is seeking to recover every dollar in cash and
services which has been the subj ect of fraud. II
III
III

10 Defendants were fully cognizant of the fact that when they filed their Motion that Reed Taylor was preparing a
Third Amended Complaint for filing with the Court. Reed Taylor will clarify his fraud claims in his Third Amended
Complaint. Thus, any issues raised by the Defendants regarding pleading will be moot. The Court should note that
the Defendants never inquired about the status of the Third Amended Complaint prior to filing their Motion.
II It is noteworthy to note that the Defendants are seeking the dismissal of Reed Taylor's fraud claims at a time in
which they are thwarting his discovery requests, attacking appropriate subpoenas to AlA Insurance's accountants,
and taking all possible actions to prevent Reed Taylor from discovering the nature and extent of the fraud at AlA
Insurance and AlA Services for which other Defendants have unlawfully benefited.
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The Complaint States a Claim for Conversion in Alleging a
Misappropriation of Corporate Funds and Resources That 'Were Subject to
Reed Taylor's Security Interest

C.

Reed Taylor's conversion claim is based upon a number of wrongful acts. First, as set
forth in

~

2.25 of the Second Amended Complaint, in the weeks leading up to the filing of this

action, Reed Taylor discovered that in 2004, AlA Insurance paid $1,510,693 to CropUSA
Insurance Agency, Inc., an entity in which John Taylor is the single largest shareholder, in
exchange for preferred stock in AlA Services which was worthless, as AlA Services was
insolvent, and there were not sufficient assets to pay Reed Taylor, much less preferred
shareholders. This $1,510,693 payment devalued Reed Taylor's security interest in all of the
shares of AlA Insurance and unlawfully side-stepped his perfected security interest in the
$1,510,693 of commissions utilized for the wrongful transaction. Such a payment constitutes
conversion. Nelson v. Jones, 38 Idaho 664, 224 P. 435, 438 (1924); Western Farm Service, Inc.
v. Olsen, 151 Wn.2d 645, 90 P.3d 1053 (2004) (when a debtor transfers collateral subject to a

perfected security interest, the secured party may commence an action against the purchaser for
conversion). These claims are further supported by the Exhibits at the Hearing. See Exhibit AS,
Consolidated Financial Statements for Year End December 31, 2004, for AlA Services
Corporation and subsidiaries, Exhibit AU, Audited Financial Statements of AlA Insurance for
Years Ending December 31, 2004, and 2005, Note 14, and Exhibit AV, Audited Financial
Statements for CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. for Years Ending December 31, 2004, and
2005, Note 11.
There are at least four other known bases for claiming conversion based on information
in the record. First, John Taylor drew his salary entirely from AlA Insurance, but spent half his
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time working for CropUSA. Transcript, pp. 98-99.
Second, AlA-salaried employees perfonned services for CropUSA. John Taylor testified
that "eight or nine" AlA Insurance employees "are salaried with AIA, but they perfonn services
for both [AIA Insurance and CropUSA]." Transcript, p. 96.
Third, AlA Insurance "provides office space and certain human resource and computer
processing services to [CropUSA] at no cost under an administrative agreement that expires in
2008." Exhibit AV, Note 7, Hearing. This claim is further supported by the following statement
contained in Addendum A to the Administrative Agreement referred to in the immediately prior
reference note:
CropUSA shall bear all expenses in connection with services to be rendered by
AlA in connection with the insurance cooperation of CropUSA, except for the
following charges, costs, and expenses that will be borne by AlA:
(a)

Human resource and payroll processing related costs;

(b)

Rent on the AIA location at the Lewis Clark Plaza at 111 Main Street,
Lewiston, Idaho; and

(c)

AlA computer processing costs.

See Exhibit B to Cressman Affidavit (Emphasis added). All of these costs, including CropUSA's
rent, are picked up by AlA Insurance without compensation. In addition, the Administrative
Agreement confinns John Taylor's testimony at the Hearing that CropUSA does not reimburse
AIA Insurance for any portion of John Taylor'S payroll or benefit costs, although he spends
approximately half of his time working for CropUSA.
All of the claims mentioned constitute conversion, because they involve the
misappropriation of corporate assets for personal benefit. Such actions have historically been
regarded as conversion. See, e.g., Lussier v. Mau Van Development, Inc., 667 P.2d 804, 814
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'
l.R.C.P. l2(b)(6) MOTION - 25

(Hawaii App. 1983). Such misappropriations hanned Reed Taylor's security interest in AlA
Insurance's stock and other assets, and constitutes "willful interference with Reed's property and
money" as alleged in the conversion claim. 2nd Am. Complaint, 1 6.2.
The final known act of conversion is the payment of attorneys' fees and costs by AIA
Insurance, the sole entity with assets, for the Defendants' in this action. This act of conversion is
the subject of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, dated March
28,2007, which is awaiting ruling by the Court.
Defendants' Motion misinterprets the law of conversion, arguing "[tJhe failure to pay
money due under a contract is actionable in contract, but, as a matter oflaw, does not constitute
conversion."

Motion at p.10.

Reed Taylor's conversion claim is not based solely upon

Defendants' failure to pay their debts.

It lies in the misappropriation of AlA Insurance's

corporate resources to the detriment of Reed Taylor's security interest in all of AlA Insurance's
stock and in the other assets of AIA Insurance.

Reed Taylor's claims further rely on the

misappropriation of AIA Insurance and AlA Services' assets for Crop USA Insurance Agency,
Inc. and that Defendants John Taylor, Duclos and Freeman benefited from such conversion by
way of their ownership in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.,shares that should be owned and
held by AlA Insurance,not Defendants John Taylor, Duclos and Freeman.
D.

Reed Taylor Has Successfully Stated Claims for
Alter Ego, Constructive Trust and Director Liability

In their Motion, Defendants assert that the Alter Ego, Constructive Trust, and Director
Liability causes of action must be dismissed because they are not in fact, causes of action. In
concluding that each of these claims are not separate causes of action, Defendants cite non-Idaho
authority, including unpublished case law, in support of their assertion that these causes of action
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should be dismissed.
These theories are in fact recognized as causes of action.

See, e.g., Magic Valley

Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 849 P.2d 107 (1993) (recognizing alter ego as a

claim); Brigham Young UniverSity v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 156 P.3d 782 (Utah 2007)
(recognizing alter ego as a cause of action); Weiss v. Marcus, 124 Cal.Rptr. 297, 51 Cal.App.3d
590 (1975) (plaintiff could state a cause of action for relief in the form of constructive trust);
Blankenship v. Citizens National Bank of Lubbock, 449 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tx.Civ.App. 1970)

(holding that a "constructive trust may arise whenever property is acquired or retained under
circumstances amounting to fraud") Ong Hing v. Arizona Harness Raceway, Inc. 459 P.2d 107
(Ariz. App. 1969) (recognizing a cause of action for director liability). Nonetheless, the extent to
which these causes of action are independent, dependent, or derivative of other causes of action
has not been defined by Idaho law. When dealing with issues that are undefined by Idaho law,
the Court should not accept Defendants' recitation of law from other jurisdictions to determine
whether a claim has been stated. Stewart v. Arrington Const. Co., 92 Idaho 526,531,446 P.2d
895 (1968) ("The court should be especially reluctant to dismiss on the pleadings where the
asserted theory of liability is novel or unusual since it is important that such legal theories be
explored and assayed in the light of actual facts, not a pleader's supposition").
In response to an l.R.c.P. 12(b)(6) Motion, it is not Reed Taylor's burden to engage in a

battle of out-of-state authority and treatise material which demonstrates whether or not he has
adequately stated a claim.

All inferences must be drawn in favor of Reed Taylor, and

Defendants' claim that these causes of action do not exist in Idaho, must be rejected.
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Beyond challenging the existence of these causes of action, Defendants assert Reed
Taylor failed to factually plead claims for relief with respect to alter ego and director liability.
First, with respect to the alter ego claims against the director-defendants, Reed Taylor has
alleged sufficient facts to establish the "unity of interest" and "inequitable result" requirements
of Idaho law. 12 The Complaint repeatedly alleges claims that demonstrate a unity of interest
between the corporation and individuals, which could lead to an inequitable result if the
nd

individuals are not held liable for the acts of the corporation. See, e.g., 2

Am. Complaint at ~~

2.13,2.15,2.17,2.19,2.25,2.28,3.2,3.3,4.3,5.2,6.2, 7.2, 8.2, 8.3,9.2,9.3,10.3,11.3, and
12.2. Further, the record in this case establishes that the corporate entity has been disregarded by
the director-defendants. See, e.g., Transcript, pp. 66-68 and 70-71 (John Taylor's disregard of
corporate formalities through his alleged oral modification of obligations owed to Reed Taylor).
Under Idaho's notice pleading system, these allegations are adequate to state a claim for alter
ego. 13
With respect to the director liability claims, Defendants assert that Reed Taylor does
nothing more than assert bald allegations of director liability in paragraph 12.2 ofthe Complaint.
Defendants again misinterpret Reed Taylor's pleading obligations. The same allegations in the
Complaint which support the personal liability of the directors under the alter ego theory, are
12 For the limited purposes of this Response, Reed Taylor accepts the standards laid out by Defendants for the
application of the alter ego doctrine. "[T]wo requirements for application of the [alter ego] doctrine are (1) that there
be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and individuals no long
exist and (2), that if the acts are treated as those of the corporation an inequitable result will follow." Chick v.
Tomlinson, 96 Idaho 483, 485, 531 P.2d 573, 574 (1975). "Factors which influence whether the corporate veil will
be pierced (and a subsidiary deemed an 'alter ego' of the parent) included the obvious under-capitalization of the
subsidiary; the failure of either the parent or subsidiary to adhere to corporate formalities; and the formation of the
subsidiary to perpetrate a fraud." Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 114 Idaho 817, 845,761 P.2d 1169, 1197 (1988).
Motion at 12.
13 Defendants' Motion continues with a two page discussion of how the dictates of a corporate treatise require
dismissal of Reed Taylor claims. Motion at 13-14. This discussion of how a corporate treatise views alter ego law
is irrelevant in a LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
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also sufficient for purposes of the director liability theory. See e.g., 2nd Am. Complaint at ~~
2.13,2.15,2.17,2.19,2.25,2.28,3.2,3.3,4.3,5.2,6.2, 7.2,8.2,8.3,9.2,9.3,10.3,11.3, and
12.2. Further, the director-defendants are liable for participating in the fraud of the corporation,
as outlined in a preceding section of this brief. VFP VC v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 334, 109
P .3d 714 (2005). Accordingly, Reed Taylor has adequately stated a claim for director liability.
E.

Reed Taylor Has Stated a Cause of Action for Equitable
Indemnification for Sums He Owes to Donna Taylor as a Result
of AlA Services' Failure to Timely Redeem her Preferred Shares

Reed Taylor's Complaint sets out a factual scenario in which Reed Taylor, John Taylor,
Connie Taylor, and Defendants are commonly liable for the same harm, which gives rise to an
indemnification obligation. 2nd Am. Complaint, ~ 8.2; See also, Mitchell v. Valerio, 124 Idaho
283, 285, 858 P.2d 822 (1993). The obligation is further evidenced by the letter agreement
between AlA Services, John Taylor, Reed Taylor, and Donna Taylor.

February 27, 2007

Affidavit of John R. Taylor, Ex. A. The obligation can be either in tort or through implied
contractual indemnity, a form of equitable indemnity. See e.g., Bay Dev., Ltd. v. Superior Court,
50 Ca1.3d 1012, 791 P.2d 290 (1990) (holding "implied contractual indemnity is a form of
equitable indemnity").

Defendants' conclusive statement in their Motion that "equitable

indemnification is a tort cause of action that simply does not apply in this contract case" is false.
See Motion at 14. Reed Taylor is entitled to, and has successfully pled, causes of action in both

contract and tort, and Defendants' contentions that Reed Taylor's breach of contract claim
somehow limits his ability to sue in tort is without basis.
III
III
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F.

Reed Taylor Has Stated a Claim for Account Stated / Monies Due

Reed Taylor has adequately stated a claim for relief, as Idaho is a notice pleading state.

Cook v. Skyline Corp., l35 Idaho 26, 33, 13 P.3d 857 (2000). Reed Taylor's claim for account
stated I monies due pertains to the $307,271 John Taylor credited against Reed Taylor's Note,
and debited against obligations owing by John Taylor to Defendants. This is reflected on the
account statements, Exhibit AJ, Hearing, which were provided by Defendants to Reed Taylor's
counsel prior to the initiation of suit. If the transaction has not been reversed, which has been
contended by John Taylor, John Taylor and Connie Taylor personally owe at least $307,271 to
Reed Taylor.
For purposes of an I.R.C.P. l2(b)(6) Motion, the allegations in Reed Taylor's Complaint
adequately state facts to show an account stated and monies due. 2nd Am. Complaint, "9.1-9.4.

G.

Reed Taylor's Allegations That Majority Corporate Control and
Shares in AIA Services Were Transferred to John Taylor
Without Proper Payment States a Claim for Unjust Enrichment

Contrary to Defendants' assertion that Reed Taylor fails to plead the elements of unjust
enrichment, and that no benefit was conferred to Defendants, the Complaint alleges that Reed
Taylor transferred his shares in AlA Services, making John Taylor the majority shareholder, and
passed control of the company to John Taylor. 2nd Am. Complaint at , 2.5. The Complaint
further alleges that Reed Taylor was not paid the amount agreed upon for the benefit conferred.
2nd Am. Complaint at ~2.18. These statements, and all inferences therein, clearly provide a short
plain statement that Reed Taylor is entitled to relief under the elements of unjust enrichment
outlined in Defendants' Motion. See Motion at 18, quoting Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v.

Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88 P.2d 917 (1999) (unjust enrichment requires, "(1) a benefit is conferred
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upon defendant by plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of the benefit, and (3) acceptance
of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the
benefit without payment of the value thereof').
Second, Defendants make the argument that a claim for unjust enrichment is precluded
when the parties have an enforceable contract.

Motion at 19.

Defendants appear to be

suggesting that Reed Taylor cannot request relief under alternative theories of contract and
quasi-contract / unjust enrichment.

Such is not the case.

See I.R.C.P. 8( e)(2); Associates

Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 733 P.2d 824 ("The first such standard is that, under
modern pleading practice, a plaintiff may advance alternative theories relating to an alleged set
offacts. I.R.c.P. 8(e)(2)").

IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss must be denied.
DATED: This 29 th day of May, 2007.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

By: _ _ _ __
Roderick C.
Ned A.
n
Paul R. ressman, Jf.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, Affidavit of
Reed Taylor in Opposition to Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion, and Affidavit of Paul Cressman in
Opposition to Defendants' I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion on the following party(s) via the methodes)
indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 - 13 th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor

Via:

Jonathan D. Halley
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AIA Services and AIA Insurance

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile - (208) 342-3829

( )
(X)
( )
( )

( )
(X)
( )
( )

( )
(X)
( )
( )

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Signed this 29 th day of May, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.

Roderick

.

0
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RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISB #7563
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person;
Case No.: CV 06-02855
Plaintiff,
v.

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;

AFFIDA VIT OF REED TAYLOR IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' AlA
SERVICES AND AlA INSURANCE'S
12(b)(6) MOTION

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
AFFIDA VIT OF REED TAYLOR IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS - 1

)
) ss:
)

OR IGIN l
..• .

..

.

I, Reed Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, am competent to testify in court, and

am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. This Affidavit is based upon my personal
knowledge.
2.

Until December 2006, I was unaware that significant assets of AlA

Insurance were being used to benefit other entities controlled or owned by John Taylor
without AIA Insurance or AlA Services receiving appropriate ownership interest or
compensation.
3.

Since filing my complaint against the Defendants in this action, I have

continued to receive $7,500 two times each month from AlA Services. In addition, AlA
Services has continued to pay the salaries for my ranch hand and pilot and pay other
miscellaneous expenses for me as it has in the past as interest payments.
4.

Every year since I sold my shares in AlA Services, I have received a 1099

from AlA Services for interest paid to me on my $6,000,000 promissory note.
5.

Prior to August 1, 2005, I had never exercised my right to accelerate

payment of all principal and interest due under the $6,000,000 promissory note.
6.

At no time through the date of this Affidavit has AlA Insurance, AlA

Services or any of the Defendants demanded that I release my

uee Financing Statement

filed with the Idaho Secretary of State which was filed to protect my security interest in
the commissions of AlA Services and AlA Insurance.
7.

At no time through the date of this Affidavit did any of the Defendants in

this action advise me that they were no longer obligated to me under the terms of the
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$6,000,000 Promissory Note, the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, Amended
and Restated Stock Pledge. Agreement or Amended and Restated Security Agreement
because the statute of limitations had run (all of the foregoing agreements are Exhibits A,
B, C, and E to the Hearing on Preliminary Injunction, respectively).
8.

At no time through the date of this Affidavit did any of the Defendants ask

me or demand that I release my security interest in the shares pledged to me under the
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
9.

Until my attorney Roderick Bond advised me in or about December 2006

of AlA Insurance's purchase of the preferred shares of AIA Services for over $1,500,000,
I had no knowledge of any specifics of the transaction or that this money had been
inappropriately transferred to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. without my consent as
the creditor with a perfected security interest in the funds.
10.

I relied on the financial statements provided to me over the years that the

Defendants were lawfully operating AlA Services and AlA Insurance in accordance with
legal requirements and duties.
11.

John Taylor falsely represented to me in a written letter dated February 27,

2001, that Crop USA was developed by AlA Insurance. I learned shortly before filing
my complaint in this action that neither AlA Insurance nor AlA Services has any
ownership interest in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. I also expended significant time
and assets assisting to develop Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. under the
representation that it was part of AlA Insurance or AlA Services. Shortly before filing
this lawsuit, I ascertained that my brother John Taylor and Connie Taylor owned almost
40% of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.

Finally, John Taylor falsely represented to
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me that he would be foregoing his salary from AlA Services during certain time periods.
I found out in late December 2006 or early January 2007 that John Taylor had been paid
significant compensation during the time in which he represented that he would not take a
salary.
12.

John Taylor, personally and as Chairman and President of AlA Services

and AlA Insurance, always represented to me that AlA Services and AlA Insurance were
being operated properly. At no time did John Taylor or any of the other Defendants
advise me that funds, assets, personnel, facilities and the like of AlA Insurance and/or
AlA Services were being improperly utilized for the benefit of other entities which
neither AlA Services nor AlA Insurance held no beneficial ownership or received no
compensation.
13.

I relied on representations from John Taylor, Chairman and President of

AlA Insurance and AlA Services, that Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. was being
operated for the benefit of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance. Until the weeks prior to
filing my complaint, I had no knowledge that AlA Insurance and AlA Services owned no
interest in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. These representations were particularly
important to me because of the significant sums of money owed to me.
14.

Shortly after October 7, 2005, my accountant, Ernie Dantini, forwarded an

email to me that was sent to him from John Taylor. In the email sent on October 7, 2005,
John Taylor discussed various aspects of obligations owed to me and possible events
which could transpire if! put AlA Insurance into default. John Taylor's October 7, 2005,
email is attached as Exhibit AI to the March 1, 2007, Affidavit of Ernie Dantini. I relied
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on John Taylor's representations (personally and as Chairman and CEO of AlA Services
and AlA Insurance) that my rights under the various agreements were intact.
15.

I relied on the fact AlA Services and AlA Insurance were paying interest

payments to me that their obligations under the Promissory Note, Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended and Restated Security Agreement, and Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement were intact and enforceable against them by the
terms of the foregoing agreements.
16.

Global Travel was formerly a tenant of AlA Insurance in the Lewis-Clark

Plaza Office Building. In the past few weeks, I noticed that Global Travel has now
moved into a building owned by John Taylor. To my knowledge, there is not a new
tenant to replace Global Travel and every dollar of rental income is important to AlA
Insurance.

At no point in time through the date of this Affidavit did any of the

Defendants ask for my authorization or consent to transfer a paying tenant of AlA
Insurance or AlA Services to a building owned by John Taylor.
DATED: This 28 th day of May, 2007.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28 th day of May, 2007.

j~<s~

Notary Public for the S1;ate of Idaho
Residing at: Lew ~
My commission expires:
q -"/,.;).
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JONATHAN D. HALLY
CLARK and FEENEY
Idaho State Bar No. 4979
1229 Main Street
P. O. Drawer 285
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9516
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160
Attorneys for Defendant Connie Taylor
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
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REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

12
13

vs.

14

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person
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DEFENDANT CONNIE TAYLOR'S
JOINDER IN MOTION TO DISMISS
FILED BY AlA SERVICES
CORPORATION AND AlA
INSURANCE, INC.

Defendant.

20

21

COMES NOW the defendant Connie Taylor, by and through her attorney of record, Jonathan

22

Hally of the law firm of Clark and Feeney, and hereby joins in the Motion to Dismiss filed by AlA

23

Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. Further defendant Connie Taylor moves for dismissal
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pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(e) due to the plaintiffs failure to comply with this Court's Order for More

1

2
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Definite Statement.
DATED this 30 th day of May, 2007.
CLARK and FEENEY
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an D. Hally, an associate of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Connie W. Taylor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30 th day of May, 2007, I caused to be served a true and
1 correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
2 following:

3
4
5

6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21

Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith and Cannon
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for Reed Taylor

~
D
D

m

Paul R. Cressman, Jr.
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
999 Third Ave., Ste. 3100
Seattle, WA 98104
Attorneys for Reed Taylor

~

Michael McNichols
Clements, Brown & McNichols
321 13 th Street
PO Box 1510
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorneys for R. John Taylor

0/1
D

David A. Gittins
Law Offices of David A. Gittins
843 7th Street
PO Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorneys for Duclos and Freeman

D
D
~

D
.~.

~
D
D

9?I

}Q
Gary D. Babbitt
D
D. John Ashby
D
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
)<2
P.O. Box 1617
Boise,ID 83701-1617
Attorneys for AlA Services and AlA Insurance

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)
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Attorneys for Defendant Connie W. Taylor
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RODERICK C. BOND
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088
Telephone: (206) 287-9900
Fax: (206) 287-9902
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-07-00208

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; AIA INSURANCE,
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR,
individually and the community property
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN,
a single person; and JOLEE DUCLOS,
a single person,

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

Defendants.

Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor submits this Third Amended Complaint against the
Defendants alleging as follows:
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I. PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.1

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed") is a single person and a resident of

Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho.
1.2

Defendant AlA Services Corporation ("AlA Services") is an Idaho

corporation with its principal place of business located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County,
Idaho.
1.3

Defendant AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AlA Insurance") is

an Idaho

corporation with its principal place of business is located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County,
Idaho. AlA Insurance is a wholly owned subsidiary of AlA Services.
1.4

Defendants R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor, were husband and wife

during most of the relevant times (collectively "John") and are residents of Lewiston,
Nez Perce County, Idaho.
1.5

Defendant JoLee Duclos ("Duclos")

IS

a single person residing

Il1

Clarkston, Washington.
1.6

Defendants Bryan Freeman ("Freeman") is a single person residing in

Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho.
1.7

The District Court has jurisdiction over thi s matter under I.C. § 1-705.

1.8

Venue is proper in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez

Perce County pursuant to I.C. § 5-404.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2.1

R. John Taylor is, and was at all relevant times, an officer and director of

AIA Services and AlA Insurance. John is the majority shareholder in AIA Services.

1/1
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2.2

R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor were divorced through an Interlocutory

Decree filed on December 16, 2005, under which only a portion of their community
assets were divided and other property remains undivided. This action includes, but is
not limited to, transactions, debts, claims, and/or causes of action which accrued prior to
R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor's dissolution and property subject to their dissolution,
and all community property subject to their dissolution. R. John Taylor's actions were
taken on behalf of himself and his marital community.

All references to "John" in this

Complaint are for claims, acts, omissions and liabilities incurred by R. John Taylor on
behalf of the marital community ofR. John Taylor and Connie Taylor, together with their
community property, whether divided or not by the December 16, 2005, dissolution
decree. Connie Taylor is named as a party in this action for her derivative liability by
virtue of her marriage to R. John Taylor and her interest in the community property of the
marriage all of which is subject to liability for the allegations in this Complaint of the
acts, omissions, and conduct ofR. John Taylor.
2.3

Duclos is, and was at all relevant times, an officer and director of AIA

Services and AlA Insurance. Duclos is a shareholder in AlA Services.
2.4

Freeman is, and was at all relevant times, a director of AlA Services and

AlA Insurance. Freeman is a shareholder in AIA Services.
2.5

Reed was the founder and majority shareholder of AlA Services. In 1995,

John desired to redeem Reed's 613,494 shares of common stock in AIA Services through
a stock redemption agreement. Upon the closing of the transaction of AlA Services'
redemption of Reed's shares, John became the majority shareholder in AlA Services.

III

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT - 3

7/~

2.6

AIA Insurance, a subsidiary of AIA Services, is wholly owned by AlA

Services and where virtually all of AlA Services' revenues are derived. AlA Insurance is
lessee of the office building located at III Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho.
2.7

On or about July 22, 1995, AIA Services and Reed entered into a Stock

Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement. Under the
terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement and related agreements, AlA Services agreed
to execute promissory note to timely pay Reed $1,500,000 Million in 90 days ("Down
Payment Note") and $6,000,000, plus accrued interest due and payable monthly at the
rate of 814% per annum ("Promissory Note").
2.8

The Promissory Note was executed by John on behalf of AlA Services on

or about August 1, 1995. Under the terms of the Promissory Note, AlA Services was
required to timely pay all accrued interest monthly to Reed and the principal amount of
$6 Million was due and payable on or before August 1, 2005.
2.9

Under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement, AlA Services and

AIA Insurance also agreed to contemporaneously execute a Security Agreement and
Stock Pledge Agreement, among other agreements and documents.

The Stock

Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement were all
either authorized by the Board of Directors of AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance and/or
approved by a shareholder vote.
2.10

When AIA Services was unable to comply with the Stock Redemption

Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement, John (on behalf of AlA
Services) entered into negotiations with Reed regarding restructuring the obligations. In
1996, AIA Services, AlA Insurance and Reed agreed to modify the Stock Redemption
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Agreement and executed the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement ("Restructure
Agreement"). Contemporaneously with the execution of the Restructure Agreement, the
parties executed an Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement ("Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement") and an Amended and Restated Security Agreement ("Amended
Security Agreement"). The Down Payment Note remained unpaid at this time and AIA
Services was in default.
2.11

Under the terms of the Restructure Agreement, the terms of the

Promissory Note remained unchanged and were not modified (including the $6,000,000
principal amount, due date, and required monthly interest payments). Under the terms of
the Amended Security Agreement, Reed received a security interest in all of AIA
Services and AlA Insurance's commissions and AIA Services and AlA Insurance were
required to have a Lock Box for all commissions for the benefit of Reed.
2.12

Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AlA Services

pledged all the outstanding shares in AlA Insurance to Reed as partial security for AIA
Services' indebtedness to Reed under the agreements. Under the terms of the Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement, AIA Services' failure to timely pay Reed interest or principal
under the Promissory Note or Down Payment Note constituted an Event of Default. In an
Event of Default for failure to timely pay interest or principal under the Promissory Note,
AlA Services' insolvency, or AlA Services' failure to maintain the required Lock Box
(among other Events of Default), AlA Services right to vote the pledged shares of AlA
Insurance ceased and terminated and vested exclusively in Reed.
2.13

Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Reed was

required to be a member of the board of directors of AlA Services until Reed was paid in
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full or sufficient security was posted to ensure the payment of the Promissory Note. AlA
Services never posted bonds or other security for the payment of the Promissory Note. In
excess of six years, AlA Services, John, Duclos and/or Freeman have intentionally
refused to appoint Reed to the Board as required. Despite Reed's demands and AlA
Services' contractual obligations to keep Reed on the Board, AIA Services, John, Duclos
and/or Freeman have refused to appoint Reed to the Board of Directors of AIA Services
as required. Because Reed has not been on the Board as required, all actions taken by
AIA Services' Board were not properly authorized and, therefore, not ratified by AIA
Services; and such acts are the personal actions of John, Duclos and/or Freeman during
their tenure on the Board of AlA Services.
2.14

Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AlA Services agreed to not

loan money to any affiliate other than a wholly owned subsidiary. AIA Services has
loaned money to or provided other services or benefits to affiliates and other parties in
violation of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, and such loans or benefits were made
during times in which John, Duclos and Freeman were Board members.
2.15

During all relevant times, Reed was the largest and only significant

creditor of AIA Services. Because AlA Services has failed to timely and properly pay
Reed as required during all relevant times, John, Duclos and/or Freeman owe Reed
special obligations because of his status as AlA Services' largest creditor.
2.16

During all relevant times, the value of AlA Services was less than the

aggregate amount of its debts, which constitutes AIA Services' insolvency. During all
relevant times, AIA Services was in default of various provisions of the agreements with
Reed, insolvent and/or unable to timely pay its debts to Reed. During all relevant times,
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AIA Services has failed to comply with the terms of the Promissory Note.
2.17

Instead of timely paying Reed as required, AIA Services, AlA Insurance,

John, Duclos, and/or Freeman utilized funds that Reed had a security interest in to make
investments in, transfer assets to, or loan money to, or provide services on behalf of John
and/or entities operated and/or partially owned by John.
2.18

On or about December 12, 2006, Reed provided AIA Services written

notice of default under various provisions of the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement, including, without limitation,
AlA Services' failure to pay principal and interest due under the Promissory Note, failure
to maintain the Lock Box, loaning money to non-wholly owned subsidiaries (including
guaranteeing the $15 Million revolving line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance Agency,
Inc.), failure to provide and timely provide all required fmancial information, among
other defaults. AIA Services and AIA Insurance have failed to timely cure the defaults
and all applicable cure periods have expired. As of the date of this Second Amended
Complaint, the principal owed to Reed under the Promissory Note of $6,000,000, plus
accrued interest of over $2,000,000 had not been paid in full as required.
2.19

Despite Reed's demands, AlA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Freeman,

and/or Duclos have failed to comply with the terms of the Restructure Agreement,
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement. Under the
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, the right to vote all of AlA Insurance's shares ceased
and terminated for AlA Services and became vested in Reed when AlA Services failed to
timely pay the required monthly interest payments due under the Promissory Note and its
subsequent failure to pay the $6,000,000 principal due under the Promissory Note on
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August 1, 2005, as well as when AlA Services committed other Defaults under the
various agreements. AlA Services was in default long before Reed demanded to exercise
his right to hold a special shareholder meeting to vote the shares to appoint a new board
of directors for AIA Insurance.
2.20

On December 12, 2006, Reed timely provided notice of his demand for a

special shareholder meeting of AIA Insurance for the purpose of removing and
appointing new board members on December 26, 2006. AlA Services, AlA Insurance,
John, Duclos and/or Freeman refused to comply with Reed's demand for a special
shareholder meeting by representing that AlA Insurance's offices were closed on
December 26, 2006.
2.21

Through a letter dated January 3,2007, John stated "I fully recognize that

[Reed] Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate, including calling a special
shareholders meeting."
2.22

On or about January 25, 2007, Reed hand delivered another demand for a

special shareholder meeting for the removal and appointment of the board of directors for
February 5, 2007, pursuant to his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
Through a letter from Duclos, AlA Insurance refused Reed's request and denied that he
had the right to call a meeting to vote the AlA shares. Despite Reed's demands, AIA
Insurance refused to hold a special shareholder meeting.
2.23

Despite Reed's demands, AIA Services and AlA Insurance failed to cure

the numerous Defaults under the terms of the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement, among other obligations (as
described above).

Through the date of this Second Amended Complaint, AIA Services
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and AIA Insurance's Defaults were not timely cured and they remained in Default.
2.24

On February 22, 2007, Reed exercised his right to vote the pledged shares

by executing a Consent in Lieu of Special Shareholder Meeting of AlA Insurance
removing John, Duclos and Freeman from the Board of Directors and appointed himself
the sole Board Member, pursuant to his right to vote the pledged shares under the
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. Because AIA Services' right to vote the pledged
shares had ceased and terminated when it became in Default and failed to cure such
Defaults, the right to vote the pledged shares in AIA Insurance vested exclusively in
Reed and he exercised his right to vote the pledged shares pursuant to the Amended
Stock Pledge Agreement and the Articles of Incorporation of AIA Insurance. Because
the shares pledged to Reed account for all the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance, Reed
had the authority to waive the notice requirement, notice period, and the formality of
holding a shareholder meeting.
2.25

In the weeks leading up to the filing of this action, Reed discovered that

more than one transfer of assets occurred during the time in which AlA Services had
failed to service its debt to Reed. In 2004, AIA Insurance paid $1,510,693 to purchase
Series C Preferred Shares in AIA Services from Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., an
entity in which John was the single largest shareholder (John holds approximately 40% of
the outstanding shares in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.).

This transaction

inappropriately and/or fraudulently transferred $1,510,693 of AIA Insurance's funds to
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. when such funds should have been tendered to Reed
and/or used to pay the holder of the Series A Preferred Shares in AIA Services. This
$1,510,693 transfer occurred at a time in which AlA Services was insolvent and when it
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was in Default on the monthly payments of interest due to Reed under the Promissory
Note. This $1,510,693 transfer also occuned at the same time that AlA Services' 401(k)
Plan (the "Plan") held over $750,000 in Prefened C Shares in AIA Services. No shares
were purchased or redeemed from the Plan, even though John and Duclos were the CoTrustees of the Plan at the time of the transfer.
2.26

Reed also discovered that John had purchased a parking lot and entered

into a lease agreement with AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance to lease the parking lot
from him for $1,250 per month. This transaction was also the transfer of funds to John,
funds which should have been paid to Reed during a time in which AlA Services was
unable to service its debt to Reed and was otherwise insolvent. The parking lot is not
even utilized by AIA Insurance or AIA Services.

There are other transfers and/or

transactions which Reed will itemize and detail at trial.
2.27

Based upon the above-referenced acts, transfers and transactions, together

with transactions referenced in the foot notes to AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance's
financial statements, there are other unauthorized and inappropriate transfers, loans,
payments, advances and other actions which occuned during times AIA Services defaults
and inability to timely pay Reed and at times in which AIA Services was insolvent.
Upon information and belief, Reed believes that forensic accounting and further scrutiny
of AIA Insurance and AlA Services books and records will reveal additional improper
activities.
2.28

John has used AIA Services and AlA as his personal source of funds

and/or assets, including, without limitation, acts in which John has transfened assets to
their name; taken advances that John never paid back; transfened assets and/or funds to
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other entities partially owned or controlled by John; entered into transactions which
constitute a violation of AIA Services' Articles of Incorporation; made transfers and/or
entered into transactions which benefited John and/or anyone or more of the other
Defendants; and provided services for entities partially owned by John and/or anyone or
more of the other Defendants without such actions being arms-length transactions. The
above acts occurred when John, Duclos, and Freeman were directors and/or officers of
AIA Services and AIA Insurance. All of the above acts occurred during times in which
AIA Services was not current with payments to Reed under the Promissory Note, in
Default of other provisions, and insolvent.
2.29

On February 22, 2007 (after executing the Consent in Lieu of Special

Shareholder Meeting), Reed executed a Consent in Lieu of Board Meeting to terminate
all officers, the employment of John, authorize the change of locks, and take such other
actions deemed appropriate. When Reed attempted to take action in accordance with the
Consents described above, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman
refused to abide by the Consents.
2.30

Donna Taylor, the holder of the Series A Preferred Shares in AlA

Services, subordinated all of her rights to payment of the redemption of her shares in
favor ofthe Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor.

III. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION-BREACHES OF CONTRACT
3.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
3.2

AlA Services, AIA Insurance and/or John's acts and/or omissions and

failure to pay Reed the amounts owed and/or comply with the Promissory Note,
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and Restructure
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Agreement constitute a breach of their contractual obligations owed to Reed.

AIA

Services, AlA Insurance, and/or John's acts and/or omissions constitute the breach of
obligations owed to Reed under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement, Restructure Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, and monies owed to
Reed.
3.3

As a result of AlA Services, AlA Insurance and/or John's acts and/or

omissions which constitute numerous breaches of contractual obligations, Reed has
suffered and is entitled to damages of $6,000,000, plus accrued interest in excess of
$2,000,000, in an exact amount to be determined at trial to be allocated between the
defendants as the evidence and claims show at trial.

In addition, Reed is entitled to an

award of attorneys' fees and costs as under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-12l.

IV. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION-FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
4.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
4.2

The

Defendants'

actions

constitute

fraudulent

transfers

and/or

conveyances under I.e. § 55-901, et seq. and/or the common Jaw doctrine of Fraudulent
Conveyances.
4.3

As a result of John, Duclos and/or Freeman's participation in the

fraudulent transfers, John, Duclos and/or Freeman should be personally liable for all
fraudulent transfers, plus accrued interest, in an amount to be proved at trial.
fraudulent transfers should be avoided and/or rescinded, and all assets placed

All
III

a

constructive trust for the benefit of Reed.
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V. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION-MISREPRESENTATIONS/FRAUD
5.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
5.2

AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Freeman, and/or Duclos made

statements of fact regarding pay, finances, transfer(s), loan guarantees, and/or services
provided to other entities, transaction(s), payment of debts to Reed, and/or rights granted
to Reed by AIA Services or AIA Insurance; such statements of fact were false; such false
statements were material; AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman
knew or should have known the falsity of such statements; AlA Services, AlA Insurance,
John, Duclos and/or Freeman intended to induce reliance; Reed was ignorant to the
falsity of such statements; and Reed relied on such statements; Reed had a right to rely on
such false statements.
5.3

As a result of AlA Services, AlA, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman's acts,

false statements, and/or omissions, Reed was damaged as consequence or proximate
result of such acts, false statements, and/or omissions.
VI. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONVERSION
6.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
6.2

AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman's conduct

constitutes the willful interference with Reed's property and money which should have
been paid to him, without lawful justification, which deprived Reed of the possession of
such money and/or property.
1//
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6.3

As a result of the AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or

Freeman's acts and/or conduct, Reed has been severely damaged and is entitled to
damages proven at trial.

VII. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ALTER EGO
7.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
7.2

Because of the fraudulent, wrongful and/or inappropriate acts and/or

omissions of John, Duclos, Freeman and/or other shareholders of AlA Services, the
corporate veil of AlA Services should be pierced thereby holding John, Duclos, and/or
Freeman and/or certain shareholders of AIA Services personally liable for all
indebtedness to Reed as equity requires such action.

VIII. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION-EQUITABLE INDEMNIFICATION
8.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
8.2

Donna Taylor is the holder of Series A Preferred Shares in AlA Services,

and such shares were issued to her as a result of a dissolution action between her and
Reed. If not for AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman's
fraudulent, wrongful and/or inappropriate acts, Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares
would have been redeemed by AlA Services and/or AIA. As of the date of this Second
Amended Complaint, over $500,000 must be paid to Donna Taylor to redeem her Series
A Preferred Shares.
8.3

Reed is entitled to be equitably indemnified by AIA Services, John,

Duclos and/or Freeman for any sums owed to DOlma Taylor because of AlA Services'
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failure to timely redeem her Series A Preferred Shares as required.
IX. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ACCOUNT STATEDIMONIES DUE
9.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
9.2

In or about 2002 or 2003, John owed AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance

at least $307,271. In order to extinguish John's liabilities to AlA Services and/or AlA
Insurance, John debited Reed's Promissory Note with a payment of at least $307,271 and
credited John's indebtedness with a payment of at least $307,271. John did not obtain
Reed's approval or consent to transfer funds between John's indebtedness and Reed's
Promissory Note and John has not tendered payment of these funds to Reed. This debt
constitutes a personal loan from Reed to John. This account stated andlor debt remains
unpaid, along with any others which may have occurred but which Reed is unaware of at
this time, the dates and exact amount of which will be proven at trial.
9.3

Reed is entitled to the payment of all amounts owed by John as a result of

all transfers between Reed's Promissory Note and John indebtedness from AlA Services
and/or AlA Insurance. Reed is also entitled to pre-judgment interest on all amounts owed
to him by John for all such accounts stated and/or debts from the date of such transfers
until payment in full is made to Reed.
9.4

As a direct and/or proximate result of John's acts and/or omissions, John

are in breach oftheir obligations to pay Reed and Reed is entitled to damages.
III
III
III
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X. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-UNJUST ENRICHMENT
10.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
10.2

AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman have retained

the benefit of their fraudulent, wrongful, improper and/or overreaching conduct and/or
transfers.
10.3

John and/or anyone or more of the other Defendants would be unjustly

enriched if allowed to retain the benefit of the assets, securities, loans, advances and/or
other services received through AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, all of which funds
should have been paid to Reed.
XI. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST

11.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
11.2

Reed has a valid security interest in AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's

commissions, among other security interests. AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos
and/or Freeman fraudulently, wrongfully and/or improperly used funds, which should
have been paid to Reed, for investments, personal use, inappropriate transactions, loans,
advances, self-dealing, and/or other wrongful and/or inappropriate purposes.
11.3

AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman's acts and/or

omissions resulted in John, Duclos and/or Freeman's acquisition of money, securities
and/or services which should have been paid to Reed but through their fraud,
misrepresentation(s), bad faith, and/or overreaching activities; and AlA Services, John,
Duclos, Freeman, and/or other entities' retention of the money, investments, securities

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT - 16

and property would be unjust.
11.4

Reed requests the imposition of a constructive trust for his benefit to

recover the proceeds of all such fraudulent, overreaching, improper, self-dealing,
wrongful andJor inappropriate transfers, acts andJor omissions.

XII. NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION-DIRECTOR LIABILITY
12.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
12.2

John, Duclos and Freeman should be held personally liable for all

fraudulent, wrongful, improper, overreaching transactions, transfers, loans, advances,
loan guarantees and fraudulent conveyances which occurred during their tenure as
member of the Board of Directors and as officers of AlA Service and AIA Insurance.

XIII. TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
13.1

Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action.
13.2

Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security

Agreement, and Restructure Agreement, Reed is entitled to vote the pledged shares of
AIA Insurance (and all ancillary rights, including, without limitation, to vote the shares to
remove the board and take all actions related in any way to his right to vote the pledged
shares), sell the shares of AlA Insurance at public or private sale, judicially sell the
pledged shares in AIA Insurance, entitled to timely receive audited financial statements
and financial information, andJor seize all of the AlA Insurance and AlA Services'
commissions in the required Lock Box. When AlA Services became in Default, it lost its
right to vote the pledged shares of AlA Insurance and the right vested exclusively in
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Reed.
13.3

Despite Reed's demands for AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos

andior Freeman to comply with the provisions in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement,
Amended Security Agreement and Restructure Agreement, AlA Services, AIA Insurance,
John, Duclos andior Freeman have refused to comply. Reed is entitled to the relief
afforded to him or reasonably contemplated under the foregoing agreements and such
other rights, remedies andior relief as may be available under Idaho Code, including,
without limitation, any action or order authorized under

I.e.

§ 30-1-701 et seq. andior

Chapter 9 of Title 29 under Idaho Code.
13.4

Reed is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred, at or

before trial, in enforcing any provision of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement,
Amended Security Agreement, andior Restructure Agreement for relief sought before or
at trial.
XIV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Without waiving any claims, rights andior remedies under any of the abovereferenced agreements, Reed respectfully requests the following relief:
14.1

For a judgment against AIA Services for the principal of $6,000,000, plus

accrued pre-jUdgment interest in excess of $2,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at
trial.
14.2

For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining any of the

Defendants from preventing Reed from exercising his right under the Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement to vote the pledged shares in AlA Insurance and taking any ancillary
actions which relate in any way to voting the pledged shares, including, without
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limitation, removing the board of directors of AlA Insurance and appointing a revised
board and such other actions he deems appropriate in his sole discretion as the exclusive
person entitled to vote all the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance.
14.3

For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining any of the

Defendants from interfering with the actions taken pursuant to the February 22, 2007,
Consent in Lieu of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Insurance and the actions
taken pursuant to the February 22, 2007, Consent in Lieu of Meeting of Board of
Directors of AIA Insurance.
14.4

For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the Defendants and

any entity owned, partially owned or operated by anyone or more of them from
interfering with, disturbing, and transferring any of AlA insurance's customers, contracts,
agreements and business.
14.5

Until such time that Reed Taylor's vote of the pledged shares is honored

and he is permitted to operate AlA Insurance, Reed Taylor requests a preliminary and
permanent injunction against the Defendants as follows:
(a) Enjoining the Defendants from utilizing, transferring or disposing of
any funds, assets, labor, facilities or services of AIA Insurance for any
other person, entity or business, unless such transactions are armslength and payment is received by AlA Insurance prior to providing
such funds, assets, labor, facilities or services (e.g., no credit
arrangements for such activities).
(b) Enjoining the Defendants from disposing of, usmg, transferring or
utilizing any of the funds received from the lawsuit entitled In re:
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Universe Liquidator Grain Growers Trust, et a1. v. Idaho Department
of Insurance aJkla GGMIT suit. All funds from the foregoing should
be held in trust until further notice from the Court.
(c) Enjoining the Defendants from negotiating or entering into any loans,
credit arrangements, credit facilities, or borrowing any funds under
any loan, line-of-credit, credit facility, open account and the like for
which AlA Insurance is a guarantor or a signatory, unless utilized for
the exclusive benefit of AlA Insurance to provide funding for AlA
Insurance and approved by Reed Taylor or such other party appointed
by Reed Taylor or the Court.
(d) Enjoining the Defendants from destroying, altering, deleting, purging,
and/or removing

any

documents

(including drafts,

proposals,

electronic files, email, back-up media and the like), property,
computers and the like from AIA Insurance's office.
(e) Enjoining the Defendants from advancing or lending any funds, assets
or services to R. John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie
Taylor or AIA Services without first obtaining written consent from
Reed Taylor or the Court.
(f) Enjoining the Defendants from entering into or negotiating any

substantive contracts or agreements without first obtaining approval
from Reed Taylor or the Court.
(g) Enjoining the Defendants from holding, calling or participating in any
shareholder meetings, board meeting, and/or executing any Consents
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in Lieu of the foregoing without pennitting Reed Taylor to vote the
pledged shares or take such other action pennitted to him as the holder
of the right to vote all outstanding shares of AlA Insurance.
(h) Enjoining the Defendants from using or transferring any funds, assets,
or services of AlA Insurance for the purpose of providing any retainers
or payments for the legal services for R. John Taylor, Bryan Freeman,
JoLee Duclos, and Connie Taylor.
(i) Enjoining R. John Taylor to only be entitled to reasonable
compensation for work perfonned for AlA Insurance.

R. John

Taylor's time expended for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and any
other entities partially owned by him shall be paid by the appropriate
entity and not AlA Insurance or AIA Services.

G)

Enjoining the Defendants from not having AlA Insurance and AIA
Services accurately and properly itemizing every employee's daily
time sheet to reflect the number ofhour(s) perfonned for AlA Services
and AlA Insurance and such other unrelated entities such as Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc. and Sound Insurance.

(k) Enjoining the Defendants from such other actions as may be
reasonably contemplated from this Second Amended Complaint, the
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, the Amended Security Agreement,
the Restructure Agreement and/or which would otherwise protect Reed
Taylor's interests.
III
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14.6

For a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants

requiring them to timely and promptly provide Reed Taylor with all financial information
required under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement.
14.7

For a preliminary and pennanent injunction enjoining John from entering

the offices of AlA Insurance, ifnecessary.
14.8

For such other relief or Court orders as Reed may request before or at trial

to enforce his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security
Agreement, and/or Restructure Agreement, including, without limitation, any action or
order authorized under I.C. § 30-1-701 et seq. and/or Chapter 9 of Title 29 under Idaho
Code.
14.9

For the avoidance of the improper and/or fraudulent transfers of funds,

assets and/or services from AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance to John, entities partially
owned by John, and/or any other party who received such transfers under I.C. § 55-916,
et seq. and/or other applicable legal authority.

14.10 For judgment against John for $307,271, plus accrued interest for the
money he owed AlA Services which was improperly paid by transferring his
indebtedness to Reed's Promissory Note.
14.11 For judgment against Connie Taylor to the fullest extent of her derivative
liability by virtue of her marriage to R. John Taylor and her interest in the community
property in an amount to be proven at the time of trial.
14.l2 For a judgment against John for all amounts, plus pre-jUdgment interest, in
an amount to be proven at the time oftrial.
14.13 For judgment against John, Duclos, and/or Freeman, jointly and severally,
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for all funds, assets, services, property and/or any other benefit fraudulently transferred
andJor fraudulently conveyed, and which such transferred may not be avoided, rescinded
andJor paid to Reed.
14.14 For judgment against John, Duclos and/or Freeman, jointly and severally,
for amounts owed to Reed in an amount to be proven at the time of trial because AlA
Services and AlA Insurance are alter egos of John, Duclos andlor Freeman.
14.15 For the imposition of a construction trust for the benefit of Reed on all
funds, investments, loans, advances, securities, property, transactions, services and/or
self-dealing which were fraudulently, wrongfully andlor improperly made for the benefit
of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Duclos, Freeman, John, andlor other parties or entities,
which sums should have been paid to Reed.
14.16 For a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants from
transferring, encumbering or otherwise disposing of any improperly and/or fraudulently
obtained and/or transferred assets under

I.e.

§ 55-916, et seq. andJor other applicable

legal authority.
14.17 For judgment and/or relief for all claims which conform to the evidence
obtained through discovery and/or forensic accounting.
14.18 For an award of Reed's attorneys' fees and costs as under the Promissory
Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, I.e. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-121.

II/
III

II/
/11
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14.19 For such other relief as Reed may request before or at the time of trial
and/or that the Court may find just, equitable, or warranted before or at the time oftrial.
DATED this 31 sl day of May, 2007.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC

By: _ _ _~,,--:~,,--_ _ _ _ _ __
Roderic
Paul R. ressman, Jr.
Ned A. Cannon
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Third Amended Complaint on the following party(s) via the
methodes) indicated below:
David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 - l3 th Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
eX) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
e ) Facsimile

Jonathan D. Halley
Clark & Feeney
P.O. Box 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AlA Services and AIA Insurance

Via:
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile (208) 342-3829

Signed this 31 st day of May, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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